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Summary 
This study focuses on three topics in the behaviour of smaller manufacturing 
firms using theories from industrial economics as theoretical benchmarks. The 
study takes as its starting point the perspective of the individual enterprise rather 
than that of an industry or a market. For the study a considerable amount of new 
data was collected by interviewing about 80 small business managers in Finland 
up to three times by the end of 1997. The first of the three parts of the study 
considers the adoption of an export strategy. The non-linear econometric model 
adopted suggests that the adoption of an export strategy in small firms is in 
particularly influenced by the language skills of entrepreneurs, and has become 
faster over time. The second chapter provides insights into the differentiation 
behaviour of industrial small firms. At the individual firm's level, vertical 
differentiation seems to have a special weight since horizontal differentiation is 
often limited by the requirement of technical compatibility, and because 
improving quality is perceived to incorporate lower risk than differentiation 
based on taste differences between customers. The third chapter studies exiting 
from export markets using the case-study method of research. There is no strong 
case for, or against, the export hysteresis in the data, and thus one can argue that 
the behaviour of the firms has been largely in accordance with the standard 
theory of a competitive industry. The lack of an explicit export strategy and 
concentration on exports to one country seem to contribute to exit where the 
nature of exporting can be described as opportunistic. Overall, the firm-level 
study presented here suggests the relevance of further studies using models of 
diffusion of innovations to theorize small business exporting and to taking better 
into consideration of an individual firm's perspective in studies on product 




This is an empirical study in industrial economics on smaller manufacturing 
firms in Finland. In recent years, the supporting of the preconditions for the 
operations of small businesses has become an increasingly important part of the 
industrial policy in Finland (see MTI 1993, Koskinen and Virtanen 1998). An 
indication of this is the establishment of the first SME Policy Programme in 
1993. In the sequel to the economics crisis in the early years of the 1990s, 
smaller firms have received special attention because of their supposed impact on 
employment and the balance of trade. At the same time the ever more 
internationalised operational environments of firms, reinforced by Finland's 
decision to join the European Union in 1995, has set new challenges for many 
smaller firms. In essence, these challenges concern competitiveness and 
internationalization, with which two concepts this thesis generally speaking 
deals. lp 
The study focuses on the decisions to export (chapter I), product differentiation 
(chapter II) and exit from export markets (chapter III). The conduct of the study 
has perhaps not been the cheapest - or indeed the easiest - way of doing a PhD 
study. Certainly, though, it has been one of the most informative concerning the 
operations of small firms. The data for the study has been collected by 
interviewing about 80 small business managers for 2-3 times in Finland, in 
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1992,1996 and 1997. This effort is typified not only by the number of face-to- 
face interviews or the 25.000 kms on the road to reach the firms, but, in winter, 
temperatures of less than -30 degrees C (! ). Due to the nature of this survey data 
the perspective of the study is to a large degree that of an individual, decision- 
making firm, rather than that of an industry or other group of firms as is the usual 
basis for microeconomic analysis (for the neglegted point of view of an 
individual firm in microeconomic analysis, see Kay 1991). 
Generally speaking, the use of survey data in economic analyses has been more 
common in the labour economics - where the questionnaire approach is used to 
collect data on individuals' characteristics - than in research in industrial 
economics. The general aversion of industrial economists to questionnaire 
approaches probably is due to the difficulty to accept the fact that survey data, 
rather than "hard" data can be used to examine theories. In particular, 
individuals' opinions are (taken as) biased views, i. e., they cannot evaluate their 
own position objectively. On the other hand, one can argue that for examining 
some economic theories empirically, questionnaire approaches are essential. 
Waterson (1997) points to a no less important example than the utility 
maximization principle, which only partially can be tested through "revealed 
preferences". Through the questionnaire approach it is possible to "capture 
actions which result in things not happening - entry not taking place or rivals not 
doing well, for example" (Singh et al. 1998,231). One can also complement the 
view of other approaches to the same phenomenon by the questionnaire 
16 
approach, as Singh et al. (1998), for example, in their study on the strategic 
behaviour of incumbent firms do. 
The survey data of this study is collected in semi-structured and face-to-face 
interviews of business managers. As a source of evidence interviews are 
insightful because they are directly focused on the topic and reveal perceived 
causal inferences. On the other hand, interviews as a source of evidence has its 
weaknesses, such as response bias, inaccuracy due to poor recall and reflexivity 
(See Yin 1994 and Eisenhardt 1989. ) This study has paid special attention to the 
data collection stage to avoid these problems: the business managers were 
interviewed more than once, the data was corroborated through cross-checking it 
against data from the earlier interviews and written material obtained from the 
firms, and the interview material is confidential. Another benefit of the interview 
method often is a high response rate: given that they were still in operation, 94 
percent of the firms interviewed in 1992 were re-interviewed in 1996. 
As to the methods of analysis utilized, the data from the same firms has here 
been analyzed by both econometric and case study methods. The benefit of this 
turned out to lie in the potential of the two methods, statistical and case study 
methods, to complement each other. As such, the case study method is ideal for 
studying research topics where existing theory is inadequate (Chetty 1997). In 
this case it is possible through a case study to provide information on the 
causality and interaction between theoretical variables, even discover new 
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important variables. It is important to note that in a case study there is a need for 
an analytic strategy to analyse the case study evidence, since otherwise the study 
can easily become stalled at the analytic stage. These strategies, involving either 
relying on theoretical propositions or developing a case description, have been 
defined better only quite recently (see Yin 1994,102-104). Another key point is 
that a case study does not seek to generalize the findings to populations or 
universes, but to expand and generalize theoretical propositions (Chetty 1997, 
74). This is also why an analysis of case study data uses a replication logic in the 
same manner as in the experimental research, rather than a sampling logic (Yin 
1994,36). 
The literature utilized in the study comes both from the area of industrial 
economics and small business studies. In this respect the study has adopted an 
eclectic approach, i. e., it has surveyed studies in both of the areas to produce 
testable hypotheses on the behaviour of manufacturing small firms in particular. 
In this introductory chapter I will not review the literature in detail here because 
the relevant literature will be reviewed in the context of each of the three 
chapters below. As to Chapter I, there are two extensive literature reviews 
available on the studies of internationalization of small firms. These are the 
articles by Miesenbock, in 1988, and Aaby and Slater a year later. Both of these 
manifest the fragmentation in this area of empirical literature: no general theory 
of internationalization of small firms exists. In contrast, the research in product 
differentiation (Chapter II) has traditionally been dominated by theoretical 
18 
studies. A good review of the models of product differentiation is Waterson 
(1994). As to econometric studies of product differentiation, Sections 1 and 2.3 
in Berry et al. (1995) effectively summarize some of the main developments in 
this area of research. Finally, a survey of the studies of export hysteresis (Chapter 
III) can be found in the introductory section in Roberts and Tybout (1997). 
As it has become clear from the foregoing, the study itself consists of three 
chapters. In Chapter I, 1 model small firms' decisions to export using an existing 
model of the theory of diffusion of innovations as a theoretical tool. The model 
incorporating so-called epidemic learning and rank effects appreciates the fact 
that different factors may be important phases of this decision making process. 
The model suggests that firms learn about export demand initially through 
contacts with other firms, creditors, middlemen, etc., but that the speed of 
committing to an export strategy is ultimately determined by firm-specific profits 
expected from exporting. These, in their turn, are influenced by the firm-specific 
characteristics such as size and other aspects of resources of firms. In the 
empirical part of the study, I use a nonlinear econometric model to analyse the 
speed of export development in the firms. The results from the probit analyses 
suggest, among other things, that the development of exporting in a small firm is 
in particular influenced by the language skills of entrepreneurs. In addition, the 
development of exporting has been more rapid in smaller firms and in firms that 
have started exporting in the 1990s than in firms which started earlier. 
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Chapter II focuses on product differentiation. The existing theories of product 
differentiation seem to be built on considering a group of firms rather than 
considering an individual firm. For this reason, they cast relatively little light on 
decision-making processes of firms in the real world. Strikingly, for example, 
horizontal differentiation by firms observed at the level of an industry may 
actually result from upgrading of product quality by firms which have specialized 
in different factors of quality. The main purpose of Chapter II is to provide 
insights into the differentiation behaviour of industrial small firms in Finland 
using the case study method of research. I study in a detailed way the motives 
and means for differentiation, factors making differentiation difficult or 
unprofitable, success in sustaining competitive advantages based on 
differentiation, and the impacts of economic integration on product 
characteristics. The observations suggest that at the individual firm level, vertical 
differentiation has a special weight since differentiation is often limited by the 
requirement of technical compatibility, and because improving quality is 
perceived to incorporate lower risk than differentiation based on taste differences 
between customers. Success of firms seems to depend mostly on firm-specific 
factors such as first mover advantages and ability to sustain the differentiation. 
Thus, a fuller consideration of John Kay's (Kay 1993) argument that firms create 
added value by distinctive capabilities, which are in general based on 
characteristics that are difficult to reproduce, could strengthen the theory of 
product differentiation. 
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Chapter III explores the process of exit from export markets. Recent studies of 
entry and exit behaviour of exporting firms, such as Roberts and Tybout (1997), 
suggest that firms have to incur a sunk cost in an uncertain environment to enter 
export markets. This tends to cause hysteresis in exporting, i. e., it may be optimal 
for firms to absorb some operational losses before ceasing exporting if it 
becomes unprofitable. In this study the export market exit and re-entry behaviour 
of those 10 firms in the data-set that have made an exit from export markets at 
some point in their history is analysed using the case-study method of research. 
The analysis focuses on sources of sunk costs and uncertainty in export 
operations, and factors that trigger decisions to make an exit from the foreign 
markets. Experiences and behaviour of the firms are then compared with 
idiosyncrasies of six firms that have been exporting similar products 
uninterruptedly since their first entry to export markets. There is little, if any, 
support for the export hysteresis hypothesis in the data. The export operations of 
the firms which exited from foreign markets have largely been opport! stic in ip, 
nature and they have not incurred large sunk costs to enter the markets. Thus, the 
behaviour of the firms seem to be largely explicable by the standard 
('Marshallian') theory, and so does not require a theory more general than this. 
The lack of an explicit export strategy and the dependence on one export 
destination made the firms susceptible to problems in the export markets. An 
implication of the research for studies on export hysteresis is that demand-side 
factors may be important determinants of the timing of market exits by smaller 
firms. 
21 
On the whole, as far as the generalizability of the results of this study is 
concerned, it must be noted that the number of observations in the analyses 
throughout the study is small. This implies that where generalizations are to be 
made, they either have to appreciate this fact, or hold to the significance of the 
findings as theoretical propositions. This is also why this study has not primarily 
aimed at contributing small business policy, but rather has concentrated on more 
academic issues. In the spirit of this orientation the Concluding Chapter is 
devoted to the implications of the study for further research. 
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Chapter I 
Modelling Small Firms' Decisions to Export 
23 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I model a small firm's decision to export using the theory of 
diffusion of innovations as a theoretical tool, and test predictions implied by the 
model by multivariate analysis of data on industrial small firms (4 - 176 
employees) in Finland. ' The theoretical model is based on the epidemic learning 
and so-called rank effects of the theory of diffusion of innovations, and it 
describes a hypothetical path of adoptions of the exporting strategy in an 
industry. In contrast to the earlier applications of the innovation theory to 
exporting (see, e. g., Simmonds and Smith 1968, Lee and Branch 1978, Reid 
1981), a firm's decision to export is here modelled explicitly using inter-firm 
spread of information on international marketing possibilities and differences in 
firms' characteristics to determine the preferred time of adopting the exporting 
strategy. Thus, the present approach maintains the assumption that different types 
of factors are important in different stages of the exporting decision. 
The data used in the empirical analysis has been collected for the specific 
purpose of this study by interviewing the managing directors of 76 small firms in 
Finland. Fifty-five of these firms have export experience - yet only half of them 
export on a regular basis. The findings suggest that inter-firm and person-to- 
'The discussion in this article is confined to exporting behavior only due to the 
fact that very few of the firms in the data-set have production abroad. For a 
conceptual framework for foreign direct investments by small and medium-sized 
enterprises into production abroad, see Steinmann et al. 1980. 
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person transmission of information are important stimuli to interest in exporting, 
and that managers' knowledge of languages increases a firm's likelihood of 
adopting the exporting strategy swiftly after becoming interested in exporting. As 
far as the hypothesized quickening of internationalization processes over time is 
concerned, firms that have started exporting later perceive lower fixed costs of 
establishing exporting operations and have also developed exporting faster than 
firms which started earlier. These findings lend support to the view presented in 
this chapter that the rank effects theory can be used in theorizing exporting 
behaviour of smaller firms and are in line with the hypothesis that economic 
integration, among other things, accelerates the internationalization processes of 
firms. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The section below critically reviews the 
traditional approach to exporting in the small business literature. Section 3 
surveys the main theoretical ideas in the diffusion of process innovations, and 
assesses their relevance for modelling exporting behaviour of smaller firms. The 
synthesis is developed in Section 4, with basic concepts and a firm's decision 
making described first, and the industry-level model second. Section 5 presents 
the empirical analysis and observations, and Section 6 the conclusions. 
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2. A small firm's exporting process 
There are several reasons to assume that the attitude of a smaller firm towards 
international operations is very different from the one of larger firms. The 
"small" size of the firm is not the only factor that makes a small firm different 
from larger firms, although it probably is the most important (see Storey 1982, 
7). The amount and quality of resources, such as managerial resources, education 
level of the employees, capital and capacity, are evidently crucial factors in a 
firm's internationalization (see Reid 1983,46-48). This point is reinforced by the 
fact that a firm's ability to find and utilize external resources depends much on its 
own resources. For external resources there are several different types of sources, 
from public institutions to informal cooperative networks between firms (see, 
e. g., Reid 1984, Christensen et al. 1990, Lautanen and Eskelinen 1994). 2 
Another important consequence of smallness is that the firm is responsive to 
unique and random factors. An indication of this is that differences in managerial 
capability and orientation are important factors in explaining the exporting 
behaviour of smaller firms (e. g., Reid 1983,50). There is also evidence (see 
Miesenbock 1988,45) that suggests that the initial stimulus for exporting in a 
'See also Lautanen (1998) which concerns the utilization of the English version 
of the MTI Sector Info-media in the internationalization of manufacturing small 
firms. In this case, however, the benefits of the information in English that concerns 
mainly the firms' domestic markets was assessed unsurprisingly rather nonexistent 
by the interviewed small business managers. 
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small firm lie outside the firm (such as getting an unsolicited order from abroad) 
than inside the firm (such as an excess capacity). 
2.1. Conceptual approaches to exporting 
Theoretical approaches to small business exporting are few and far between. 
Instead, the literature is based on empirical studies the results of which are 
extremely fragmented. As very recently Leonidou and Katsikeas (1996) have put 
it: "the extant empirical knowledge on export development models"... "is 
currently characterized by fragmented, uncoordinated and spasmodic efforts to 
synthesize a general theory"... (p. 519). 3 What they conclude from the state of the 
research is that the status of the existing theory should be enhanced by 
contributions from marketing, business and other disciplines, such as economics 
and psychology. Below, I review two early conceptual frameworks of reference 
on the internationalization process of a small firm that bear relevance to the 
1P 
model presented later in the chapter. 
The traditional way to organize analytically the behaviour of smaller firms is to 
describe it as a slow learning process where the firm gradually increases its 
3 See also the literature reviews by Miesenbock (1988) which includes nearly 200 
references to empirical studies, and Aaby and Slater (1989) which includes 
references to 56 empirical studies. Miesenbock's (1988) conclusion was that "... the 
literature based on empirical studies is full of inconsistencies and a conclusive theory 
of small business internationalization is far from being available". See also 
Westhead (1994). 
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commitment to international operations. Perhaps the best-known manifestation 
of this idea is the so-called stages "model" of internationalization which dates 
back to the late 1970s (see Bilkey and Tesar 1977). According to this descriptive 
framework the firm increases stage by stage its international commitment, 
starting from being initially uninterested in exporting, then filling possible 
unsolicited export orders and exporting to psychologically close countries, and 
ending in committed involvement in international marketing (Figure 1). The 
central suggestion of this framework is that small firms slowly increase their 
commitment to international operations. The incremental, cautious nature of the 
process follows from greater perceived uncertainty and risk associated with 
international business decisions compared to home-market operations (Cavusgil 
1984,54). 4 
Figure I. 1. A stages "model" of internationalization (Bilkey and Tesar 1977,93) 
Stage 1 Management is not interested in exporting; would not even fill an 
unsolicited export order 
Stage 2 Management would fill an unsolicited export order, but makes no 
effort to explore the feasibility of exporting 
'The internationalization process of firms has also been described as a process 
resulting from an interplay between the development of firm's knowledge about 
international markets and operations on one hand and an increasing commitment of 
resources to these markets on the other. This so-called "Process model of 
internationalization" (See, e. g., Johanson and Vahlne 1990) is not specifically aimed 
at describing small firms internationalization, but it also suggests that the 
internationalization process is a slow and incremental learning process. Recent 
empirical support and challenges to this model are discussed in Zaby (1996). 
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Stage 3 Management actively explores the feasibility of exporting (can be 
skipped if unsolicited export orders are received) 
Stage 4 The firm exports on an experimental basis to a psychologically close 
country 
Stage 5 The firm is an experienced exporter to that country and adjusts 
exports optimally to changing exchange rates, tariffs, etc. 
Stage 6 Management explores the feasibility of exporting to additional 
countries that, psychologically, are further away, ... etc. 
Although depicting exporting as a process has gained considerable empirical 
support (see Miesenbock 1988,44) it has been criticised on both empirical and 
theoretical grounds. The stages framework has been argued to be too universal 
and lack contextual factors, mixing descriptive and normative elements in the 
model (Christensen and Lindmark 1993,138-139). Also, it ignores market 
characteristics and firm resources, does not appreciate the situational specificity 
in export decision-making, and lacks the ability to explain strategic dimensions 
of internationalization (Reid 1983,44-45). In addition, firms seem to develop 
international operations in a more rapid and direct way than the framework 
suggests because, among other things, economic integration has lowered 
obstacles to international marketing (Young 1987,34, Christensen 1991). 5 
Overall, clearly, a conceptualization of the internationalization process in the 
'For a discussion on the various mechanisms through which the economic 
integration may quicken the internationalization process of firms, see Lautanen 
1996. 
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stages framework "represents a clear departure from classical economic theory" 
(Cavusgil 1980,279). 6 
The internationalization process has also been viewed as an intra-firm 
innovation-adoption process. Reid (1981) describes the export expansion process 
of a firm as an innovation-adoption process consisting of five stages. These are 
export awareness, export intention, trial, evaluation, and acceptance, with the 
final stage as the adoption of exporting stage (Figure 2). 
Figure 1.2. Export behaviour as an adoption of innovation process (Reid 1981, 
103) 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 
Export Export Export trial Export Export 
awareness intention evaluation acceptance 
Problem or Motivation, Personal Results from Adoption/reje 
opportunity attitude, beliefs, experience engaging ction o 
recognition, and expectancy from limited exporting exporting 
arousal of about export exporting 
need contribution 
'The justification for the departure from classical economic theory is given by 
arguing, for example, that "... the internationalization process does not appear to be a 
sequence of deliberate, planned steps, beginning with a clearly defined problem and 
proceeding trough a rational analysis of behavioural alternatives. Personal 
characteristics of the decision-makers lack of information, perception of risk and 
presence of uncertainty seem to be especially valuable in understanding firms' 
involvement in international marketing. " (Cavusgil 1980,279). 
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The idea of linking innovation theory and exporting is, however, older than this. 
Already by the late 1960s Simmonds and Smith (1968), as well as later Lee and 
Branch (1978) and Cavusgil (1980,274) had all suggested that the initial 
involvement stage in international marketing could be regarded as an innovation 
in the firm. A common feature of these approaches is, however, that they all 
consider the innovative process within a firm. This is based on the view that 
exporting is in one sense different from innovation diffusion: A firm considering 
exporting "is not one of the first to adopt a recently developed practice", but 
"when the perspective is narrowed to the firm itself the first export order can be 
considered an innovation within the closed environment of the firm" (Simmonds 
and Smith 1968,94). 
2.2. Preliminary conclusions 
Firstly, the above descriptive frameworks of reference, like the stages 
framework, do not explicitly model the decision-making of a firm. The above 
review also suggests that the internationalization process for a small 
firm may 
not follow today the stages proposed in the framework, but that it may 
have 
become a more straightforward process due to, for example, economic 
integration and general improvement in the information on the international 
business operations. Yet, it must be appreciated that idiosyncracies of small 
firms 
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such as lack of resources and concentrated decision-making may be important 
sources of variation in the exporting behaviour of smaller firms. Secondly, it 
seems plausible to assume that costs of exporting, such as costs from product 
adaptation, market research, advertising and marketing or possible sales 
organization abroad, may be significant in comparison to sales if the firm itself is 
small. Given this, the notion of cautiousness of the internationalization process in 
the frameworks presented above can be, in economic terms, due to the fact that 
the costs of committing into international marketing are partly sunk (see Roberts 
and Tybout 1997) and the export investment decisions may be made in an 
uncertain environment. These two factors ultimately determine how risky a 
commitment to international marketing is. 
3. Theories of innovation diffusion and exporting 
In essence the study of diffusion of innovations aims to rationalize why, if a new 
technology (or a product) is superior, it is not adopted immediately by all 
potential user firms (consumers). Theoretical models often concentrate on the 
demand side alone (Stoneman 1983,65. ) These models are of four main types 
(Karshenas and Stoneman 1993,505) that can be called epidemic and 
learning, 
rank, stock, and order effect models. The three latter ones are essentially 
inter- 
firm diffusion (imitation) approaches, i. e., they consider spread of innovations 
among firms of an industry. Epidemic learning models can 
be applied both to 
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inter- and intra-firm diffusion analyses (for an example, see Mansfield 1989). 
Models based on learning and epidemic type forces are the traditional approach, 
and derive their impetus - and mathematical tools - from the analysis of the 
spread of diseases in biology (Davies 1979,9). The general idea in epidemic 
diffusion is that, given that the new technology is profitable to adopt, a potential 
adopter firm actually adopts the technology after it has received information on 
its existence. However, the new technology is not immediately adopted by all 
potential firms because they feel uncertainty about its characteristics. 
Consequently, the time path of adoption reflects learning by potential users 
(Stoneman 1987,51). The learning effects are at least partly endogenous and 
often characterized by a logistic function, resulting in a S-shaped learning curve'. 
The central characteristic of rank, stock, and order models is that they consider 
explicitly the adoption decision by the firm and generate rules under w3 ich 1 
different firms will have different expected returns from the use of the new 
technology and thus differing preferred dates for the adoption of it (Karshenas 
'The logistic learning curve can be derived from the most simple epidemic model 
that is represented by the equation mt+1 - mt = b(n - mt)mt/n, b>0, where mt is the 
number of infected individuals and n is the total fixed population. The equation 
states that the number of individuals contracting the disease during a period is 
proportionate to the number of uninfected multiplied by the proportion already 
infected (b indicates effectiveness of the learning mechanism and is assumed to be 
constant and equal across all uninfected individuals). If the period t to t+l is short, 
the equation can be written as a differential equation dm/dt(n - m, ) = bm, /n, the 




and Stoneman 1993,504). The decision to adopt can be viewed as depending 
exclusively on the (expected) profitability of adoption such that a marginal 
adopter actually adopts the new technology when the cost of adoption falls under 
the profit expected from adopting it. Therefore, to generate an adoption path, 
rank, stock and order models generally assume that the cost of adoption 
decreases as the technology becomes increasingly common. 
The rank models (see, e. g., Davies 1979,20-22) are based on the assumption that 
the differences in the expected profits result from differing characteristics of 
potential adopters (such as firm size). In other words, because firms differ, they 
have differing reservation prices for acquisition of the technology (Stoneman 
1987,52), and those firms having high expected returns adopt first, and firms 
with low expected profits adopt late. In the stock effect models (also called the 
game-theoretic approach) the benefit from adopting a new technology changes as 
the number of earlier adoptions increases. This is because adoptions are assumed 
to lead to increases in firms' outputs and through this in the industry output. 
Consequently, earlier adoptions influence the profitability of future adoptions 
(Stoneman 1987,52). The order effect idea is rather similar. Here the firm's posi- 
tion in the adoption order determines the benefit to the marginal adopter (because 
of first mover advantages), so that it is more profitable to adopt early than late 
(Karshenas and Stoneman 1993,504-505) 
As to the exporting decision of smaller firms, I find that an analogy between the 
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adoption of innovations and exporting can be utilized in research on small firm 
exporting. In addition to the contributions by Reid (1981), Simmonds and Smith 
(1968) and Lee and Branch (1978), which were referred to in Section 2, the 
analogy may be supported by the following facts about adoption of innovations 
presented by Karshenas and Stoneman (1993,509). Firstly, the process of 
adopting a technology has uncertainty and information as an key element. 
Secondly, it involves learning behaviour. Thirdly, a process of adopting a new 
technology is often initiated through human contact, and has the firm's decision- 
maker as the most important person influencing the process. Whilst many 
economic problems may share these elements, they seem to match very well the 
nature of the small firm's internationalization process discussed in Section 2. 
Because the spreading of information and external factors play a major role in 
firms' becoming interested in exporting, the idea of epidemic learning effects 
seems a suitable framework for theorizing the export behaviour of small firms8. 
On the other hand, the literature on small business exporting has been successful 
in explaining entry to exporting by the characteristics of firms, such as firm size 
or the quality of a firm's resources (see, e. g., the literature reviews by Aaby and 
Slater 1989 and Miesenbock 1988). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that 
there exists an unequal benefit distribution from exporting that is generated by 
8In addition, extensions of the epidemic learning idea could possibly be used to 
describe a process where firms export experimentally in order to acquire more 
information (for a corresponding model of technology adoption, see Tonks 1986). 
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differences in firm-specific characteristics. This fact clearly lends a priori support 
to the rank effects theory. On the contrary, there are general features in the order 
and stock effect models which suggest that their applicability to the exporting 
behaviour of small firms might be more restricted. An important such feature is 
that these theories rely on interaction between the firms adopting the new 
technology, whereas in the case of the small firm exporting firms are likely to 
enter in competitive export markets (and thus not competiting essentially with 
other domestic firms in the export markets). Given these considerations, I 
decided to use a model incorporating epidemic learning and rank effects to depict 
the exporting behaviour of smaller firms. 
4. Synthesis: A model based on epidemic learning and differences between 
potential exporting firms 
4.1. Basic concepts 
The four principal concepts of the present framework of analysis are an initial 
stimulus for exporting, (expected) profitability and feasibility of exporting, and 
the actual commitment to the exporting strategy (Figure 3). 1 have separated the 
initial stimulus for exporting from the actual commitment decision of a firm 
because it seems likely that different types of factors are important in these two 
stages of the decision to export. In particular, becoming interested in exporting 
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through a stimulus seems likely to involve information spreading (epidemic type 
forces)9, whereas the commitment decision after a period of experimental 
exporting seems likely to be dominated by the profitability of exporting (rank 
effect type forces). 
Figure 1.3. Export commitment decision 
stimulus --> evaluation of profitability 
and feasibility of exporting --> committing to exporting 
In the model, a stimulus for exporting is a necessary, yet not sufficient, prerequi- 
site for the actual commitment to the exporting strategy. Subsequent to the 
stimulus the firm becomes a potential exporter. Now the firm is interested in 
exporting and evaluates the expected profitability and feasibility (i. e. adequacy of 
its resources) of exporting through experimental export deliveries10. It should be 
'For empirical support to this assumption, see Lee and Branch 1978. They found 
that the initiating force for exporting is often either precise knowledge of the 
existence of a market opportunity or gaining technical knowledge of exporting. The 
information may be passively received from, for example, other firms, governmental 
agencies, banks, middleman, or potential buyers in foreign countries. 
"Reid (1983) has suggested that the profitability of exporting is likely to be 
evaluated on the basis of transaction costs. Thus it is primarily influenced by 
heterogeneity of customers, how these customers are spatially distributed and the 
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noticed that feasibility is separable from profitability only if the feasibility of 
exporting depends on experimental knowledge that cannot be purchased in any 
form, which is unlikely after the starting phase of exporting (see Johanson and 
Vahlne 1990,15). Once the exporting is expected to be profitable and feasible, 
the firm actually commits itself to exporting strategy, and exporting becomes an 
established and regular part of the firm's operations (Figure 3)". 
Firms in the model are assumed to be rational profit maximizers. Yet they may 
want to postpone committing to exporting beyond the moment the profitability 
and feasibility, prima facie, break even. Waiting can have value especially if the 
firm (that holds rational expectations), experiences firm-specific uncertainty 
about the commitment to exporting, for example, because of some random 
component in the entrepreneur's skills or learning , or perceived uncertainty 
related to the future exchange rate. Under these circumstances, if the expected 
adoption of exporting involves a sunk cost, such as a marketing campaign to 
settle the firm's position in the foreign markets, the firm may do better by 
postponing its decision (see Dixit 1993,5-6). This is because by waiting it can 
avoid the subnormal return from exporting that would be realized if, for example, 
the exchange rate became less favourable for the firm, and still actually commit 
regularity with which they purchase. 
"Defining precisely when a firm becomes an exporter is of course arbitrary. Here 
the moment of adoption of exporting to a market is defined as the moment when 
operations in this market become regular, or a normal part of the firm's activities 
(for 
the empirical operationalization, see Section 5). This can be seen as the successful 
development of exporting. 
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if it did not12. 
4.2. The commitment decision 
Next I depict the export commitment decision by an individual small firm in 
slightly more formal terms. At this stage, the stimulus for exporting is taken as 
given. The reader should note also that throughout the analysis the tradeable 
product is given, but that firms are assumed to differ in their other characteristics 
(such as size and quality of resources). 
Suppose that a potential exporter firm i, with characteristic z;, is evaluating the 
expected profitability of exporting, seeking to maximize its profits over a 
planning period. For simplicity, assume that the time is discrete with a per period 
rate of interest r, and that there are only two time periods, t=1,2. Further 
assume that the cost of adoption of exporting at time t, c, is a fixed cost and that 
the firm has perfect foresight to adoption costs and to its resources in period 2. If 
the firm commits itself to exporting in the first period, it obtains an expected 
benefit hl(z) = g, (z; ) + [1/(1+r)]g2(z) - cl, where gl and g2 are the expected 
revenues from exporting to the foreign market for the two periods respectively. If 
the firm adopts in the second period it gains h2(z; )= g2(z) - c2. Denoting the 
"Naturally, waiting involves a cost which the firm is here expected to allow for in 
its decision-making. 
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firm's resource situation in time t with respect to exporting to the destination 
country or countries by v, (z; ), and v"Ii the minimum of resources that can (are 
expected to) sustain exporting to the particular country for the two periods, I now 
can write the conditions for committing to exporting in period 1 as: 
(1) h, (z; ) = g, (z; ) + [1/(l+r)]g2(z; ) - c1 > 0, h, '(z) >0 
(2) at(z; ) = [1/(l+r)]h2(z; ) - h, (z; ) <0 
ý3ý Wl(Zi) = V1(Zi) - Vmi >_ 
0, wl'(Z) >0 
where al is the arbitrage profit from postponing the adoption until the next period 
and wl represents slack in the firm's resources (for simplicity, I will leave out the 
function arguments hereafter). The profitability condition of adoption consists of 
two parts represented by the equations (1) and (2), and the feasibility of one (3). 
As to profitability condition, assuming that exporting does not affect the firm's 
domestic operations, the firm adopts exporting at time t=1 if it is expected to 
yield positive profits (equation 1), but only if it does not find it profitable to wait 
until the second period (equation 2). Following the diffusion literature, I call 
these two components the profitability condition and the arbitrage condition. 
Note that if g2 < c2, it is not possible for the firm to benefit from delaying the 
commitment decision, whereas if gz > c2, the arbitrage condition will be 
dominant. 
On the other hand, the firm can commit itself to exporting only if it has sufficient 
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knowledge and resources for the planned exporting strategy. This condition is 
represented by the equation (3): there has to be a non-negative slack, w,, in the 
firm's resources before it can make the required commitment. Note that this slack 
is, as well as profitability of exporting, assumed to be an increasing function of z. 
Given that the firms are rational profit maximisers, it follows that a potential 
exporting firm commits itself to exporting in the first period if the conditions 
implied by the equations (1) - (3) become satisfied. If the firm does not commit 
itself at the first period, the conditions for committing to exporting in period 2 
are simply h2 >0 and w2 >_ 0. 
4.3. Epidemic learning, rank effects and the adoption path 
Now, to allow for the importance of external stimuli in firms for exporting, the 
initial stage of becoming interested in the possibility of exporting will be 
assumed to be dependent on the epidemic type of information spreading. The 
model is based on a technology diffusion model in Stoneman (1987,68-69)13 1 
will apply the demand side of the model to my framework of exporting. 
Suppose again that there are only two time periods, t=1 and t=2, with r as the 
discount rate. Let the total number of firms producing or selling the tradeable 
"The model is based initially on Stoneman and David (1986). 
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good in the industry be N. In period t Pt of these firms are potential exporters and 
Et exporters. Denote Pt + E, = S, and the corresponding proportions of these three 
groups of firms of N by lower case letters p, et and s, Now suppose that the 
proportion of firms that have learnt about exporting in time t, st, is given in the 
first period, and determined for the second period through a simple epidemic 
learning process: 
(4) S2 = G(P1, E,, N) 
=q+p, +e, +b(1 -p, - 
=q+s, + b(1 - 
G', >0, G'2>0, G'3<0,0 <_ s,, 0<s2, 
where q represents exogenous learning between the two periods and b the 
effectiveness of the learning mechanism in the spread of the information. Hence, 
the proportion of firms that have learned about exporting by period 2 is assumed 
to be determined as a sum of three effects: firstly, the proportion of "old" 
potential and committed exporters of the given product; secondly, new 
exogenously stimulated firms; and thirdly, an effect that is proportionate to the 
product of the proportion of firms not yet interested in exporting and the 
proportion of exporting firms14. This learning mechanism is consistent with the 
"Foreign firms which export the product into this country are also potential 
sources of stimuli to exporting for domestic firms. In this model, this type of stimuli 
are included in q. 
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view that stimuli for exporting are often external in smaller firms, but that they 
can be assumed to be more frequent in more internationalized industries. Notice 
that (4) implies also that firms that export in period 1 are exporting in period 2 as 
well, i. e., adoption of exporting is an irreversible decision in this model. In 
contrast, as the study in the third Chapter of this thesis strikingly shows, in the 
real world a decision to export is not irreversible. However, the results of the 
analysis in Chapter III support the view that the likelyhood of exit from export 
markets is greatest at the reactive stage of exporting (i. e. before adopting the 
export strategy), suggesting that the violation of the assumption of irreversibility 
in the model is to some extent smaller than at it looks at the first sight. 
The N firms differ across the characteristic z, that is assumed to be independent 
of the exporting and continuously distributed according to f(z) with cumulative 
distribution F(z). Let the benefit in time t for a firm with resources z from 
committing itself to exporting in time t be denoted by g, (z), and assume g', (z) > 0. 
Further assume that gl(z) and g2(z) have perfect rank correlation. As mentioned, 
the slack in resources also increases with z, i. e., w', (z) > 0. For simplicity it is 
assumed that the feasibility of exporting does not depend any more at this stage 
on a lack of experimental type of knowledge. This means that the potential 
exporters could acquire the rest of the needed resources from markets, other 
firms or public organizations (with a cost included in ct; in (1)) if the profitability 
condition was satisfied before the feasibility condition. Consequently, assuming 
perfect foresight and that g2 > c2 to keep the model simple, the arbitrage 
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condition will dominate in the commitment decision, and it will be sufficient to 
consider the adoption process on the basis of this condition. 
Under these circumstances, in each period there are (possibly) a number of 
potential exporters for whom it is profitable and feasible to commit to exporting, 
while for the others it is not. The number of firms committed to an exporting 
strategy in period t is given by: 
00 
(5) Et = s, N 
f f(z)dz = s, [N - NF(z*t)], t=1,2, 
z, 
where z`t is the strength of resources of the last firm which finds it profitable to 
commit itself to exporting in time t, i. e., z for the marginal exporter in time t. By 
simple calculation: 
(6) z*ý =F 1[(1 - EýS)], t=1,2. 
The marginal exporters in periods 1 and 2 will be determined in accordance with 
the arbitrage condition such that: 
(7) g1(z*1) = c, - [1/(l+r)]c2 
fig) g2(Z*2) _ X29 
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i. e. that the benefits from committing to exporting equal the costs from such a 
commitment in each period. 
Basically, given c, and c2, exporting would extend among N to the point where 
the marginal exporter received a benefit equal to the cost of committing to 
exporting. However, as only the given proportion s, of the total number of firms 
in the industry are interested in exporting in period 1, only this proportion (s, ) of 
firms for which regular exporting would be profitable, will actually be committed 
exporters in this period (equation 5). The number of exporters in period 1 then 
affects through (4) the proportion of firms interested in exporting in period 2, 
and, again, given c2, only this proportion of all those firms in N for which 
exporting would be profitable actually are exporting firms in period 2. 
Entrepreneurs not interested in exporting do not observe the profitability (and 
feasibility) of exporting for their enterprise. On the other hand, if there were no 
differences in resources between the small firms, all s1N in the first period, and 
1P 
s2N firms in the second period, would have regular exporting. 
To complete the model, the time path of commitments and the role of economic 
integration has to be discussed. The time path of export adoptions results from 
assuming that profitability and feasibility of the adoption of exporting are 
improving exogenously over time, i. e., that c, > c2 so that g2(z`, ) > c2 implying E2 
> E1. In other words, given the differences in the characteristics between firms 
interested in exporting, committing to an exporting strategy becomes profitable 
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for more and more enterprises. The economic rationale for this assumption is 
based on economic integration and general betterment in the quality and supply 
of information on foreign market operations. By lowering tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade and making market conditions more homogenous in different 
countries, economic integration lowers costs of, for example, transportation, 
product adaptation, or mobilizing resources for exporting. If the integration 
incorporates monetary cooperation among the relevant destination and 
competitor countries, the risk related to exchange rate changes in export 
decisions should also diminish. In addition, feasibility of exporting will be 
improved per se because in the more homogenous markets less experimental 
knowledge is needed, and because of the improvement in information supply. 
Note that this not only suggests that the number of exporting firms increases over 
time but also that adoption processes that have started later will be more rapid 
than early ones. 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1. The data on smaller firms in Finland 
The data set used in this analysis is based on detailed structured interviews of the 
managing directors of 76 industrial small and medium-sized enterprises (number 
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of employees between 4 and 176) in Finland in 1996.15 The firms operate in 
wood-processing and engineering sectors, which are traditional exporting 
industries in the economy of Finland, and for which the Western European 
markets are crucially important. 16 
Table 1 presents basic information on the data. Of the 76 firms interviewed 21 
(28 %) operate in three wood-processing sectors and 55 (72 %) in five 
engineering sectors". As to firm size, the bulk of the firms are comparatively 
small: on average the firms employ 35 persons (median 22 employees) and run a 
yearly turnover of about FIM 23 million (i. e. £ 3.3 million). In terms of the 
number of enterprises, this sample represents about 4 per cent of the total 
population of firms employing from 10 to 200 persons in wood-processing and 
"The virtue of the data set follows from the use of the interview method to collect 
the data: the level of response was high (> 90 %) and it could be ensured in the 
interviews that the questions were correctly understood and deliberately answered. In 
addition, the face-to-face interviews made it possible to acquire rich information on 
the businesses and their operations not covered in the structured questionnaire. On 
the other hand, because of the relatively small number of firms in the database, the 
possibilities of using sophisticated econometric methods successfully are naturally 
limited. For the 1996 questionnaire, see Appendix 1. 
"Trade in these sectors between the EU and Finland has been free of tariff 
barriers since 1978, i. e., since the free trade agreement with the EEC in 1973 became 
fully operative. Yet even before that the openness of the economy was advanced by 
an associate membership in EFTA. More recently, in 1994 Finland joined in the 
European Economic area, and it became a full member of the European Union in the 
beginning of 1995. The essence of the latter developments has been that they lower 
physical, technical and fiscal barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital and 
labour between Finland and its key markets (VATT 1992,6,35). 
"The two firms in manufacture of paper products (341) have been aggregated to 
wood-processing firms. 
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engineering sectors in Finland's. 
Table I. 1. Basic information on the data. 
SIC-3 Number of Average Average Number of Average share of 
sector firms in number of share of own exporting exports of the 
the data- employees products of firms 1995 turnover, 
base 1995 the turnover exporting firms 
1995 1995 
331 13 46 84 10 50 
332 6 27 92 6 29 
341 2 39 87 2 45 
381 23 27 45 14 27 
382 15 33 31 5 31 
383 9 53 47 6 30 
384 6 34 91 5 27 
385 2 12 79 2 46 
Total 76 35 33 50 34 
lp 
Remark: Standard industrial classification (SIC) 1979: (331) manufacture of wood and wood and 
cork products, except furniture, (332) manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except primarily of 
metal, (341) manufacture of paper and paper products, (381) manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and equipments, (382) manufacture of machinery except electrical, 
(383) manufacture of electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances and supplies, (384) manufacture 
of transport equipment, (385) manufacture of professional and scientific, and measuring and 
controlling equipment n. e. c. and of photographic and optical goods. (Central Statistical Office of 
Finland, Handbook no. 4, rev. ) 
"Source: Central Statistical Office of Finland, Register of Enterprises 1994. 
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Eighteen (86 %) of the wood-processing firms and 32 (59 %) of the engineering 
firms in the data set had direct exports of goods in 199519. Only 38 (76 %) of 
these, however, perceived their exporting as regular. For all exporters, the 
average share of exports in the yearly turnover was 34 per cent in 1995 (median 
30 %). In addition to these 50 exporting firms, five enterprises had tried 
exporting at some stage earlier. Thus, taken all together, as many as 55 
enterprises in the data set have export experience. The two most important export 
destinations for the firms in the present sample were Sweden and Germany in 
1996. 
5.2. The hypotheses 
This empirical analysis focuses on the spread of export information, costs of 
exporting, and characteristics of marginal adopters of the exporting strategy, 
which are the three key elements in the theoretical model presented above. The 
key proposition of the model is that firm-specific characteristics such as the size 
of a firm, quality of its resources or perceived risk related to the exporting will 
determine the expected revenues from exporting, and thus influence the speed of 
the adoption process for each individual firm interested in exporting. 2° In particu 
"The difference in the share of exporting firms between the two aggregate sectors 
is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level (x2-test). 
20Note that because exporting is by no means a recently invented practice, the points 
of time firms actually have started exporting do not represent the order of adoptions 
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lar, larger firms, firms abundant in highly educated personnel with good 
knowledge of foreign languages, and firms perceiving low risk in exporting are 
expected to have adopted the exporting strategy in a shorter time than firms with 
the opposite characteristics. Secondly, inter-firm and person-to-person 
transmission of information should be important sources of initial stimuli for 
exporting. Thirdly, the improvement of profitability and feasibility of exporting 
over time should be reflected in lower costs of exporting and the speeding-up of 
the adoption processes because of, among other things, the process of economic 
integration of Finland into Western Europe. In the following, I briefly comment 
on findings on the stimuli for exporting and costs of exporting, and then report 
the analysis of the rapidity of development of exporting. 
5.3. Spread of stimuli for exporting 
In the interviews the managing directors were asked to name the three most 
important factors that initially got their firm interested in exporting. The four 
most frequent most important initial stimuli for exporting in these 55 firms were 
getting an unsolicited order from abroad (24 %), starting exporting as a part of an 
intrinsic growth objective of the firm (24 %), getting the idea through a personal 
among the given population of firms. Consequently, the analysis focuses on the 
speed of the adoption processes, controlling simultaneously for the time at which the 
exporting was initiated. 
50 
contact outside the firm (16 %) and an initiative by another domestic enterprise 
(13 %)(Table 2). More than three quarters of the total number of exporting starts 
in the present sample are covered by these four stimuli. " 









1 Got an unsolicited order from abroad 24 24 24 
2 Observed other firms exporting the 
similar products 12 5 7 
3 Own import operations 0 0 0 
4 The idea came from another domestic en- 
terprise 0 18 13 
5 The idea came through a personal contact 35 8 16 
6 The idea came from a bank or a 
middleman 0 0 0 
7 The idea came from public export stimula- 
tion programme 0 0 0 
8 Excess capacity 0 0 0 
9 Domestic recession 12 5 7 
10 Intensified local or domestic competition 0 3 2 
11 Growth objective of the firm 12 29 24 
12 Taking advantage on potential economies 
of scale 0 0 0 
13 Other stimulus 5 8 7 
"This result slightly deviates from findings in earlier studies (see Miesenbock 1988, 
45). In particular, in the present sample, excess capacity has not played any major 
role as a factor pushing firms to exporting, whereas a quite common stimulus appear 
to have been the growth objective of the firm. 
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Of the most important stimuli, the three stimuli related to inter-firm and inter- 
person contacts outside the firms (i. e., unsolicited orders, or personal or inter- 
firm contacts to other domestic firms) cover 53 per cent of the export starts. 
Although these results are not enough to confirm the hypothesis (that inter-firm 
and person-to-person transmission of information are important sources of initial 
stimuli for exporting) they are in line with this hypothesis. 
5.4. Costs of exporting 
Table 3 summarizes the evaluations by the managers of the meaning of different 
types of (fixed) costs from establishing exporting in their firm. According to 
these assessments, the three most important types of export establishment costs 
are outlays for travelling, promotion and advertising abroad, and product 
development. 
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Tale 1.3. Significance of different types of costs incurred to establish exporting 
in the operation of firms, and the extent to which these are sunk costs, by sectors 
(averages of the managers' assessments given on scale: 1 not important to 5 very 
important) 
a) Employment of new staff devoted 
to exports 
b) Investments to technology 
or capacity of production 
c) Product development 
d) Market research 
e) Export market promotion based at home 
country (promotion and advertising abroad) 
f) Direct investments abroad in production, 
sales or promotion offices or subsidiaries 
g) Travelling 
h) Other, please specify 
Average a)-h) (COST_AVE) 
Extent to which possible to benefit 
from these investments in the 
domestic markets (sunk costs) 
Wood- Engineering Total 
processing 
2.7 2.4 2.5 
2.4 1.8 2.0 
2.5 2.7 2.6 
1.9 2.5 2.3 
2.6 3.1 2.9 
1.4 1.8 1.7 
3.3 3.3 3.3 
1.4 1.2 1.2 
2.3 2.3 2.3 
1.9 2.0 2.0 
A linear regression model (OLS) was used to test whether the costs of 
establishing the exporting strategy have become lower over time because of 
economic integration as the rank effects model suggests. The variables of the 
estimated model are defined in Table 4. The dependent variable, COST_AVE, is 
the average of the entrepreneurs' assessments on the importance of 8 different 
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costs from developing exporting operations. On the right hand side, the 
integration process of Finland into the European Union has been divided into 
three era, with the latter two of these represented by dummy variables in the 
estimated equation. These two stages are the period from 1979 (the free-trade 
agreement with the EEC in effect; variable ERA_EEC) till 1993, and the time 
since the beginning of 1994 (i. e. from the establishment of the EEA; ERA_EEA). 
In addition, two control variables were included in the equation: E_SHARE 
representing the share of exports of the firm's turnover, and SECTOR, 
representing the aggregate sector of the firm. 
Table I. 4. Definitions of the variables in the analysis of (fixed) costs of 
exporting. 
Left hand side variable: COST_AVE: the mean of managers' evaluations (1.2,..., 5) 
of the meaning of 8 different types of (fixed) exporting costs in order to est: P, 1 sh the 
exporting. 
ERA-EEC A dummy variable representing the time when the firm has started 
exporting: 1979-1993 
ERA_EEA A dummy variable representing the time when the firm has started 
exporting: 1994- 
E SHARE Share of exports of the total turnover in XK 
SECTOR Dummy variable representing the aggregate sector (wood-processing = 
1) 
The results (Table 5) suggest that both of the integration agreements have 
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lowered the likelihood of a firm being a "high cost" export establisher, yet only 
the change in 1978 (ERA_EEC) is strictly statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level (the significance value for the ERA_EEA dummy is 0.067). 22 Thus the 
result is in line with the view that the costs of exporting have become lower due 
to economic integration. By this means it is also in line with rank effects theory. 
Yet the result does not support the view that the costs of establishment of 
exporting would be likely to be affected by non-tariff barriers more than tariff 
barriers to trade. 
Table 1.5. Estimation results from a linear regression model (OLS) of costs of 
exporting 








ERA_EEC -0.641 (0.213)** 0.512 
ERA_EEA -0.594 (0.314) 0.146 
E_SHARE 0.011 (0.004)** 36.88 
SECTOR -0.388 (0.204) 0.342 
Number of observations 41 
F-statistic 7.18 
Degrees of freedom 4 
Significance level 0.000 
R square 0.44 
"In the analysis I assume that firms have incurred costs from establishing exporting 
during the era they have started exporting. In the reported model the effects of 
economic integration are controlled for the share of exports of the turnover and for 
sectoral effects. Firm size (turnover) was found insignificant control which confirms 
that evaluations are relative with respect to firm size. 
23This is really a truncated regression as the dependent variable is continuous in 
the interval [1,5] rather than [- infinity, infinity]. OLS is used because there is little 
difference in practice. 
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5.5. Rapidity of committing to exporting 
The way of deciding the moment at which the adoption of the exporting strategy 
becomes operational is naturally one of the key questions in the present analysis. 
In this study I consider a firm to have adopted the exporting strategy when it has 
been exporting at least 10 per cent of its total turnover for two consecutive 
years. 23 Hence, this empirical analysis does not consider a commitment to 
exporting as an organizational change in the firm, but more as successful 
development of exporting up to the carefully chosen point. Another major 
assumption I make in the theoretical model is the dominance of profitability over 
feasibility at the time of the commitment decision. As we will see below, 
25 
according to entrepreneur's perceptions, the need for experimental knowledge is 
not related to the speed of the adoption process in any statistically significant 
way. Given this, I see no reason to reject the assumption that committing to 
exporting after a period of experimental exporting is no longer critically 
restricted by the need for experimental knowledge. 
23 This seems to be the best estimate when looking at the contemporary shares of 
exports in firms the managers of which do and do not perceive their exporting as 
"regular": in only 8 per cent of the regularly exporting firms is the share of exports 
less than the 10 per cent, and in only 7 per cent of the irregularly exporting firms 
more than this cut-point. If a 20 per cent cut-point had been used, 27 per cent of the 
regularly exporting firms would have been "misclassified". In case of a5 per cent 
cut-point, the proportions of "misclassified" firms would have been 5 per cent of the 
regular exporters and 73 per cent of the irregular exporters. 
25By experimental knowledge is meant firm-specific knowledge on exporting 
operations that cannot be purchased in any form, i. e., it can be learned only by doing. 
Johanson and Vahlne (see, e. g., 1990) have argued that a need for this kind of 
ýd6u unx a xyrm's internationalization. 
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The hypothesis concerning the adoption process is that the characteristics of 
firms influence the speed of adoption of exporting in a firm. Thus the null- 
hypothesis is that the speed of committing to exporting in a firm is unrelated to 
firm-specific characteristics but influenced by factors such as sector, time of 
starting exporting or (the level of) exchange rate. A probit model, where the 
firms were divided into quick adopters (length of adoption process from a 
stimulus for exporting to the establishment of exporting less than the median 
value, 4 years) and slow adopters (adoption time greater or equal than four 
years), was used to test the hypothesis: y*; = ß'x; + E;, y; =1 if t; <4 years and y; = 
0 if t; z4 years, and E; - N(0,1), where t; refers to the length of the adoption 
process in years for firm i. In other words, I am interested in finding firm-specific 
characteristics x; that affect the likelihood of adopting the exporting strategy 
quickly: P[y; = 11 = P[x'; p + E; > 0]. In the following the dependent variable y; is 
given name ADOPT_SPEED. 
Table 6 defines the variables in the estimated models. The firm-specific 
characteristics included in the x; represent firm size (F_SIZE), features of 
managerial and staff capability (manager's language skills: LANGUAGE; staff 
education level: EDUCATION), perceived risk related to exporting (RISK) and 
need for experimental knowledge in developing exporting (EXP_KNOW). The 
control variables used are the level of exchange rate (EXCHRATE), time of 
becoming interested in exporting (STIMULUS80 for 1980s, STIMULUS90 for 
57 
1990s) and aggregate sector (SECTOR)24 
Table 1.6. Definitions of the right hand side variables in the probit analysis of 
speed of adoption. 
Left hand side variable: ADOPT_SPEED is based on the duration of the adoption 
process of exporting from a stimulus to exporting to the establishment of exporting 
(made operational as having exported more than 10 % of the total turnover of the firm 
for at least two consecutive years) t;; ADOPT_SPEED; =1 if t; <4 years and 
ADOPT-SPEED; =0 if t; z4 years which is the median value. 
Characteristics variables: 
F_SIZE (+) Firm size: Manager's assessment on the size of the firm in 
relation to other domestic enterprises in the branch at the time 
of the establishment of exporting; 5 point integer scale from 
small to large 
LANGUAGE (+) Language skills: An average of 4 binary variables indicating 
managers knowledge of English, Swedish, German and 
French. 
EDUCATION (+) Education level of the staff: proportion of white-collar staff 
with a university degree of the total white-collar staff 
RISK (-) Perceived risk related to the adoption of exporting strategy: 
manager's assessment to what extent the costs related to the 
development of exporting could have been utilized in the 
domestic markets if the exporting was found unfeasible or 
unprofitable. Measures risk through the extent to which the 
costs of exporting are sunk. 
EXP_KNOW (-) Meaning of experimental knowledge in developing exporting; 
a 5-point integer scale from not important to very important 
24International trade theory suggests that a country exports products in which it 
has a comparative advantage. Thus a variable describing capital/labour ratio at the 
3- 
digit sector level was also tried in the equations as a control variable. The equations, 
however, turned out to be impossible to estimate using this control variable. 
On the 
other hand, it can be argued that this potential sectoral effect is already roughly 
captured by the Sector dummy. 
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Control variables: 
EXCHRATE Level of exchange rate at the time the exporting started 
(FIM/USD) 
STIMULUS80 Dummy variable representing the decade adoption process 
started: the 1980s 
STIMULUS90 Dummy variable representing the decade adoption process 
started: the 1990s 
SECTOR Dummy variable representing the aggregate sector (wood- 
processing = 1) 
The estimation results for two specifications are reported in Table 7: Firstly, a 
model (A) including all the independent variables listed in Table 6, and secondly, 
a reduced specification of this model, (B), including those variables which were 
found statistically significant in the specification (A), with the same set of 
control variables. 
59 
Table 1.7. Estimation results from probit regressions with Huber standard errors: 
pace of adoption 
Specification: A B 








F_SIZE -1.053 (0.357)** -0.854 (0.295)** 3.029 
LANGUAGE 6.540 (2.820)* 5.585 (2.551)* 0.275 
EDUCATION 1.363 (1.792) 0.077 
RISK -0.083 (0.361) 1.978 
EXP_KNOW 0.413 (0.369) 3.064 
EXCHRATE 0.103 (0.312) -0.059 (0.293) 4.533 
STIMULUS80 0.145 (1.032) -0.278 (0.967) 0.148 
STIMULUS90 3.724 (1.098)** 3.008 (0.963)** 0.431 
SECTOR 0.424 (0.765) 0.256 (0.735) 0.282 
Number of observations 26 28 
Log likelihood function -8.83 -9.49 
Restricted log likelihood -17.71 -19.34 
LR 17.77 19.68 
Degrees of freedom 9 6 
Significance level 0.030 0.003 
Pseudo R2 0.52 0.51 
Correctly predicted obs. 23(88%) 24(86%) 
LR/LM for testing °º 
homoscedasticity 
assumption in the basic 
probit regression -/20.76 8.14/19.96 
LR for testing hypothesis that 
the 3 variables left out in B 
do not significantly 
deviate from zero 1.32 (3 D) 
A likelihood ratio test suggests that the three parameters included in (A) but left 
out from (B) do not differ from zero, for which reason the latter was used when 
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computing marginal probabilities of the significant characteristics. Because of a 
problem of heteroscedasticity, I have used probit regression with Huber standard 
errors (i. e. White's method) instead of the basic probit estimation procedure. 25 
The significant coefficients were found to be robust across different 
specifications of the model. They indicate that, firstly, the larger the firm with 
respect to other domestic firms in the industry at the time of the adoption, the 
smaller is its probability of adopting exporting within 4 years from becoming 
interested in exporting26. Secondly, those firms the managers of which have 
knowledge of more foreign languages, have a higher likelihood of adopting 
exporting strategy quickly than firms run by managers with weaker language 
skills. The highly significant control variable indicates that firms which have 
ZSHomoscedasticity assumption is an important assumption in a probit regression, 
where, in practice, one estimates ß/S instead of P. If the error term does not have 
constant variance, estimation produces inconsistent estimates of standard errors and 
also biased parameter estimates (see, e. g., Davidson and McKinnon 1984). Because 
estimation of more general models with full sets of heteroscedasticity correction 
terms was found impossible, undoubtedly due to small number of observations, the 
Huber standard errors procedure was used instead. This procedure does not change 
the coefficient estimates but produces robust confidence standard errors under 
heteroscedasticity (Stata Corporation 1993,406-413). 
26As explained in Table 5, the firm size variable F_SIZE used can have integer 
values from 1 to 5 and is based on the assessments by the entrepreneurs. Normally, 
of course, one would want to use three dummies instead of a one variable in this type 
of situation, which also applies to the variables RISK and EXP_KNOW in the 
present analysis. Here, however, these specifications were found impossible to 
estimate, no doubt because of the small number of observations. I also tried other 
size-measures such as the number of employees today and the number of employees 
at the time of the adoption of exporting: the coefficients were negative but were 
statistically insignificant. Use of other size measures did not have major impact on 
the other significant coefficients in (A) or (B). 
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started to export in the 1990s have a higher probability of adopting the exporting 
strategy fast than firms which have started exporting earlier. Other characteristics 
included in the analysis do not, on the basis of the specification (A), affect 
significantly the speed of the adoption process. With the exception of the firm 
size and the need for experimental knowledge, the coefficient estimates have the 
expected signs shown in Table 6. 
As to firm size, several alternative explanations for the unexpected negative 
relationship with the speed of adoption can be thought. The first one of these is 
that there may not be significant economies of scale (or scope) to be achieved in 
the initial phase of exporting. Intuitively, given that we are dealing with small 
firms, this might well be true. On the other hand, the negative coefficient may 
reflect a measurement error as exporting is likely to result in growth of firms and 
the firms in the sample are in most cases late adopters of exporting strategy in 
highly internationalized sectors. Thirdly, the result may reflect the fact that in a 
small firm the 10 per cent share of exports of the turnover is probably easier to 
achieve than in a large firm. One can also argue that the sector dummy may not 
be enough to capture the effect of product characteristics on the speed of 
adoption to the full, leaving open a possibility that small firm size is related to 
production of certain, highly specialized products. 
Finding those firms that have started exporting in the 1990s likely to be quick 
adopters directly supports the third hypothesis according to which the 
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development of exporting in firms has accelerated in time, due to, among other 
developments, economic integration. Yet again the result is susceptible to 
another interpretation. Because of the major slump in the domestic markets in 
1991-93 in Finland, the export shares of the firms may have grown even if there 
were no change in the actual values of firms' export deliveries. However, a 
scrutiny of the data reveals that this is unlikely to have influenced the analysis 
since only one of the quick adopters that have adopted the exporting strategy in 
1990-1994 have the share of exports lower than 10 per cent either in 1994 or 
1995. Of course it is possible that the domestic slump operated as a push factor, 
forcing firms to develop their exporting independent of economic integration. 
The influence of the entrepreneurs' language skills on the likelihood of adopting 
exporting strategy fast can be examined in detail through the probability values 
given in Table 8. These are probabilities of a rapid adoption calculated for firms 
the managers of which have a knowledge of either 0,1,2,3 or 4 foreign 
languages, ceteris paribus, in the specification B. In other words, the 
probabilities are computed for a hypothetical firm of average size, the level of 
exchange rate at the initial phase of exporting, time of starting exporting and 
sector. 
The figures in Table 8 suggest that, if the entrepreneur has knowledge of two 
foreign languages instead of one (which is close to the average and the mode 
value), the probability of adopting the exporting strategy fast rises from 0.48 to 
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0.69, i. e more than 40 per cent. Learning one more foreign language 
increases this hypothetical probability of adopting the exporting strategy fast for 
another 23 per cent (i. e. from 0.69 to 0.85). While the positive coefficient is 
something one could expect, the magnitude of this effect is surprisingly large. 
This is likely to reflect the crucial role of an entrepreneur in a small firm. 
Naturally, language skills can be related to having a more international overall 
orientation to marketing, and possibly to earlier experience in export 
operations. 27 
Table 1.8. Probability of fast adoption of exporting strategy for "average" firms 
differing only as a result of manager's language skills (computed at the means of 
other X's in specification B). 
O(ß'x) 
Knowledge of 0 foreign languages 0.28 
Knowledge of 1 foreign languages 0.48 
Knowledge of 2 foreign languages 0.69 
Knowledge of 3 foreign languages 0.85 
Knowledge of 4 foreign languages 0.94 
27A closer look at the knowledge of languages reveals that four out of five 
entrepreneurs speak English and two out of five German, whereas knowledge of 
French and other languages is rather rare (Knowledge of Swedish was excluded from 
the analysis since this is a native language for some of the entrepreneurs). It was 
possible to include only German in the model (B) as separate dummy variable: it 
turned out to be statistically insignificant (p-value 0.11). The influence of earlier 
work experience of the entrepreneurs in large firms, foreign firms or consultancies 
was found to be negative in the model (B) but statistically insignificant (p-value 
0.43). 
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A rapid development of exporting can be seen as a sign of competitiveness and 
success of the firm in exporting. Given this, it is relevant to ask whether a rapid 
adoption of exporting is an important element in the firm's overall success, or is 
exporting just one of many possible strategies for these firms? It is also unclear 
on the basis of the above analysis whether adopting exporting rapidly is actually 
related to product-specific rather than firm-specific characteristics, and whether it 
could result from some organizational changes or innovations in the firm. 
A scrutiny of the interview material suggests that it is very unlikely that these 
alternative explanations would in general hold good. Quick adopters are not 
producing any specific goods and are not especially R&D oriented. Neither have 
they used any specific marketing channels at the initial phase of exporting. 
Instead, they show considerable variation in all these aspects. Also, the stimuli 
for exporting vary from unsolicited orders to intrinsic, strategic growth aims of 
firms, as they do in firms that have been slower adopters of exporting. Neither 
are there any salient common features in the basic competitive strategies 
(competitive - defensive) of the quick exporters, or statistically significant 
evidence suggesting that the strategies would differ from the ones adopted by the 
slower adopters of exporting. Further, in terms of net financial result in 1995, the 
quick adopters seem not to be more successful than the firms which developed 
exporting more slowly. Some of the quick developers of exporting firms have 
found export markets suddenly as a bonanza, whereas for some firms it has been 
65 
a natural strategy because of the smallness of domestic markets. Neither does a 
fast adoption of exporting seem to be related to organizational changes in the 
firms28. Slow adopters perceive themselves as having improved their products 
and technology through exporting more than rapid adopters. 
Overall, this analysis suggests that the really important factor in the firms' export 
success has been the influence of the entrepreneurs. This influence is likely to be 
the greater the smaller the firm, and thus the suggestion coincides with the 
finding that the influence of firm size on the speed of adoption is negative. 
6. Conclusions 
The above analysis generates both theoretical and policy implications. The 
theoretical model used in this chapter can describe a process as complex and 
1 
dynamic as the development of exporting in a small firm in only a very crude 
way. Even so, the exercise suggests that the theory of innovation diffusion can be 
used to model the exporting operations of smaller firms even if we regard the 
traditional learning idea in the closed environment of the firm as inadequate as 
such. Instead, the more recent developments in the theory of innovation diffusion 
28This is suggested by a statistical test where a dummy variable that describes 
whether the firm has been re-established or not was included in the equation (B). 
The coefficient for the dummy was statistically insignificant and negative (p-value 
0.14). 
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such as the rank effects theory, which was used in this chapter together with 
epidemic learning, seem to provide potential frameworks for theorizing export 
behaviour. The empirical analysis in this chapter focused mainly on the costs of 
exporting and the speed of adopting the exporting strategy, reflecting the 
predictions of the rank effects theory. The findings are largely in line with the 
predictions of the theoretical application. 
It must of course be acknowledged that the actual number of observations that 
have contributed to the results in this study is small (26-55 firms), and the 
robustness of the results to an increase in the number of observations cannot be 
known. Subject to this qualification, however, the main suggestion of the 
analysis is clear: it seems not, among other things, the financial risk related to 
exporting, nor the lack of experience, nor the education level of the white collar 
staff that is likely to determine which small firms develop their exporting 
quickly, but rather the language skills of the entrepreneurs. This not only 
underlines the importance of language skills in the development of exporting, but 
is also a manifestation of the crucial role of an entrepreneur in a small firm. 
Hence, on the basis of the above analysis, supporting present and future 








According to the principle of differentiation firms differentiate 29 to relax price 
competition. This is a theoretically feasible result and a hypothesis that 
"corresponds to the recommendation found in most marketing texts concerning 
market segmentation, and to the observation that firms do successfully 
differentiate in the real world" (Tirole 1988,286). Product differentiation has 
also been the centre of great attention in the recent theoretical literature in 
international trade. Yet in contrast to the plentiful theoretical literature, there are 
few in-depth empirical analyses of the differentiation behaviour of firms in the 
industrial economics literature. The search for empirical insights into 
differentiation by firms is made especially attractive by the fact that the results in 
theoretical studies have often turned out to be tied to technical nuances of the 
models employed (Waterson 1994,133). In particular, one can argue that 
theoretical industry-centred models are not very good at predicting individual 
firms' behaviour when there are many strategic options available for firms. It has 
been argued that this relative underdevelopment of analysis starting from an 
individual firm's point of view pervades microeconomic theory in general (see 
Kay 1991). 
29The term differentiation is used in this article to refer to differentiation of 
competing products, whereas the term change in product specification refers to 
changes in the characteristics of a firm's product. 
69 
The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the differentiation behaviour 
of small industrial firms in Finland. Contrary to theoretical studies, my point of 
view is firm-based rather than industry-based. The study uses the case study 
method of research, which is a rigorous methodology that allows decision- 
making processes and causality to be studied, being ideal for studying research 
topics where existing theory is inadequate (Chetty 1997). The present 
longitudinal study of product strategies is especially relevant given two 
developments in the economy of Finland. Firstly, Finland joined the European 
Union in the beginning of 1995, which may have encouraged firms to rearrange 
their products due to a decrease in transportation costs and/or changes in the 
intensity of international competition they potentially face. Secondly, the 
economy has gone through a major depression in the early years of the 1990's, 
which may have been reflected in firms' product strategies as well. 
I also tentatively present a methodology to examine differentiation by firms by 
applying the so-called characteristics approach. In this tentatively proposed 
methodology a set of parameters of competition of firms is taken as a given set of 
characteristics that typify products, and changes in this spectrum are assumed to 
reflect changes in product specifications. Empirically the study uses a data-set 
collected by interviewing 56 managing directors of industrial small firms in 
Finland in 1992 and again in 1996. For the case-study, additional material was 
collected in in-depth interviews of four of the managers in the spring of 1997. 
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The paper has been organized as follows. The next few pages survey the 
literature on product differentiation. Section 3 presents the methodology based 
on the parameters of competition. The empirical analyses are presented in 
Section 4, with the statistical approach presented first and the case study of firms 
second. Section 5 summarizes observations based on the case-study, and Section 
6 ends the article by considering implications of the study for theory. 
2. How and why do firms differentiate? 
Differentiation has been considered as "one of the most pervasive features of 
modem economies" (Waterson 1994,105). By differentiating their products from 
competitors' products firms seek to lessen the price elasticity of the demand they 
face, i. e. to obtain (short term) market power. 3° According to Porter (1980) 
differentiation provides shelter against competitive rivalry because of brand 
loyalty by customers and resulting lower sensitivity to price. This customer 
loyalty and the need for a competitor to overcome uniqueness form entry barriers 
to industries. 
30In slightly more formal terms, suppose that two firms produce products which 
are perfect substitutes from the point of view of consumers. Both firms in this 
elementary example face a demand P=a-b, q, - b2g2, where a and b, = b2 are 
positive constants. If the products become differentiated, b, - b2 become >0 for firm 
1 and b2 - bl >0 for firm 2, i. e. the residual demand curves the firms 
face become 
more downward sloped, the demand becomes less elastic with respect to the price 
and the firms gain (short term) market power. (Carlton and Perloff 1994,288) 
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On the other hand, achieving differentiation sometimes preclude gaining high 
market share (Porter 1980,38). Naturally, rationally behaving firms differentiate 
only if it is anticipated to be profitable in the sense that the expected loss of 
demand resulting from a potentially smaller market segment is outweighed by the 
expected benefits from less intense price competition (see Tirole 1988,286 and 
Moorthy 1988). There are also other reasons which may discourage 
differentiation, such as "agglomeration economies" (see Swann 1985). These are 
mutual external economies accruing to two or more producers selling similar 
products. According to Swann (op. cit., 36), in product space, these are of two 
sorts: standardization economies and informational externalities. The 
standardization economies are exemplified by a firm making standard size paper 
since it fits standard envelopes, photocopiers etc., and the informational 
economies by a potential entrant who chooses a particular design that has been 
successfully produced and marketed by an incumbent firm. Technical standard- 
ization as a factor limiting possibilities of differentiation is also mentioned by 
1P 
Buigues and Jacquemin (1989). Tirole (1988,286-287) divides forces opposing 
differentiation into three categories. These are, firstly, positive externalities, 
secondly, that firms wish to "be where the demand is", and thirdly, that price 
competition may be subdued for legal or technical reasons in which case 
differentiation to relax it is not relevant. 
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2.1. Horizontal and vertical differentiation 
If an enterprise embraces the differentiation strategy it has, in theoretical terms, 
two possibilities. It can differentiate in either the horizontal or vertical 
dimension: in general, differentiation is vertical when it is based on quality 
differences between related products, and horizontal when it is based on 
differences in the tastes of consumers . 
31 Following the characteristics approach to 
differentiation (Waterson 1994,106): 
Definition 1: 
"If we consider a class of goods as being typified by a set of (desirable) 
characteristics, then two varieties are vertically differentiated when the first 
contains more of some or all characteristics than the second, so that all rational 
consumers given a free choice would opt for the first. They are horizontally 
differentiated when one contains more of some but fewer of other characteristics, 
so that two consumers exhibiting different tastes offered a free choice would not 
unambiguously plump for the same one ". 
This definition, however, seems fully exhaustive only under certain assumptions. 
"Greenaway (1984) distinguishes conceptually also a third form, technological 
differentiation. It occurs when one or more of the core characteristics of a product 
are technologically altered. However, this resembles closely vertical differentiation 
and, as Greenaway himself admits (p. 232), "in practice the distinction (between the 
two) may be somewhat opaque". 
73 
Notably, in the case of the vertical differentiation, if the consumers were also 
concerned with prices of products, differing prices could offset any difference in 
the other characteristics of the two products. Showing this, Anglin (1992) argues 
that "the important distinction between different models of product 
differentiation lies in an understanding of fixed costs", which in turn reinforces 
earlier reasoning by Shaked and Sutton (e. g., 1987). 32 In addition, it seems 
likely that horizontal differentiation defined in the above manner also involves 
vertical differentiation if one of the two products contains more of several 
characteristics but less of only few characteristics than the other one. 
Nevertheless, for the present empirical purposes it seems reasonable to adopt the 
above definition based on the difference in the way of ranking of products. 
The principle of differentiation, i. e., that firms differentiate to relax price 
competition, has been shown to hold in both horizontal and vertical 
differentiation models. In the case of the horizontal differentiation, an illustrative 
example is the study by Neven (Neven 1985). He modifies Hotelling's (1929) 
framework to one with quadratic transport costs and uses the perfect equilibrium 
"See also contributions by Cremer and Thisse (1991) and Dos Santos 
Ferreira and Thisse (1996). Cremer and Thisse show that many horizontal 
differentiation models are actually special cases of a vertical differentiation model 
and thus can yield similar results. Dos Santos Ferreira and Thisse, for their part, 
combine these two major types of differentiation using the spatial duopoly model 
proposed by Launhardt in the 1880's, where the firms are allowed to have different 
transportation technologies. 
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as the solution concept in a two-period oligopoly game. 33 In the first period firms 
choose the product (i. e. the level of differentiation) and in the second period a 
price for the product. Given the future price competition (subgame perfection and 
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium) in the second period, the firms choose to maximize 
the level of differentiation in the first period of the game. The intuition behind 
the behaviour of firms is in this game apparent: A desire to avoid price 
competition drives firms to choose as different products as possible. Waterson 
(1994,118) suggests that a tendency leading to superabundant variety is 
somewhat general in address models of differentiation. 
In the case of the vertical differentiation the intuition is analogous. Shaked and 
Sutton (1982), for instance, use the framework of perfect equilibrium in a three- 
stage non-cooperative game. Consumers are identical in tastes but differing in 
income. In the first period firms choose whether to enter or not, in the second the 
level of differentiation (quality), and in the final stage a price for the product. It 
appears that "... the two firms choose distinct qualities", because "as their 
qualities become close, price competition between the increasingly similar 
"It must be noted here that the original model by Hotelling (1929) runs somewhat 
counter intuition with respect to the effect of an increase in competition: if the two 
firms in the model moved close together both the optimal output and price would be 
increased (Waterson 1994,117). As well known, the model has no equilibrium in 
pure strategies. Of course, it was D'Aspremont et al. (1979) who made the 
contribution of quadratic transportation costs in the Hotelling's model first, and 
showed that it leads to maximal differentiation in this model. Neven (1985) is used 
here as an example due to the fact that the two period perfect equilibrium game 
illustrates the principle of differentiation more effectively. 
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products reduces the profit of both firms" (p. 12). 34 It has also been suggested 
that, in a longer run, vertical differentiation can have repercussions on industry 
structure if improving quality increases steeply fixed costs instead of variable 
costs35, and that more differentiation occurs under price competition than under 
quality competition whatever the nature of the cost to improve quality (Motta 
1993). It seems also reasonable to assume that in some circumstances quality 
may deteriorate and the price of the product lowered by a firm wishing to become 
different from its competitors (see Lancaster 1979,27-28). 
In practice, differentiation is possible not only via the physical characteristics of 
products, but also by incorporated post-selling services and other features of a 
product-customer relationship (e. g., Buigues and Jacquemin 1989,54). 
34Later (see, e. g., Shaked and Sutton 1987) the authors have suggested that the 
key results of the analysis are fairly robust in respect of alternative specifications of 
the model. 
"See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), and contributions by Shaked and Sutton 
(see, e. g., 1982,1984 and 1987, and Sutton 1986 and 1991). The suggested role of 
vertical differentiation in determining an industry structure becomes visible in a case 
of a market expansion or a fall in fixed costs in relation to variable costs. Two types 
of outcomes have been shown theoretically to be possible (Shaked and Sutton 1984, 
35): Firstly, where the proportion of fixed costs of the costs of improving "quality" is 
high, the number of enterprises with positive market shares is limited in that industry 
irrespective of the size of the market. The intuition is as follows: there is "room" for 
only limited number of firms - with distinct qualities to soften price competition - in 
the industry, because if the quality of a product was low enough, even the poorest 
consumers would buy higher quality. On the other hand, when developing quality 
increases substantially variable unit costs in contrast to fixed costs, these models of 
vertical differentiation yield an outcome which is comparable to the case of the 
horizontal differentiation: As the size of the market increases, the number of firms 
entering with different specifications rises boundlessly. Underlying technology and 
tastes of consumers determine which one of these possibilities dominate. 
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According to Porter (1980,37) a differentiation strategy may be based on design 
or brand image, technology, features, customer network or other dimensions, and 
ideally a firm differentiates itself along several dimensions. Actually, all non- 
price factors of competitiveness of firms (sometimes called the "real 
competitiveness"), may be used by firms in differentiation (Eskelinen and 
Lautanen 1996). According to Piercy (1982) these relate either to a product itself 
(such as quality and design), supporting services (such as advice and assistance 
to customers prior to purchase, after sales services, terms and conditions of 
payment or guarantees) or advertising and marketing (marketing channels or 
intangible values such as brand images). 
Porter (1980,38) stresses that differentiation strategy does not allow the firm to 
ignore costs, but rather low costs are not the primary target for a firm that has 
adopted this strategy. The need for low costs is reduced by the fact that 
differentiation increases price-cost margins. As to costs of differentiation, costs 
from developing a better product, or an image of a superb product (vertical 
differentiation), are likely to be fixed type costs from R&D or advertising, rather 
than variable type costs such as labour or raw material outlays (e. g., Shaked and 
Sutton 1984). Models of vertical differentiation suggest that if a firm is 
successful in producing a product better in some regard than those of its rivals, 
with a limited increase in its unit variable costs, it can capture a significant share 
of the market (Sutton 1986,397). On the other hand, where technology and tastes 
of consumers make such a development useless, the industry is likely to stay 
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fragmented (i. e., the differentiation by firms resembles horizontal differentiation, 
as explained in the above footnote). 
Kay's (Kay 1993) "distinctive capabilities" of firms, i. e., the features of a firm's 
position or organization which cannot readily be reproduced by competitors, 
resemble closely differentiation as a source of competitive advantage. A 
distinctive capability may be generally based on architecture (collection of 
relational contracts), innovation (new products, processes, or styles of 
relationship), reputation (high quality in character), or the ownership of strategic 
assets (a source of competitive advantage that is derived from factors external to 
the firm rather than from its own distinctive capabilities). According to Kay (op. 
cit. ) a distinctive capability becomes a competitive advantage when it is applied 
in an industry and brought to a market, which normally has both product and 
geographic dimensions. Clearly, a distinctive capability may also result in an 
ability to produce a product with lower costs than competitors, in which case 
1 
differentiation generally would not be the ideal primary strategic target for the 
firm. 
2.2. Empirical approaches 
In contrast to the theoretical literature there is surprisingly little empirical 
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research on product differentiation per se in the industrial economic literature. 36 
Econometric studies of differentiated products markets have often focused on 
automobile markets, whereas examples of studies on other markets are 
represented by Shaw (1982), Swann (1985) and Sutton (1991). Shaw focuses on 
product competition in the UK agricultural fertilizer market using the 
characteristics approach. By using the case-study method of reasearch he is able 
to capture nicely the process of competition (in terms of introduction, relocation 
and proliferation of products) between three main producers of fertilizers over a 
period of 30 years from 1958 till 1978. Products are identified in the analysis by 
their plant food ratios and the total plant food contents. The conclusions suggest, 
for example, that competition for market share resulted generally in product 
proliferation rather than leapfrogging behaviour by the firms, and that many 
products were already initially optimally located entailing thus no changes in 
their characteristics over a long time. Some (weak) support for birth of clusters of 
minimally differentiated products is found. Overall, although the approach of this 
early study is ingenious, it seems to have the understandable limitation that it is 
explicitly concerned only with the horizontal differentiation of products. 
The paper by Swann analyses product competition in microprocessors through 
36Product differentiation has also been a much discussed topic in empirical 
studies of international trade. Yet, understandably, these studies have not focused on 
the differentiation behaviour of firms or its motivations per se, but succeeded in 
explaining intra-industry trade by product differentiation (see, e. g., Hummels and 
Levinsohn 1993). On the measurement of product differentiation in these studies, 
see, e. g., Greenaway (1984). 
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variations of the Hotelling's (1929) model. Thus, again, it is only concerned with 
horizontal differentiation. The study focuses on a role for "agglomeration 
economies", i. e., mutual external economies accruing to two or more producers 
selling similar products, that lessen firms' incentives to locate apart from each 
other. Product developments in microprocessors are followed over the period 
1971-81 through three key parameters: power of the device, number of computer 
features incorporated in the one device and (subjectively measured) status of 
device. The results tend to support the role of agglomeration economies. 
Actually, the data shows two types of clustering: copying established designs, 
and tendency for some producers to cluster in their own designs. Consequently 
Swann concludes (p. 52) that models which predict product dispersion are 
inadequate for the analysis of product competition in the microprocessor industry 
if they do not give a role to agglomeration economies. Sutton (1991), for his part, 
finds in an extensive study of food industries support for the link between a 
concentrated structure and advertising intensity as the model of vertical 
differentiation (where costs of improvement in product quality falls mainly on 
fixed costs) predicts. Hence the results from this study implicitly also support the 
principle of differentiation in the considered industries. It is worth noting that the 
key part of the evidence can also here be seen to be based on case studies of 
industries, rather than on the econometric analysis. 
An approach to differentiated products markets that has got much attention in the 
literature is the so-called hedonic price approach (see, e. g., Cowling and Cubbin 
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1971 and Bitros and Panas 1988). This approach is based on the idea that bundles 
of characteristics of products can be used in an econometric analysis to explain 
the price of the products. Markets for cars have been popular subjects for 
investigations, since cars are clearly indivisible products and because different 
models of cars offer reasonably easily distinguishable bundles of characteristics 
implying quality differences between different models. This is important due to 
the fact that the approach is based on the assumption that the relevant 
characteristics of the models are included in the analysis. Given that this 
assumption is satisfied, the coefficients from regressing prices on the character- 
istics can be interpreted as implicit prices of the characteristics that reflect the 
consumers' marginal valuation of the characteristics concerned. These prices 
equal the marginal cost of supplying a characteristic and, if the differentiation 
gives firms market power, a monopoly element on the top of it (Hay 1979,90- 
92). In general, however, it seems reasonable to suspect that the hedonic prices 
approach is most suitable in the context of markets where vertical differentiation 
is important. This is because horizontal differentiation does not necessarily 
manifest itself in price differences between the different models (Greenaway and 
Milner 1986,120). 
Berry et al. (1995) and Goldberg (1995) have developed further techniques for 
econometrically analysing demand and supply in differentiated products markets 
using the characteristics approach. In a way these analyses may be seen as an 
outgrowth of the critique of the hedonic price approach. The distictive 
feature of 
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them is that they apply discrete choice models in which individual choice 
behaviour is explicitly modeled (for the theory, see, e. g., Anderson et al. 1992 
and 1995). The analyses can be argued to take into account horizontal 
differentiation better than hedonic regressions, or analyses based on models of 
pure vertical differentiation, such as Bresnahan (1987). The latter studied pricing 
in the U. S. auto markets by applying the model by Shaked and Sutton (1982). 
Berry et al. (op. cit., ) consider two problems that rise quite naturally in the 
characteristics approach to differentiated products markets. The first one of these 
concerns the assumed functional form of the consumer utility and the resulting 
pattern of cross-price elasticities between different products. The second problem 
is related to the correlation between prices (which are observed by the 
econometrician) and product characteristics (some of which are observed by 
consumers but not by the econometrician), and the bias in estimated elasticities 
that this induces. The authors show in the paper that these problems can be 
solved by moving from individual to aggregate demands by the simulation 
method, and on the other hand, by solving a non-linear simultaneous equations 
problem related to the endogeneity of prices to account for the second problem. 
While Berry et al. (op. cit. ) use mostly aggregate data, Goldberg (op. cit. ) analyses 
the same oligolistic markets using disaggregate consumer data. Here the process 
of buying a specific car is modelled as a nested sequence of logit models, which 
allows explicit consideration of an outside good and avoids some unintuitive 
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substitution patterns imposed by a simple logit model. The total demand is 
derived as the weighted sum of individual household demands. Endogeneity of 
prices has been avoided by assuming in the demand side estimation procedure 
that a single household does not have an impact on vehicle prices and 
characteristics. 
Unfortunately the econometric auto market studies cited seem not to provide very 
extensive intuition regarding the differentiation behaviour of individual firms or 
the causal relations related to changes in product locations. Bresnahan (1987) 
provides evidence that the decrease in prices and increase inquantitiesobserved in 
1955 was due to the breakdown of a cartel, and Goldberg (1995) concludes, for 
example, that quota restrictions on Japanese car imports in the 1980's have 
resulted in an increase in overall quality and prices of automobile sales in the 
U. S. However, the motives of firms to increase quality (indeed, to be different 
from competitors or to imitate them), and the role of advertising and a firm's 
reputation for quality as perceived by customers, amongst other issues, remain 
fairly unclear on the basis of the studies. 
2.3. How does economic integration affect differentiation by frms? 
In the current conditions of deepening economic integration in Europe, the 
principle of differentiation has special significance as the potential benefits from 
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the internal market programme are to stem to a considerable degree from an 
increase in competition by firms (Cecchini 1988, Emerson et al. 1988, see also 
Jacquemin and Wright 1993). Realization of the so-called dynamic gains, in 
particular, involves processes such as an improvement of the organisational 
efficiency of firms and an increase in innovative activity that are boosted by 
competition. A straightforward conclusion from the above argument is that the 
pressure of competition that is created by the internal market programme and 
concomitant competition policy tends to lose its edge through the intrinsic aim of 
firms to differentiate their products. Of course, on the other hand, differentiation 
is beneficial for consumers if it results in products which are better in quality or 
otherwise closer to individuals' tastes, but less expensive. 
Models of international trade with product differentiation generally assume that 
consumers' welfare can be increased by trade liberalization either in the form of 
increased variety of products available to consumers and/or lower prices 
1 
resulting from harsher competition. Motta (1992) divides the models of 
international trade in differentiated products in general into monopolistic and 
oligopolistic competition models. According to him (Motta 1992,578) the 
monopolistic competition models tend to emphasize the result that trade benefits 
all partner countries either in the form of a greater variety of differentiated 
products available to consumers, or in the form of both greater variety and lower 
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prices because of increased competition. 37 In oligopolistic models the answer to 
the question what is the effect of economic integration on especially horizontal 
differentiation by firms in a small country seems less conclusive. It has been 
argued that the outcomes are fairly dependent on the specific assumptions made 
in the models about, among other things, the pattern of consumers' choice over 
the differentiated products (Shaked and Sutton 1984,34), and it is even quite 
possible to achieve outcomes where trade decreases the number of horizontally 
differentiating firms and the variety of products available to consumers in a 
smaller country (see, e. g., Eaton and Kierzkowski 1984). Neither do prices 
necessarily fall in this case. 
As to vertical differentiation models, outcomes seem more robust. Notably, 
Motta (1992) reworks the model by Shaked and Sutton (1984) arguing that the 
crucial assumption is that of an industry where goods differ by quality rather than 
the particular functional forms adopted. As in the original paper, short run effects 
(qualities given) and long run effects (qualities variable) are separately analyzed. 
In the short run, given that the small country firms are producing in the integrated 
37See, however, Lancaster (1984) where imposing a tariff increases the number of 
products available and, in a longer term, number of firms in the smaller economy. 
This is because a tariff decreases the competitiveness of imports making the demand 
in the small country less price elastic (in the short term), which in turn attracts new 
entry. Initially, however, trade also increases the degree of product variety in this 
specific model (p. 152). The number of firms producing differentiated goods in a 
smaller economy may also decrease in a case where firms are allowed to have 
differing market shares in the domestic and export markets (Venables 1987) or 
where firms in a particular industry are asymmetric in export behaviour, i. e., some of 
them export while the others do not (Venables 1994). 
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market equilibrium, there is a price reduction because of harsher competition. In 
the long run, given that all the small country firms do not go bust because of a 
too wide quality gap to the large country's firms prior to integration, qualities 
also increase. This is because under harsher competition every firm has an 
incentive to increase its product quality above the autarky level. The result is also 
in line with Sutton (1991) as the finiteness property holds in the model, i. e., there 
exists an upper limit to number of firms producing differing qualities no matter 
how much the markets expand. 
However, it seems possible that competition may also ease in some smaller and 
more peripheral country markets (such as Finland) as a consequence of the 
integration-induced reorganization of economic activities. This possibility rises, 
for example, in Krugman and Venables (1990) paper where the authors consider 
the effect of economic integration on the competitiveness of a small peripheral 
country in a two-country model. The smaller, peripheral country in the model is 
characterized by lower production costs but higher total transport costs to the 
other market. The authors show that a moderate (but not complete) reduction in 
transport costs can result in an equilibrium where the entire production is shifted 
to the more central country whereas the small one is being served exclusively by 
exports. Itaki and Waterson (1993) model a similar situation from a point of view 
of an multinational enterprise. The argument is that an integration-induced 
reduction in transport costs may encourage existing multinational firms, that 
perform similar activities in more than one country, to concentrate their 
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production geographically into fewer spots and serve the rest of their markets by 
exporting. 
3. The empirical approach based on parameters of competition of firms 
In this chapter I describe a methodology to analyze differentiation behaviour of 
firms on the basis of information on their parameters of competition. The virtue 
of the approach is that no direct information on the product characteristics, prices 
or costs of firms are needed. 
3.1. Parameters of competition and a product spectrum 
Parameters of competition, such as price, quality or design, describe a firm's own 
perception of what factors their product's competitiveness is based on. 
Consequently, a set of parameters of competition can be seen as a given set of 
characteristics which typify products: a good is described by the importance of 
different parameters of competition for that good, hereafter a product spectrum. 
Thus, changes in product specification will by assumption be reflected as 
changes in this spectrum (cf. Lancaster 1979). 
To distinguish between the vertical and horizontal changes in a firm's product 
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specification in this approach, it is useful to review the definition 1 (in Section 
2). Consider then a good GT being characterized at time T by the product 
spectrum (PT, n1T), which consists of the importance of price, denoted by p, and 
the importance of more than one (but a finite number of) other parameters of 
competition, n; = In,, n2, ..., n1 }. Assume an earlier model of this good, at time t, t 
< T, be denoted by G,. Distinguishing between horizontal and vertical changes in 
product specification is now straightforward: 
Definition 2: 
The two models of the good, G, and G,, T>t, are horizontally different 
specifications when the importance of at least one non-price parameter n;, is 
higher at the moment T than at t but the importance of at least one other non- 
price parameter is lower, so that two consumers given free option between the 
products at the moment T would not necessarily choose the same one. The two 
products are vertically different specifications when the importance of one or 
more non-price parameter is greater (or smaller) at the moment T than at t, so 
that consumers given equal possibilities to opt for any of the two products at the 
moment T would unanimously prefer the same one. 
Defining the difference between the two types of changes in product specifica- 
tion in the above manner rests on differences between the two product spectrums 
defined at different points of time. Product spectrums of different enterprises 
cannot, by assumption, be reliably compared with each other because they are 
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based on subjective evaluations. The definition is also subject to four assump- 
tions. Firstly, indivisibility of goods is assumed to ensure the possibility of 
vertical differentiation. Secondly, the utility of consumers, let it be denoted by U, 
is assumed to strictly increase with respect to the importance of non-price 
parameters of competition of firms, i. e., U(n) >0 for every n; ={n,, ..., n1}. Yet 
there is no reason to assume that the hypothetical effects of different parameters 
of competition on the utility of consumers would be mutually comparable, or 
linear. Thirdly, it is assumed that consumers, who differ in their tastes and 
incomes, appraise products on the basis of non-price characteristics, and fourthly, 
of course, that the importance of these non-price parameters can be objectively 
assessed. 
The first of these assumptions is a standard technical assumption in the address 
models of product differentiation, and also reasonable here because the empirical 
analysis focuses on manufactured wood-processing and engineering products. 
The purpose of the second assumption is to guarantee that a vertical change in 
specification implies an improvement (or deterioration) of the "quality" of a 
product. This is apparently satisfied as the non-price parameters are measures 
used by enterprises in competition for consumers. The third assumption 
quarantees that a quality difference between two specifications of a product 
cannot be offset by a price difference. It should be noticed that offsetting a 
quality difference by price difference does not eliminate the quality difference 
per se, which will still be observable to consumers. Hence, the location of the 
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product in the product space changes. It is the last one of the assumptions which 
is the Achilles's heel of the approach since it is susceptible to subjective 
interpretations. 
3.2. A product spectrum and the principle of differentiation 
Parameters of competition reflect the elasticities of demand with respect to the 
corresponding characteristics of the product. To see this suppose again that a 
good is characterized at a moment by a set of firm's parameters of competition (p, 
n; ), i=1, ..., 5. 
Let the importance of parameters of competition for the 
firm/product be measured by, say, an integer scale from 1 (not important) to 5 
(very important). Consider then the two different product spectrums shown in 
Figure 1. 














p nI n2 n3 n4 n5 p nI n2 n3 
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For the good A price is the only important parameter of competition and thus the 
real price of the product is likely to be low in comparison to prices of competing 
products (Figure 1). As the competitiveness of this product in this market 
situation depends exclusively on the price of the product, there must be close 
substitutes for the product within consumers' reach. Clearly, a marginal change in 
the real price of the product would presumably have a substantially large effect 
on the sales in this situation, i. e., the demand is elastic with respect to the price of 
the product. Consider then the product spectrum B. In this market situation the 
elasticity of the demand is high with respect to the characteristic n3, suggesting 
either that the firm operates in a market (segment) where the dominant form of 
competition is captured by the characteristic n3, or that the product of the firm is 
highly specialized with respect to the characteristic considered. Note also that the 
market resembles a monopoly if the demand is inelastic with respect to all 
(relevant) characteristics, and a competitive market in case the demand is fully 
elastic with respect to all (relevant) characteristics. 
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Figure 2 exemplifies the principle of differentiation in the cases of the vertical 
and horizontal differentiation. As noted above, changes in product specification 
are by assumption reflected in different spectrums of non-price parameters of 
competition. Now, a reduction in the importance of price subsequent to change in 
the product specification implies that the firm has become less concerned with 
the price of its product with respect to competing products. In other words, by 
assumption, the enterprise has been successful in softening price competition 
through differentiation. In the case of the vertical differentiation, one (or more) 
of the non-price parameters get more (or less) emphasis, whereas in the case of 
the horizontal differentiation changes in the importance of (at least) two of the 
non-price parameters are in the opposite directions between the two points of 
time, t and T, T>t (Figure 2). 
Vertical differentiation Horizontal differentiation 
p n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 p nl n2 n3 n4 n5 
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4. Empirical observations 
4.1. The data 
The data-set used in this statistical analysis is based on two separate interviews 
of 56 managing directors of industrial small businesses in Finland. These 
interviews were carried out in the summer of 1992 and in the spring of 1996, the 
latter one of which especially for this study (for the questionnaire, see Appendix 
1). 38 In addition, the managing directors of four firms subject to a closer 
investigation (in Section 4.5. ) were interviewed for a third time in the spring of 
1997. The firms in the data-set are independent and locally-owned enterprises in 
2 wood-processing (15 enterprises)39 and 4 engineering (41 enterprises) 3-digit 
sectors, and they each employ from 4 to 167 persons. The 56 firms represent 
about 3 per cent of firms employing from 10 to 199 employees in the wood- 
1°In total the data-set includes 80 firms interviewed in 1992 and 76 firms 
interviewed in 1996, but due to changes in the firms' management and main products 
only 56 enterprises were accepted for the analysis. The interviews in 1992 were 
associated with the Nordic comparative study "Smäföretagens internationalisering - 
en studie av anpassningsprocesser till EG'92 och regional utveckling" (see Lindmark 
et al. 1994, Eskelinen et al. 1994 and Lautanen 1994). The 1996 sample also 
includes those firms that had been adjudicated bankrupt between 1992 and 1996 but 
which had been re-established afterwards. The interviews were structured, 
confidential, made in face-to-face situations, and the interviewers (usually a pair) 
were academic persons involved in the project. 
390ne firm processing paper products (ISIC 341) has been incorporated into 
wood-processing sector. 
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processing and engineering sectors in Finland. 40 Basic information on the firms 
in the data-set is presented in Table 1. 
Table Il. 1. Basic information on the firms in the data-set 
Wood- Engineering Total 
processing SIC 38 
SIC 33 
Number of firms 15 41 56 
of which, % 
- subcontractors 7 40 31 
- producers of semi-finished 
products or components 40 20 26 
- producers of final products 53 40 44 
Number of employees 44 34 36 
-average 23 22 22 
- median 
Number of firms with regular exports 8 20 28 
(column %) (53) (49) (50) 
- average share of exports of the 62 35 43 
turnover 
Number of failures between 1992-96 1 5 6 
(column %) (7) (12) (11) 
The bulk of the enterprises are comparatively small, as the median number of 
employees (22) indicates. Every second one of the firms had regular exports in 
1995, with an average share of exports of the turnover of 43 per cent. The data on 
'Central Statistical Office of Finland, Register of Enterprises. 
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the parameters of competition consists of the assessments of the entrepreneurs on 
how important price and five other attributes (quality, technical standard, relia- 
bility of delivery, design and customization) were for the competitiveness of the 
main product of the enterprise at the time of each interview. These assessments 
are given on an integer scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (very important). Thus, 
the present empirical approach can describe 3125 (= 55) different product 
spectrums. Naturally, because changes in these spectrums are restricted in the 
two extreme cases where all the parameters of competition have either highest or 
lowest meaning, horizontal changes in product specification in accordance with 
Definition 2 can only take place in 3123 of these spectrums. In addition to the 
information on the parameters of competition, the data-set includes versatile 
information on the differentiation behaviour, competitive conditions and 
exporting operations of the firms. 
The potential influences of economic integration on firms' operations follow 
from the fact that Finland became a member in the European Economic Area 
(EEA) in 1994 and the European Union (EU) in the beginning of 1995. Trade in 
industrial goods, however, had been free of tariffs between the EU (or its 
predecessors) and Finland since the late 1970's41. Consequently, this study is 
41The free trade agreement between Finland and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) was signed in 1973, but a majority of the institution did not come 
into force before 1978. This agreement covered trade in industrial goods with the 
exception of some food industry sectors. The openness of Finland's economy to 
international competition has also been due to the country's membership of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Finland was an associated member of 
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concerned with the effects of a reduction in the non-tariff barriers to trade 
implied by the internal market programme. Firms have to, for example, cope 
with the fact that earlier regulatory practices in foreign direct investments into 
Finland have been abolished42, and that lower non-tariff barriers to trade may 
intensify import competition. Finland also joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) in 1996 and it is an established aim of the country to join the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) once it is established. Overall, one can argue that 
given the initial openness of the Finnish wood and metal industries to 
international competition, the effects of the recent deepening of integration are to 
be found most clear at the level of firms, especially in their strategies and 
competitive conditions" 
On the other hand, as the economies of its Scandinavian neighbour countries, 
Norway and Sweden, the economy of Finland went through one of the most 
severe depressions in its history in the early years of the 1990's, which may also 
1P 
EFTA from 1961 onwards and became a full member in 1986. For a succinct 
historical survey on the integration of Finland and Western Europe, see ETLA 1992, 
28-32. 
42These were restrictive especially in the forest industries until 1989. On the 
whole, foreign direct investments into Finnish manufacturing industry were insig- 
nificantly small still even at the beginning of 1993 (Heikkilä 1994). 
43For the import penetration ratios and the shares of exports of production in the 
wood-processing and metal sectors studied in this paper, see Lautanen (1994). The 
argument is supported by the industry-level studies that suggest that the conventional 
comparative advantage has been largely exploited in the Northern Europe (see 
Neven 1990, Lundberg 1992). The key competitive advantages are now seen to be 
based increasingly on special skills developed by firms especially in the high-tech 
sectors (e. g. Jacquemin and Sapir 1991,88). 
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have been reflected in firms' product strategies. In terms of GDP the economy 
declined in 1991-1992 by about 10 per cent, after which it started to recover 
under the export sectors' lead. The very depth of the recession followed from 
several simultaneous adverse demand and supply shocks, which include a too 
rapid deregulation of the financial markets in the mid-1980's, the overheating of 
the economy and expansion of the public sector in the late 1980's, the collapse in 
exports to the Soviet Union and a cyclical downturn in the Western European 
markets, unrealistically high external value of markka at the turn of the decade, 
and rising public and foreign debt (see, e. g., Bordes et al. 1993). The crisis 
increased both the number of bankruptcies and established firms, thus leaving its 
traces on the industrial structure of the economy. In the present data, about one in 
ten enterprises went through a bankruptcy and were re-established between 1992 
and 1996 (Table 1). Only one of the six failured firms was a regularly exporting 
firm, which is in line with the view that the domestic sector was more seriously 
hurt than the exporting sector of the economy. 
4.2. The hypotheses 
On the basis of the literature review in Section 2 the following three propositions 
are of interest in the statistical analysis: 
1. Horizontal changes in product specification will be more common than 
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vertical ones (improving quality), since horizontal differentiation can be seen as 
an easier and less costly process than improving quality. 
2. The differentiation behaviour of exporting enterprises differs from that of 
firms operating only in the domestic markets. This is because the influences of 
economic integration can be assumed to differ between exporting and non- 
exporting firms. 
3. Economic integration has lead to pressures to improve quality of products or to 
horizontal changes in product specification, and to a decrease in relative price of 
products as a result of harsher competition. 
4.3. Observations based on statistical analyses 
The managers' views on the importance, principal type (horizontal or vertical) 
and practical means of differentiation in their firms are presented in Table 2. The 
information is based on the 1996 interview and analyzed in Table 2 by the two 
aggregate sectors and according to export status (whether a firm is exporting 
regularly or not). Overall, as many as two out of three managers consider 
differentiation as an important or very important part of their firm's competitive 
strategy. In almost every second case the differentiation mainly aims at vertical 
differentiation (improving quality of the product above the quality of 
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competitors' products), whereas aiming at horizontal type of differentiation is 
less frequent. This finding is somewhat contrary to expectations (Hypothesis 1) 
and leads to an important suggestion: a firm's attempt at vertical differentiation 
may be interpreted as horizontal differentiation at the level of the markets if 
firms have specialized in different factors of quality. This possibility becomes 
evident if one considers changes in the product spectrums of two goods (cf. 
Figure 2 above) which become vertically differentiated along a single, but 
different, characteristic: if the impacts of these two different kind of quality 
improvements on the utility of consumers are equal, the two products have 
become (only) horizontally differentiated. I will come back to this important 
observation below. To go back to Table 2, on the basis of a simple X2-test, 
vertical differentiation seems to be less important for engineering enterprises 
than for wood-processing firms. 
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Table 11.2. Descriptive data on the differentiation 
Per cent of firms belonging to the referred group; W = wood-processing firms, 
n=15, E= engineering firms, n=41, RE= firms with regular exporting, n= 28, 
NE=firms no regular exporting operations, n=28, T= all firms, n=56 
Overall meaning of differentiation for the firm: 
WE RE NE T 
1. No meaning at all 0847 6 
2.14 18 15 18 17 
3.7 13 4 18 11 
4.64 28 46 29 37 
5. Very important 14 35 31 29 30 
Principal type of differentiation: 
WE RE NE T 
1. Vertical 21 58 42 54 48 
2. Horizontal 14 13 19 7 14 
3. Both 64 29 39 39 39 
Meaning of physical characteristics of a product in differentiation: 
WE RE NE T 
1. No importance 7 13 8 15 12 
2. Some importance 43 34 34 39 37 
3. Most important 50 53 58 46 52 
Meaning of post-selling services, conditions of sale, by-products etc. in 
differentiation: 
WE RE NE T 
1. No importance 36 40 46 31 39 
2. Some importance 36 26 35 23 29 
3. Most important 29 34 19 46 33 
Meaning of advertising in differentiation: 
WE RE NE T 
1. No importance 43 55 42 62 52 
2. Some importance 43 34 46 27 37 




In practice the most common means of differentiation among the 56 small 
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industrial firms studied has been altering physical features of their products 
(Table 2). The other two possibilities considered, becoming different by post- 
selling services, conditions of sale, by-products etc., or by advertising or 
distribution channels, have not had such an important role in differentiation. This 
finding is likely to be explained by the fact that many of the firms operate as 
subcontractors for other firms rather than produce final products for ordinary 
consumers. As some of the entrepreneurs explicitly remarked in the interviews, 
their "long-term contractors would hardly appreciate their intense advertising 
since in practice it would be interpreted as an attempt to find customers among 
their competitors". For competing subcontractors also many other features of 
producer-customer relationship, such as conditions of sale, are often fixed by the 
contractor. As to Hypothesis 2, x2-tests suggest that there are no significant 
differences in the importance, principal type or means of differentiation between 
regularly exporting firms and other firms (Table 2). 
Next I turn to observations based on the tentative approach based on the 
parameters of competition. Figures 3 and 4 represent the average product 
spectrums for the total number of 56 firms (Figure 3), and for the two aggregate 
sectors and by firms' export status (Figure 4) analyzed in 1992 and 1996. 
Overall, surprisingly small changes in the meaning of different parameters of 
competition of the firms over the 4-year period have occurred. The averages for 
the meaning of reliability of delivery, quality and customization are in practice 
the same at both of the time points. The relevance of price has grown slightly 
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suggesting that price competition has marginally increased between the two 
points of time. On the other hand, the meaning of design and technical standard 
of a product have marginally decreased. 
Figure Average product spectrums in 1992 and 1996, N=54-56. Left pillar: 
1992, right pillar: 1996. Parameters of competition: p= price, nl = reliability of 
delivery, n2 = quality, n3 = technical standard of a product, n4= design and n5 = 






On the basis of Figure 4, it seems that both an increase in price competition, and 
a decrease in competition via the high technical standard of a product have 
concerned mostly regularly exporting, and on the other hand, wood-processing 
firms. Yet, on the basis of simple t-tests for differences in means, none of these 
inter-temporal changes in the meaning of different parameters of competition is 
p nl n2 n3 n4 n5 
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statistically significant. The design of a product has been more important for 
exporting firms than for non-exporting firms both in 1992 and 1996. No 
significant differences in the meaning of different parameters of competition 
were found between the wood-processing and engineering firms. 
Figure 11.4. Average product spectrums by sector and export status (left pillar: 
1992, right pillar: 1996). Parameters of competition: p= price, n1= reliability of 
delivery, n2 = quality, n3 = technical standard of a product, n4= design and n5 = 


























A scrutiny of the changes in the product spectrums reveals that there are 
altogether 19 firms (35 %) in which the changes in the parameters of competition 
satisfy the definition of horizontal change in product specification, and 34 (63 %) 
which satisfy the definition of a vertical change in product specification (see 
Definition 2 and Table 3; cf. Hypothesis 1). For one firm only are the two 
product spectrums identical, which points to the possibility that the 
comparatively large variation in the product spectrums are due to response bias 
(due to the fact that the spectrums are based on two independent subjective 
assessments by the managers). No less than 23 (68 %) of the 34 vertical changes 
in product specifications are cases where at least one of the parameters of 
competition have become less important, suggesting a lowering of product 
"quality". Eleven (58 %) of the horizontal re-specifications and 20 (59 %) of the 
vertical re-specifications further support differentiation - suggesting that in these 
firms price as a parameter of competition has become less important during the 
Regularly exporting Non-exporting 
p nl n2 n3 n4 n5 p ni n2 n3 n4 n5 
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period under examination. 
Table 11.3. Number of horizontal and vertical changes in the product spectrums 







specification; 19 11 23 
number of firms 
Differentiation; 
number of firms 11 7 13 1 
In general, these findings are in line with the view that vertical differentiation is 
especially important for manufacturing firms. However, suspiciously many of the 
vertical changes signal a lowering of quality: do these cases really signal gaining 
market power through relocation of the product, or are they due to easing of 
competition in general when the economy has started to recover from the 
depression? As to differences between the two main sectors, or between 
exporting and non-exporting enterprises, there are no statistically significant 
differences in the frequency of the three forms of product specification or 
differentiation between these groups of firms (cf. Hypothesis 2). Hence, in 
conclusion, these descriptive findings do not unambiguously support either one 
of Hypotheses 1 or 2. 
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Hypothesis 3 was evaluated econometrically. Varibles used in the text and 
equations are presented in Table 4. Firstly, probit models were used to test 
whether observed vertical or horizontal changes in product specifications 
(denoted by h;, v`; and v2; in the equations) are explained by changes in the 
intensity of competition (denoted by c; ), and whether these changes in product 
specifications have allowed firms to put less stress on price as a competitive 
parameter in their product spectrums (which is captured by the variable sgndp; ). 
Secondly, a relaxed form of the hypothesis, according to which the volume of 
changes in the product spectrums in general (denoted by N) can be explained by 
changes in the intensity of competition, was tested using a linear multiple 
regression model (OLS). 
Table IL4. Definitions of the variables used in the text and equations 
Left hand side variables: 
hi Horizontal product specification by the firm i (1 if this is the case, 0 if not) 
v'i Vertical product specification by the firm i, by improving "quality" (1 if this is the 
case, 0 if not) 
v21 Vertical product specification by the firm i, by downgrading "quality" (1 if this is 
the case, 0 if not) 
sgndp, Sign of the change in the importance of price as a parameter of competition for the 
firm i between 1992 and 1996 (1 if negative, 0 if non-negative) 
N, Sum of absolute values of changes in the non-price parameters of competition in 
firm i. 
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Right hand side variables: 
C1Expected change in the competitive situation of the firm in 1992-95, (based on an 
assessment of the manger in 1992: 1 if competition is expected to increase, 0 if no 
change or decrease is expected) 
c21 Occurred change in the competitive situation of the firm i in 1992-96, (based on an 
assessment of the manager in 1996: 1 if competition increased, 0 if no change or 
decrease) 
c31 Hypothetical change in the competitive situation of the firm i (number of the 
industry of firm i in the order of industries according to the pre-EEA level of non- 
tariff barriers to trade, by three-digit ISIC industries) 
Control variables: 
A Change in the proportion of own products of the turnover in 1992-95 (a proxy for 
change in the firm's position in the vertical production chain) 
si Aggregate sector (1 if wood-processing, 0 if engineering) 
ej Export status of the firm (1 if the firm has regular exporting, 0 if not) 
As to the right hand side variables, to achieve reliable results I tried three 
alternative ways of making changes in competitive conditions operational. Two 
of these, c'; and c2;, are based on the managers' assessments and the third one, c3;, 
on the level of non-tariff barriers to trade before Finland's membership of the 
European Economic Area in 1994. The managers' assessments concerned, firstly, 
an expected change in the intensity of competition in 1992-95 (ex ante, based on 
the 1992 interview), denoted by c';, and secondly, a perceived change in the 
competitive situation during the same period (ex post in the 1996 interview), 
denoted by c2;. Values of c3; have been derived from the order of industries 
according to the level of non-tariff barriers to trade (source: Kajaste 1991). An 
industry group dummy (wood-processing or engineering), as well as variables 
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describing the change in the firm's position in the vertical production chain 
(change in the proportion of own products of the turnover) and a firm's export 
status (whether the firm is exporting regularly or not) were included in the 
equations as control variables. Also a control variable for whether a firm has 
been adjudicated bankrupt during the period under examination was tested 
throughout the analysis, but eventually left out from the results since this 
appeared to be highly insignificant in all the equations tested and lowered the fit 
of the models. 
Now I turn to the equations tested in more detail. According to the main 
hypothesis (a rise in) price competition will be relaxed by differentiation. Thus, 
using the notation defined above it was expected, firstly, that for all j: 
P1[h; = 1] = g(c';, *) (1) 
P2[v'; = 1] = g(c';, *) (2) 
P3 [v2; = 1] = g((: ';, *) (3) 
lp 
where P, [h; = I], P21v'; = 1] and P2[v2; = 1] are the probabilities of horizontal and 
the two forms of vertical changes in the product specifications, which are 
expected to be functions of changes in the intensity of competition and the 
control variables. In accordance with the hypothesis, c'; were expected to get 
positive coefficient estimates, whereas the null hypothesis in all the three cases 
took the form: observed vertical or horizontal changes in product specifications 
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are not explained by an increase in competition. 
Secondly, in accordance with the principle of differentiation, a possible change in 
product specification should have allowed the firm to put less emphasis on price 
as a competitive parameter in its product spectrum. Using the agreed notation, 
P4[sgndp, = 11 = f(h;, v';, *) (4) 
where the explanatory variables were expected to get positive coefficient 
estimates. The null hypothesis in this case insists that product specification 
horizontally or vertically through improving product quality is not significantly 
associated with relaxed price competition. 
For estimable forms of the equations (1) - (4) the control terms were specified 
and intercept and error terms added. The probit models were then estimated 
using Limdep software. Selected estimation results are given in Table 5. 
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Table 111.5. Estimation results 
Column 1 Column 2 
Dep. var. H Dep. var. V' 




-0.363 (. 58) 
-------------------------- 
-1.303 (. 08) 
CMCHB (c) 0.368 (. 38) -0.881 (. 04) 
SECTOR (s) 0.324 (. 42) 0.010 (. 98) 
EXREG (e) -0.203 (. 58) 0.664 (. 12) 
CV069 (p) 0.011 (. 24) -0.008 (. 29) 
N of observations 53 53 
Log likelyhood -32.60 -23.63 
signif. level . 
0.41 0.05 
correct predictio ns 37/53 41/53 
Column 4 
Dep. var. SGNDP 
Variable Coeff. (P[ I ZI z z]) 
Constant -0.438 (. 47) 
H 0.127 (. 76) 
VI 0.260 (. 60) 
SECTOR (s) -0.408 (. 30) 
EXREG (e) 0.463 (. 21) 
CV069 (p) 0.004 (. 54) 
N of observations 53 
Log likelyhood -34.09 
signif. level 0.59 
correct predictions 34/53 
Column 3 
Dep. var. V2 
0.005 (. 99) 
0.286 (. 47) 
-0.176 (. 65) 
-0.237 (. 50) 






Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
Dep. var. N 
Variable 
-------------------------- 
B (Sig. T) 
------------------------------- 
B (Sig. T) 
------------------ 
B (Sig. T) 
Constant 6.156 (. 02) 
---------------- 
0.873 (. 73) 
----------------------- 
-0.862 (. 55) V279 (c') -0.618 (. 27) -0.563 (. 33) 
CMCHB (c2) 0.610 (. 46) 
BTOTRAD (c) 0.130 (. 37) 0.236 (. 02) 
CV069 (p) -0.005 (. 74) -0.007 (. 62) -0.003 (. 84) 
SECTOR (s) 1.926 (. 02) 1.133 (. 33) 
EXREG (e) 1.955 (. 01) 1.933 (. 01) 1.708 (. 02) 
Signif F 0.028 0.063 0.019 
R square 0.20 0.22 0.18 
The results given in the columns 1-4 (Table 5) show that only in the case of 
equation (2), where c2; got an unexpected negative coefficient (significance 0.04; 
model significance 0.05), could the null hypothesis be rejected (i. e., the null 
hypotheses remained valid in those cases where the change in competitive 
situation of the firm was operationalized as c'i and c2; ). Consequently, any 
general or robust relation between variables describing changes in the intensity of 
competition and changes in the parameters of competition between the two 
points of time considered (1992-1996) cannot be verified in the present small 
sample. The above mentioned result is, however, conspicuous as it is completely 
contrary to expectations. The result suggests that those firms which had 
experienced an intensity of competition between 1992 and 1996 which had either 
decreased or stayed at the same level, have been more likely to raise the 
"quality" 
of their products. Sticking strictly to Hypothesis 3, this makes no sense.. 
111 
However, the result points to the conclusion that the causal relation in the present 
data may run from differentiation to decreases in competition, rather than vice 
versa. Interpreted in this manner, the finding indicates that the firms have been 
successful in relaxing competition through re-specification of their products. 
This conclusion is, however, clearly rejected in the case of the equation (4) 
(column 4), which specifically tests whether those firms which have re-specified 
their products either horizontally or by improving quality have been more likely 
to experience a decrease in the meaning of price competition over the period of 
time. Thus, overall, there is no basis for such a strong conclusion in the present 
analysis. 
Because of the fact that, as pointed out in the context of Definition 1, vertical and 
horizontal differentiation may overlap when using the characteristic approach to 
differentiation, I also tested a relaxed form of Hypothesis 3. According to this 
hypothesis the volume of changes in the product spectrums in general can be 
explained by changes in the intensity of competition. In other words, I no more 
made the (potentially artificial) distinction between the three types of changes in 
product specifications, but rather looked at the overall volume (number) of 
changes in the non-price parameters of competition. To test the hypothesis, 
different specifications of the linear regression model (5) were estimated by 
OLS: 
N; = a+ß, c`'1+ß2S; +ß3R+Ne1+E; (5) 
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where Ni refers to the sum of absolute values of changes in the importance of 
different parameters of competition of firm i over the four year period under 
examination. The corresponding null hypothesis here naturally maintains that the 
number of changes in product spectrums are independent of changes in the 
intensity of competition. 
The estimation results (for examples of the results, see columns 5-6 in Table 5) 
indicate that none of the three different specifications of a change in firms' 
competitive situations were found to be statistically significantly related to the 
volume of changes in the parameters of competition. Accordingly, the null 
hypothesis that the volume of re-specifications is not related to a change in 
competitive situation, remained valid. However, estimation of the equation (5) 
(without the sector dummy of course) for the two industry groups separately, 
yielded quite different results. On the basis of these tentative estimations it seems 
that the number of changes vary more according to changes in competitive 
situations in the case of the wood-processing firms than in the case of the 
engineering firms. Estimation of the equation for the whole sample without the 
sector control dummy even results in a significant positive coefficient for the 
varible c3 (column 7). This suggests that firms in those industries that had a low 
pre-integration level of non-tariff barriers to trade have changed their products 
more than firm in industries with high barriers to trade, which again is a result 
directly contrary to my expectations. 
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Another interesting result is that, without exception, in all the three different 
specifications tested I found a significant positive coefficient estimate for the 
control variable for exporting status, e;. Hence, it seems that the magnitude of 
changes in product spectrums between 1992 and 1996 is significantly greater in 
those firms that have been exporting regularly than in those which have not. 
These results lend robust support to Hypothesis 2, proposing that the 
differentiation behaviour of exporting firms will be different from the one of 
non-exporting firms, which did not gain support in the light of the descriptive 
analysis in above. On the other hand, the result is also consistent with the finding 
that firms in sectors that had a low pre-integration level of barriers to trade have 
re-specified their products more than firms in sectors with high barriers to trade. 
Arguably, exporting firms have been affected more than firms operating on the 
domestic markets by the large changes in the export price competitiveness of 
Finnish products during the period under examination, or by changes in the 
competitive environment of firms implied by the ever closer economic 
integration of Finland to the European Union. 
On the other hand, as mentioned, the control variable for whether the firm has 
gone into a bankruptcy during the period under examination remained 
insignificant in the analysis and only lowered the fit of the models. In terms of 
volume of changes (N) there are on average only slightly larger changes 
in the 
product spectrums of the failed firms than in those which survived (the means are 
3.6 for surviving and 4.0 for failed firms). This suggests that a bankruptcy 
does 
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not need to dramatically influence product characteristics if the firm was soon re- 
established. 
Overall the above econometric analyses suggest that the impact of a change in 
competition on the differentiation behaviour of firms is quite ambiguous in the 
present analysis. In addition to the above mentioned problems - endogeneity of 
competition, and the problem in differentiating between horizontal and vertical 
differentiation - there are at least three other reasons that may have caused the 
lack of a robust relation between the intensity of competition and differentiation 
by firms in the present context. Firstly, it may be simply the case that the sample 
used is too small and heterogenous in the sense that the firms represent very 
different industries inside the very coarse separation into two aggregate industry 
groups, wood-processing and engineering industries. Secondly, I have assumed 
that no significant changes have taken place in tastes or incomes of consumers 
over the period under examination. This may not hold good especially in the light 
of the very deep depression in Finland in the first half of the 1990's. Thirdly, 
excessive variation in product spectrums due to response bias may be an 
especially serious problem in a small sample. 
4.4. A 
-case study 
The tentative statistical analysis above makes evident the limitations of 
both the 
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data and the specific approach used to analysing differentiation behaviour of 
firms. In this chapter, the differentiation behaviour is analyzed through a case 
study of firms. One can argue that the case study method of research provides a 
powerful tool for analysing differentiation behaviour of firms because: 
1. The theory seems inadequate to predict the behaviour of individual firms 
especially when there are many strategic options available for firms as in the real 
world. This makes the proposing and statistical testing of hypotheses on the 
differentiation behaviour of enterprises quite frustrating, and suggests more in- 
depth analyses are useful for studying product differentiation. The case study 
method has been argued to be ideal for studying this kind of research topics 
where existing theory is inadequate (Chetty 1997). In smaller firms, which this 
paper focuses on, firm-specific factors are likely to be emphasized due to scarcer 
resources and decision-making highly concentrated to an owner-manager. 
2. Differentiation by firms, as well as independent variables that by assumption 
influence the differentiation by firms, are inherently difficult to measure 
quantitatively. A central example of such a (seemingly) independent variable is 
the intensity of competition, especially taking into account the fact that 
competition can take many forms: price, quality, sales, market share, advertising, 
or many of these together. Changes in the intensity of competition perceived by a 
firm are directly influenced by the firm's and its rivals' actions (including 
differentiation which induces a problem of endogeneity), and by many other 
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factors (such as changes in threat of potential entry, substitutes, or in demand in 
general). Further, it is commonly known that changes in product locations may 
be motivated by an aim to block potential entry, rather than a desire to soften 
actual price competition. 
3. Related to the first point, the case-study method can be used to create and 
extend theories, and not just to test them. The existing theories of product 
differentiation seem to be built on considering a group of firms rather than 
considering an individual firm, and thus cast relatively little light on the decision- 
making processes of firms in the real world. It is notable that this relative 
underdevelopment of an individual firm's point of view has also been argued to 
apply to microeconomic theory in more general (see Kay 1991). By the help of 
the case study method of research, which allows decision-making processes and 
causality to be studied in detail, the theory can be developed in this direction. 
In essence, the present explanatory study aims to use the case study method to 
produce theoretical implications, i. e., to develop theory rather than to test it. 
Selection of cases for theory building relies on theoretical rather than statistical 
sampling, and it is reasonable to choose very different cases in which the object 
of interest is clearly observable (see Eisenhardt 1989,537). In the present study, 
the four cases have been chosen from different levels of vertical production 
chains (Table 6): Firm A is a subcontractor (construction industry), Ba producer 
of semi-finished products (manufacture of wood products), Ca producer of 
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components (manufacture of fabricated metal products), and Da producer of 
final products (manufacture of transport equipment). A common feature of the 
firms is that differentiation is, or has been at some earlier stage, a strategic aim of 
the firms. Three of the firms (A, C and D) have gone through bankruptcy during 
the deep recession of the 1990's in Finland. The causes of the failures linked with 
the changes in the product strategies resulted make these firms attractive targets 
for an analysis. Firms B, C and D export their products, whereas A operates on 
the domestic markets only. 
Table 11.6. The four firms 
Firm Product Success over the Exports 
depression 
(A) subcontractor metal profiles for failed no 
frontages of 
buildings 
(B) producer of sawn and planed survived yes 
semi-finished wood 
products 
(C) producer of power transmission failed yes 
components components 
(D) producer of tanks for failed yes 
final products transportation of 
inflammable 
liquids 
Case study research can involve qualitative data only, or quantitative only, but it 
is usually beneficial to use both (Eisenhardt 1989,538). The major sources of 
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evidence for the present study are the firms themselves. According to Yin (1994, 
80), the strengths of this method of data collection are, firstly, that interviews are 
insightful as they provide perceived causal inferences, and secondly, that they are 
focused on the case study topic. Weaknesses, on the other hand, are potential 
response bias, bias due to poorly constructed questions, inaccuracy due to poor 
recall, and the fact that interviewees may tend to say what the interviewer wants 
to hear. For the weaknesses it would be preferable to use multiple sources of 
evidence, although Eisenhardt (1989,537) does note that some investigators 
successfully use only one data collection method. In the present study, most of 
the information used in the study is based on two separate interviews of the 
managing directors of the firms in 1996 and 1997. The material collected in 1992 
and 1996 was used in designing the interviews in 1997 (the 1997 interviews were 
customized, in-depth interviews; for an example of the interview agenda, see 
Appendix 2). The accuracy of the information collected in 1997 was also 
compared and checked against the information gathered earlier. Other sources of 
information have been direct observation by visiting the firms the three times, 
product brochures and other written material obtained from the firms (such as the 
uncited numerical information used in the study). The contents of the stories 
presented in below has also been confirmed by the managing directors. In the 
present study, the cases have been presented anonymously and unidentifiably at 
the managers' request. 
The analysis uses so-called explanation building technique, since this better suits 
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the nature of the present data material and the goal of the study to produce 
theoretical implications rather than simple pattern matching, time-series analysis 
or program logic models (see Yin 1994,106-119). In this technique the aim is to 
analyze the case study data by building an explanation about the case by 
stipulating a set of causal links about it. These links may be complex and 
difficult to measure in any precise manner. Ideally, the explanations reflect some 
theoretically significant propositions. Initial theoretical propositions about 
causality can be developed by asking questions "how" and "why" (Chetty 1997, 
80). On the basis of the literature survey in Section two and the analysis thus far 
in this chapter, the main questions reflecting this study's theoretical 
underpinnings are the following. Firstly, why and how have the firms striven to 
become different from their competitors? Secondly, why and how has the 
differentiation strategy been successful, and why may it have failed? Thirdly, 
why may differentiation from competitors be difficult or unprofitable? Fourthly, 
why may vertical differentiation be emphasized in firms that do not produce final 
1 
products? Fifthly, why and how has economic integration influenced the product 
specifications and differentiation aims by the firms? 
The following stages proposed by Eisenhardt (1989) were used to reach the final 
propositions. Firstly, both within-case analyses (describing and explaining the 
cases) and cross-case analyses (listing differences and similarities between each 
pair) were used in the search for tentative hypotheses. These hypotheses were 
then compared systematically with the evidence on each case in order to evaluate 
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how well they fit with the data, and revised accordingly. The revised hypotheses 
were then again compared with the evidence, including this time more details of 
the cases, and so forth. This iteration was stopped when theoretical saturation 
was reached, i. e., the propositions could no more be sharpened by the data and 
they were verified by the case data. The final propositions reached (presented in 
Section 5) were then compared with existing propositions in the literature 
Section 2 to increase their validity. The discussion and implications of the 
findings for theory are presented in Section 6. 
One more important note that concerns the generalization of observations of a 
case study has to be made before going into the case study reports. The logic of a 
case study is very different from that of a statistical analysis. Since cases are not 
sampling units nor likely to be representative cases, a case study does not aim at 
statistical generalization but to theoretical generalization (Yin 1994,34). Put 
differently, with the case study method, the investigator aims to expand and 
generalize theories and not to enumerate frequencies (see Chetty 1997,74). For 
this reason, the final propositions should not be taken as features of a population 
of small firms, but as theoretical suggestions only (that have been verified as 
possible in a small industrial firm). 
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4.5. Case reports 
4.5.1. A subcontractor (Firm A) 
Firm A operates as a subcontractor for the domestic construction industry 
producing different types of metal profiles for frontages of buildings. In the 
mid-80's, where my analysis begins, the firm's (or more precisely its 
predecessor's) competitive advantage was based on good product quality and the 
firm's position as a forerunner in supplying total frontage structure service. The 
idea of this total service, which can easily double the value of a contract, is to 
offer installation and the needed subcontracting, such as glazing, providing metal 
fittings and finishing in addition to the basic profile structure. For building 
companies buying a bundle of services from a supplier instead of making 
different contracts with all suppliers is a way to reduce their own risks. The 
operations of the firm were clearly profitable till the end of the decade, although 
the firm did not expand much in terms of the real value of the turnover' or the 
number of employees. 
In a longer term, the firm was not, however, able to sustain its competitive 
advantage. Loss of the competitive advantage has resulted from several different 
negative influences on the firm after the turn of the decade. Firstly, some of the 
44 1 have used industry-specific price indexes to deflate. 
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firm's competitors (which are about 20 in total) had also started to supply total 
service similar to that of the firm. As the number of firms offering similar 
products increased, the price-cost margins from the contracts won became lower. 
The firm did not respond to the rivals' actions in any clear way by changing its 
own product or services, but relied on its longer experience as a supplier of the 
bundled service. Secondly, between the years 1990 and 1993 the volume of 
newbuilding fell in Finland for about 55 per cent, which was reflected in a 
dramatic drop in the demand for metal profiles for buildings. A slow recovery of 
the construction started no sooner than in 1994-95. According to the manager's 
perception, the strong negative demand shock further intensified price 
competition in the markets such that contracts were won even by bids that hardly 
covered more than fixed costs of firms. Thirdly, the firm ran into debt as a result 
of trying to support its product strategy based on total service by backward 
integration by acquiring a window factory. As a consequence of these difficulties, 
creditors of the firm adjudicated it bankrupt in 1994. 
Soon after the bankruptcy, the present firm was established in the same 
production plant by the personnel of the failed firm. Competitor firms had bought 
the old machines and equipment from the bankrupt's estate and thus the firm had 
to procure new machines. It had turned out to be difficult to get investment loans 
for the new enterprise, and thus it started its operations with a markedly smaller 
invested capital than the predecessor. For this reason the machinery acquired was 
not as good as the earlier one, which was reflected in a lower quality of products 
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and loss of competitiveness. The competitiveness of the firm also suffered from 
loss of economies of scale as the volume of operations diminished for about 60 
% in the bancruptcy (in terms of the number of personnel). 
The earlier basis for competitiveness, offering total service, has also been 
abandoned to a large degree. This is mainly due to the fact that the lower 
price-cost margins are no longer high enough to compensate for the higher risk 
related to providing a complex bundle of services in comparison to just the basic 
frontage structure. The firm's present position in the markets characterized by a 
steeply fallen price level is well described by the entrepreneur's humorous 
expression: "One cannot win a contract without making a mistake in the 
calculation of costs". According to him, the price-cost margin of a typical 
contract has fallen for about 5 percentage points from the situation in the late 
1980's. Despite a 10 per cent growth in terms of the turnover and number of 
employees in 1995-96, the net profit has been close to zero. 
In terms of the different raw-materials used (50 % aluminium, 50 % steel) the 
developments of the 1990's have not had any influence on the product assortment 
of the firm. The use of different raw-materials is being determined primarily by 
the demand, since there is no marked difference in the profit margins gained 
from the different materials. On the other hand, the new firm has turned to 
markets outside the local region more than its predecessor, and aimed also at 
indirect exporting to Russia. The products offered to export building projects 
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have been special products including several domestically subcontracted 
services. Yet to date the exporting plans have not succeeded. 
Differentiation 
. 
in the markets is difficult because these naturally emphasize price 
competition. Firstly, since the products are technically and by their outward 
aspect produced according to an orderer's (actually an architect's) instructions, 
horizontal differentiation of the physical product itself is in practice impossible. 
Neither has advertising been seen worthwhile in the firm since the markets 
operate under the principle of competitive bidding: with very rare exceptions the 
lowest bid wins a competition between otherwise similar contract offers. For this 
reason, differentiation by supplementary services, such as offering installation 
and glazing in addition to the physical product itself, had been seen by the firm's 
predecessor as the most plausible means to become different from competitors. 
Information on the profitability of this strategy was based on the relation of lost 
and won bids, and on the price cost margins of the contracts built. 
Secondly, price competition is intensified by the way the markets operate. 
Typically a builder orders the building from a building company that has won a 
sealed bidding for the building contract, which then arranges a competitive 
bidding for profile suppliers. Normally there are about 5-10 profile suppliers 
competing for a contract. But profile suppliers also use subcontractors which still 
may themselves use subcontractors. In this situation, it is in the interest of all the 
firms down the production chain to reduce their costs after the price has been 
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fixed in the competitive bidding at each stage (typically firms, especially 
construction companies, may try to reduce their costs by using cheaper materials 
and less expensive subcontractors than was initially suggested to the builder, or 
by calculating "shadow prices" for contracts offered to suppliers to make them to 
lower their bids). Put differently, because the product of a profile supplier is not 
purchased by the end user (the builder) the meaning of price as a parameter of 
competition will be emphasized. This is in line with the view of the manager that 
the demand is price-elastic for the firm (a 5% decrease in competitors' prices 
would have a greater than 5% impact on the amount sold by the firm). In public, 
the excess price competition in the industry has been argued to lower the quality 
of building in Finland (Helsingin Sanomat 1997). 
The direct impacts of the economic integration on this relatively small firm's 
operations have so far been non-existent. The integration developments have not 
increased competition in the form of new foreign competitors or increased 
imports, since the firm hardly ever competes for contracts large enough o 
interest foreign firms. Neither have the integration agreements implied any 
pressures to adapt the product physically. 
4.5.2. A 
-producer of semi-finished products 
(Firm B) 
The firm used as an example is a modern independent sawmill. The main 
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products of the firm are sawn and planed wood. One tenth of the turnover 
consists of by-products, such as chippings and fuels. From the late 1970's the 
firm has striven to become different from sawmills producing bulk products by 
marketing its products directly to industrial end users instead of dealers and 
wholesalers, and by specializing in sawing of certain kind of wood and size of 
logs. Instead of fewer bulk products, the firm produces today thousands of 
"different products" according to, for instance, different kind and quality of the 
round wood, or shape, measures, protective treatments, levels of dryness or ways 
of packaging and transportation of the sawn and/or planed wood. For the 
industrial end-user it is essential that in this way the amount of waste wood in 
further processing of the raw-material, say to furniture, becomes less, and that it 
does not need to take the risk of storing the material when the deliveries are 
made on a regular, even a weekly basis. The firm, for its part, has benefited 
especially from the fact that focusing on the industrial end-users has lessened 
fluctuations of the demand. 
The firm operated as an ordinary sawmill exporting bulk products before it 
started to develop the deviating product strategy in the end of the 1970's. At that 
time, the firm was completely dependent on the given international price level. 
Consequently, the profitability of operations varied strongly due to great changes 
on one hand in the demand for construction material in Europe and on the other 
in the price competitiveness with respect to the main competitor countnes, 
Sweden in particular. The starting point for the differentiation and specialization 
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was the type of the local round wood. This is most suitable for furniture and 
board industries, and consequently the management of the firm deduced that it 
would be possible to refine the wood profitably further already at the sawmill. To 
gather information on the end-users' requirements for their raw-material, the firm 
started to search for direct contacts with foreign industrial companies 
further-processing wood, instead of just selling standard products to dealers or 
wholesalers. Through these contacts the firm gradually created for itself a 
perception of what would be required to become "a subcontractor for 
manufacturing industries". The firm faced no marked competition with its new 
thinking since in practice there were only exporters of bulk products operating in 
the markets at that time. 
The fact was that with an ordinary production installation it would not be 
possible to export fast and customized deliveries. Thus, essential for profitability 
of the strategy was that, firstly, efficiency in production, as well as reliability and 
rapidity of deliveries could be markedly raised. Secondly, the firm would need to 
create firm customer relations with industrial end users. To improve efficiency in 
production the firm started comparatively large technological investments into 
production installations in the beginning of the 1980s. The production was 
radically automatized to improve productivity. Over the last decade, yearly net 
investments into machinery and required new facilities have been up to 10 per 
cent of the turnover. As a result of the development, the number of personnel has 
diminished by 46 per cent, while the turnover (in real terms) has risen by 65 per 
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cent over this time. At the same, the proportion of labour costs in turnover has 
decreased by 20 per cent. According to the manager this increase in productivity 
has been crucial for the competitiveness of the firm. 
The second element of profitable differentiation was to create new customer 
relations. To achieve this goal the firm has aimed at direct personal contacts with 
end user companies. Relations to customers have firmed up not only through 
customization and high quality of the products, but also by increased reliability 
and flexibility in deliveries. As the business manager neatly put it: "A direct 
transportation in a closed long-distance truck is the best way to tie a West- 
European customer". On the other hand, advertising has not been seen as very 
profitable. In the future, however, the meaning of non-measurable values and 
consequently the meaning of advertising is expected to increase due to growing 
importance of environmental values and product quality schemes. 
Since the beginning of the 1980's, half a dozen other Nordic sawmills have 
started to pursue similar product strategies targeted to industrial end users other 
than the firm in hand. The technological solutions, however, are not necessarily 
similar nor the specialization taken as far as in this firm. Differentiation by the 
firm is also strongly supported by the local raw-material. This is because each 
tree species grows on each latitude in its own distinctive manner, influencing 




Although the product strategy has clearly been successful, it is very difficult to 
get rid of price competition in the markets for sawn and planed wood in general. 
Differentiation is opposed especially by standardization economies: It is in 
practice impossible to deviate from, say, certain standard measurements since 
there is no demand for such non-standardized material. In this sense there is little 
such in the product itself that could not be reproduced by a competitor. 
Competition is still strongly dominated by price especially in the domestic 
markets. In the export markets, where the customization and the degree of 
working up of the products are higher, customer relations are more established 
and price competition less intensive. The greatest benefit from the change in the 
product strategy has not, however, been an increase in price-cost margins, but the 
fact that the strategy has helped to subdue heavy demand fluctuations that are 
typical for the industry. The decrease in demand for Finnish sawn wood in 1995 
(mainly due to decrease in price competitiveness in relation to Sweden), for 
instance, did not influence the running degree of the sawmill in the way similar 
situations have done in the past. The strategy has thus made the demand easier to 
predict and the whole operations of the firm more methodical, which then have 
contributed to, for example, acquiring outside financing for the firm. 
An indication of successfulness of the product strategy has been the firm's stable 
exporting operations. The share of exports of the growing turnover of the firm 
rose for more than 20 per cent in the first half of the 1990's. Undoubtedly, this 
growth was initially boosted by the improvement in price competitiveness due to 
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devaluation of Finland's Markka in 1991-92. Since then the price advantage has 
been lost (due to devaluation of the currency of the main competitor Sweden, and 
because Markka itself has gained back its strength), but despite the weakened 
price competitiveness, the share of exports of the total turnover of the firm has 
remained at the higher level. 
The firm is very dependent on export markets as more than half of the production 
is being exported each year. West-European markets especially are crucial for the 
firm. Against this background, the economic integration of Finland into the EU 
as such has had a surprisingly small influences on the firm's operations in the 
1990's. Import competition has not increased, and the few acquisitions of Finnish 
sawmills by foreign investors after the deregulation have not had any marked 
implications for the competitive situation in the markets in Finland. More than 
these the competitive situation has been affected by changes in the direct 
transport subsidy due to harmonization of competitive laws with the EU. The 
most significant menace of the integration development, however, is the 
possibility that Sweden will not join the monetary union together with Finland, 
and would thus sustain a chance to upgrade competitiveness by devaluations in 
the future. So far, however, the influences of the economic integration in the 
1990's have been perceived as positive in the firm: the agreements have secured 
for the firm a free access to its main markets in Europe into the future, and 
increased exporting possibilities to some extent. On the physical characteristics 
of the products the integration agreements have not had any significant direct 
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influences. 
4.5.3. A producer of components (Firm C) 
Firm C is a high-class engineering works that produces mechanical power 
transmission components. From the mid-80's the markets for transmission 
components in Finland have faced increasing import competition from Asian 
countries, which has for its part forced the firm to renew its product strategy. In 
particular, the firm has differentiated from the low-quality imports by 
specializing in high-quality special components, and diversified production by 
starting to produce machine parts to order. 
Over the last ten years period, the firm has gone through several marked changes 
of ownership that have for their part also had an influence on the product strategy 
of the firm. In the mid-80's the firm was jointly owned by a Finnish an un 
English company. Its market share in the first installation industry was in most 
products very high (30-70 %), whereas the share of markets for subsequent 
installations (i. e., replacement parts) was much lower (15-30 %). The firm, which 
was small but had a strong grip on the markets in Finland, would have fitted 
perfectly a giant Swedish manufacturer's expansion strategy. Although the 
negotiations about the acquisition were frustrated, the partners could agree on 
dealer cooperation. With the help of the strong and established dealer network of 
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the Swedish company the firm's share of the markets for replacement parts grew 
rapidly in 1986-87, despite ever increasing importing of components from Asia. 
At the turn of the decade the economy dived into the deep recession. The firm 
was oppressed by debts from two subsidiary engineering shops that had been 
established during the boom and had to be run down when the demand collapsed. 
When Finland's Markka devaluated substantially in 1991-92, the real value of the 
debts, part of which had been loaned from abroad, grew intolerably. At this stage, 
the marketing company and the brand name of the firm were sold to the Swedish 
company. The firm was adjudicated bankrupt and re-established to produce 
components for the Swedish company. In 1995, however, the management of the 
firm decided to break away from the marketing cooperation with the Swedish 
company, since when the firm has marketed its power transmission components 
independently again. 
The other important factor that has influenced the firm's product strategy has 
been the increased import competition from the East. Not only the markets in 
Finland, but in Europe in more general, have been shaken by the imports. Since 
the import competition became a serious threat to the firm in hand, it has 
intentionally changed its product strategy mainly in two ways. Firstly, the firm 
started to specialize in rapid, short series and specialized transmission 
components. Secondly, production has been diversified by operations as a 
subcontractor. 
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The transmission components imported from the East are generally of lower 
quality but are also significantly cheaper than those produced in the Western 
Europe. Because of this fact, in its new product strategy the firm aimed at 
producing high quality and short, rapidly supplied series of special components. 
As a matter of fact, this seems to have been the only viable option for the firm, 
since "no robot can help if the price for the imported products falls below the 
cost of raw-material for the firm" (Manager, 1997). Most essential in the quality 
of the components is the technical quality, represented by the exactness of 
measurements, hardness and finishing of the outer face, in addition to quality of 
the raw-material. Rather surprisingly, the outlook of the product is also very 
important. This is a factor that had often come out with poorly finished imported 
components. Factors of quality that are harder to imitate are the firm's knowledge 
in using special materials, and non-material values such as the firm's image as a 
reliable supplier (time of delivery, stability in pricing, credibility). The firm has 
started to create the company image again by advertising. 
Although the firm has not started to compete against the imports with price, the 
meaning of price as a parameter of competition is still crucial for the firm in both 
of the markets for transmission components. Sticking to high quality has been the 
only reasonable option for the firm, since lowering of product quality would not 
decrease costs significantly. Neither has shifting of production to countries with 
significantly lower labour costs, such as Russia or Estonia been considered as a 
viable strategy. This is because the operations in these countries have been seen 
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to involve too high risks and harm the firm image. Instead, like some other 
European transmission manufacturers, the firm has imported transmission 
components from East (Russia) reselling these both to the domestic and 
European markets. 
Due to partial loss of the markets for transmission components, the firm has 
diversified production by starting to produce machine parts to order for large 
exporting enterprises in Finland. The volume of these operations grew rapidly 
especially in the beginning of the 1990's: in four years from 1991 to 1995 the 
share of subcontracting of the total turnover of the firm has grown for more than 
40 percentages. Because of the financial difficulties in the early 1990's, 
investments in machine tools and equipment by the firm had decreased leading to 
losing of an earlier technological advantage over standard engineering works. 
Consequently, the firm aimed at improving other factors of quality than 
technology to differ from competitor works in subcontracting business. Notably, 
the firm adopted the so-called partnership-principle in its relations with customer 
companies, which aims at forward-looking and safe subcontracting relations for 
both partners. In this kind of production relation the quality of the firm's product 
is determined solely by its competence in production services, because the 
responsibility for product development is with the contractor. The firm has to be 
able to, for example, customize everything from handling the orders to packaging 
and transportation of the machine parts, as well as willing to present all the 
relevant information on the economic situation of the firm for the customers to 
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sustain credibility as a reliable long-term subcontractor. Most problematic for the 
firm in the partnerships has been the adaptation quickly enough to fluctuations in 
demand. This is because a typical partnership contract is for supplying certain 
parts for a predetermined time period, but the actual demand is determined on a 
very short term basis. 
Concentrating on the new market segment seems to have been for the firm the 
only way to survive in the markets for transmission components. After the first 
import shock in 1985-86, the turnover of the firm (excl. the two subsidiaries) 
even continued to grow for about 10 per cent a year until the great depression hit 
the markets after the turn of the decade. However, after the bankruptcy, the 
growth has been based on the operations as a subcontractor, whereas the share of 
component production of the turnover has decreased accordingly. It is hence very 
difficult to evaluate the success of the product strategy. Today subcontracting 
operations are the firm's main source of business (representing for more than 60 
per cent of the total turnover of the firm), and production of transmission 
components is used to level changes in the demand for subcontracted machine 
parts. On the other hand, only half a dozen firms that produce roughly similar 
transmission components in the Europe have survived independent. 
According to the manager most important factors opposing differentiation in the 
markets for transmission components are the technical standards. On the other 
hand, technical similarity and compatibility of the components has also been 
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used by the firm as a marketing measure when striving to penetrate the markets 
again independently. In the earlier situation, when the firm had a marked share of 
the markets in Finland, marketing by the firm aimed at making clear differences 
between the firm's and competitors' products in order to make subsequent 
installation of competitors' products less attractive. In the subcontracting 
business competitors are followed in certain ways of action. 
The firm is also exporting power transmission components, but the share of 
exports of the total turnover of the firm is only marginal. In most cases the export 
deliveries are unsolicited orders by old customers. Exporting used to be more 
marked in the 1970's (when price competitiveness was not a problem), but as a 
consequence of the alliance with the English company, the firm concentrated in 
its exporting on the markets in Sweden. Today the exporting possibilities are 
limited by the low tradeability of the rapidly supplied specialized components 
and the lack of price competitiveness in standard products. 
The direct influences of the European integration on the firm's operations have 
been minor in the 1990's. This is because of the fact that most of the technical 
standards concerning power transmission components in Europe had been 
already harmonized before Finland became a member of the European Union. 
Neither have customs regulations changed markedly from the point of view of 
this firm. 
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4.5.4. A producer of final products (Firm D) 
The fourth firm subject to a closer investigation produces tanks for transportation 
of inflammable liquids. The firm was established when employees bought out 
operations of a part of a larger conglomeration of enterprises that was 
adjudicated in bankruptcy in the early years of the 1990's. From the beginning it 
has strongly aimed at differentiation for increased competition in the domestic 
markets. In addition to the production of tank structures, the firm overhauls, 
mends, alters and sales at second-hand tank trailers, and also sells spare parts for 
these as secondary activities. 
The hauling equipment group in which the firm belonged to started to become 
economically troubled at the turn of the decade. Entry of new competitors on one 
hand and the recession on the other, had made price the central parameter of 
competition in the markets. The tank trailer division was taken into this price 
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competition, yet there was no real basis for such price competitiveness. From 
1991 to 1993 the total turnover of the whole hauling equipment group fell (in 
real terms) for about 60 per cent. The tank trailer division, on the other hand, 
grew in terms of the turnover, but as shown by the books the operations were 
clearly in the red. The group was not reorganized quickly enough and a failure 
was inevitable. 
Some of the employees of the failed tank trailer division considered it 
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economically healthy despite the bankruptcy of the conglomeration, and decided 
to continue its operations as an independent limited company. To keep the know- 
how in the firm, the new management purposely employed all the earlier skilled 
labour force, although the volume of operations of the enterprise decreased in the 
first year (in terms of the turnover) for about 20 per cent from the situation as a 
part of the group. Entry of new domestic and foreign competitors in the markets 
in Finland had increased competition and it was evident in that situation that the 
product strategy had to be renewed in order to gain competitiveness. As starting 
points for the strategy became, firstly, differentiation from other Nordic tank 
trailer producers, and secondly, internationalization. In addition, the firm 
simplified the product mix by dropping out of production of tanks for 
transportation of foods and chemicals and concentrated on the hauling equipment 
for transportation of inflammable liquids. 
The differentiation strategy of the firm relies strongly on physical characteristics 
of the products. The substance of the product strategy has become to produce 
customized, efficient, safe and ergonomically right designed tank lorries and 
trailers. Essential in the differentiation are high quality and technical details, as 
well as finishing and appearence of the lorries and trailers. The efficiency of the 
vehicles is mostly dependent on the time consumed in loading and unloading of 
the tanks, which can be minimized by correct design and dimensioning of the 
pipe systems and pumps, as well as by correct logistics of the total pneumatic 
system of the lorries. Loading and unloading times are essential for the 
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efficiency, since the hauling equipment today are heavier but less in number than 
earlier, and because loading and unloading can easily take one third of the 24 
hours daily hauling time. It is also very important that the risk of a human error 
in the use of the lorries is minimized (for instance, to minimize the risk for 
mixing of different liquids in the tanks since these have appeared to be very 
expensive to clean). By the right ergonomy of the vehicles the firm aims at 
improving safety at work and the working conditions of drivers. 
Another important difference to the other Nordic companies in the branch is that 
the production process of the firm is 100 per cent manual. Because of the 
deviating production process, the turnaround time in the production is much 
longer in Firm D than in the competitor firms. Recently, the firm has tried to 
shorten the turnaround time by increasing flexibility of production by using 
components produced in series in certain stages of work. As to marketing 
practices and terms of sale, the firms in the industry are very similar to each 
other. However, the firm in hand aims at documenting the technical solutions of 
the product better than competitors to make service and repairing of the vehicles 
more convenient for a customer. 
The firm does not have a research and development department but the product 
development is based on the competence and long experience of the personnel in 
the branch. Information and feed-back acquired from the most important 
customers, petroleum companies and private lorry drivers, on the requirements 
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on safety at work and efficiency of the vehicles are essential in developing the 
products. The requirements are tried to apply individually in the firm such that 
the end product would not only cope with the technical requirements, but would 
outperform competitors' products also by design and appearence. 
The main purpose of the product strategy is to differ from other Nordic tank 
trailer producers that pursue similar customized product strategies. Three or four 
of these companies are marked competitors for the firm. In comparison to the 
products of these, the product of the firm is an expensive one. However, there is 
a segment in the markets that demands high quality and tailored tank lorries and 
trailers, and is willing to pay for the quality difference. On the other hand, the 
firm faces not much other competition: because of some differing technical 
regulations and especially regulations concerning size and weight of the hauling 
equipment, the markets in the Nordic countries are quite isolated from the 
European standard tank lorry markets. In the Western European countries, a 
typical maximum gross weight of the trailers is between 40 and 48 tons, whereas 
in the firm's main markets in Sweden and Finland a 60 tons maximum weight 
limit is still used. Consequently, the heavy hauling equipment in these Nordic 
countries deviates clearly from the standard semi-trailers used in the rest of the 
EU. It is mainly for this reason that the markets in Sweden and Finland have not 
interested the large European (mainly Belgian and German) tank trailer 
producers. 
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The other important component in the firm's strategy has been 
internationalization. The first foothold in export markets was created already as a 
part of the hauling equipment group, when growth aims and the domestic 
depression made the group to think of expanding the marketing of the tank 
trailers beyond the domestic markets (as some of the Nordic competitors had 
done). However, after a few deliveries the firm withdrew from the export 
markets due to a lack of price competitiveness. Export development was started 
forcefully again by the re-established firm. Now, with the re-specified product, 
the firm entered successfully markets in Sweden and the Baltic countries. In a 
few years, the export markets have indeed become the most important source of 
business for the firm: In 1996, more than two thirds of the turnover already 
consisted of export deliveries. Competitiveness in exporting is mainly based on 
differentiation as in the domestic markets, since the firm is not able to compete 
with price in the export markets either. For example, in contrast to other 
domestic exporting firms, the firm uses the exported vehicles technical solutions 
that are based on locally produced components in each export destination to 
make the servicing and repairing of the vehicles easier for the orderer. The 
success especially in the export markets has led the firm on a growth path again: 
in 1995-96, for instance, growth in terms of the turnover was no less than 30 per 
cent, and in terms of the number of employees, 15 per cent a year. At the same 
time, the operations have been established by investments into production 
facilities. 
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Most obvious forces opposing differentiation inside each country markets are the 
technical regulations. The major oil companies also demand certain technical 
characteristics and equipment, although these may differ between the companies. 
Some of the safety regulations are quite hard to meet which makes the starting of 
similar production without earlier experience in the industry difficult. As an 
example, welding seams have to pass a fluoroscopy test to detect production 
failures. 
So far the economic integration of Finland into the European Union has not had 
any significant direct influences on the operations of the firm, since many crucial 
technical standards in the industry have not been harmonized. Discussion on the 
harmonization of the maximum weights as well as other technical standards 
however continues and at least partial harmonization is expected in the future. 
The manager anticipates that it would be very hard for the Nordic companies to 
survive in price competition with the large European standard trailer producers, 
in the unlikely case that all technical regulations were standardized in the EU: the 
price difference between a customized and a standard tank equipment may easily 
be one fifth of the price of a delivery. Actually, a likely reason for the increased 
competition in the Nordic markets is that the Nordic companies have tightened 
their grip on their traditional markets because of the anticipated increase in 
competition from the rest of the Europe. On the other hand, a certain amount of 
harmonization of the technical regulations would make. exporting easier for the 
firm D. 
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5. Observations and propositions on the differentiation by the four firms 
Table 7 summarizes some observations on the motives, practical means and 
success of differentiation in the four firms. The findings are largely in line with 
expected patterns in differentiation behaviour of firms (Section 2), but on the 
other hand bring out points that have been considered less in the literature. The 
most obvious proposition on the firms' behaviour is that some form of price 
competition has indeed been a motive for differentiation in all the four firms. 
However, the most important benefit actually gained through the differentiation 
need not be an increase in a price-cost margin, but may follow from the 
stabilization of demand fluctuations as a result of increased loyalty by customers, 
as the case of Firm B shows. In the cases of Firms B and C it is hard to 
distinguish between the benefits from specialization and the benefits from 
differentiation by firms, since in practice these aims may be mixed in a firm's 
1 
strategy. Differentiation aims may also be influenced by the firm's position in the 
markets. For example, a firm may find it profitable to imitate competitors when it 
is trying to penetrate markets but to differentiate when it already has an 
established position in the markets, as the case of Firm C shows. 
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Tale 11.7. Information on the differentiation of the firms 
Firm Motive for Means of Success in brief 
differentiatio differentiation 
n 
A domestic price bundling services into lost the competitive advantage 
competition the physical product through several different 
negative shocks and imitation 
by competitors 
B heavy demand selling directly to smaller demand fluctuations as 
fluctuations/ industrial end users a result of loyalty by customers; 
price instead of wholesalers or weak price competitiveness in 
competition middlemen; relation to Swedish competitors 
specialization into in the future is a potential threat 
certain type of wood and 
size of logs 
C import price high quality of the though lost market share in 
competition physical product and general, retained its position in 
rapidness of deliveries; special components; diversified 
specialization into production to subcontracting 
special components 
D entry of new customization, high successful in the short term 
competitors/ quality and outlook of especially in export markets; 
price the product harmonization of technical 
competition standards in the EU is a 
potential threat 
For firms producing industrial products for other firms to offer (subcontractors) 
horizontal differentiation may be inherently difficult as indicated by the cases of 
Firms A, B and C. This is largely due to the requirements of technical 
compatibility, and thus the factors that make differentiation unprofitable for the 
industrial small firm in these cases fall in the category of standardization 
economies. As a result of this, a firm may emphasize the quality of their 
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production service and use other means than physical features of products, such 
as supplementary services, to become different from competitors (Firm A). On 
the other hand, the appearence of an industrial product may, quite surprisingly, 
be an important attribute of quality (Firm Q. On the other hand, not only lack of 
price competition, but excessive price competition in the form of competitive 
bidding, may make differentiation irrelevant for industrial enterprises (Firm A). 
In markets where vertical differentiation is important this may result in low 
quality products. 
As to the success of the differentiation strategy, a long-term success in 
differentiation seems to require either continuous development of the product or 
preventing competitors from imitating or developing a better product. This is a 
process which requires resources. Obviously, asymmetric negative shocks, due to 
recession for example, may lead to losing of the particular competitive advantage 
based on differentiation (Firms A and C). 
Possible influences of economic integration on product specifications and 
strategies of firms appear to be difficult to observe at the firm-level. In the above 
firm cases the direct effects of economic integration (through technical 
harmonization in particular) are perceived by the managers as insignificant, since 
many technical standards concerning the firm's products have not changed 
markedly in the 1990's (Firms A, B and Q. On the contrary, there may 
be 
indirect influences. For example, one can argue that both product quality and 
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price have increased in the case of Firm D due to economic integration, even if 
the tendency in the markets in the longer term seems to be towards cheaper 
standardized products. 
6. Implications for theory 
In contrast to its treatment in industry-centred models the differentiation 
behaviour of firms has been explored in this paper empirically from the point of 
view of individual enterprises. The analyses have thrown up the following 
observations relevant for the theory of product differentiation. The first two are 
related principally to the characteristics approach, and the other two have been 
derived from the case studies. 
Firstly, theoretical models of product differentiation seem to be built on 
assuming a group of firms rather than on examining the phenomenon from the 
point of view of an individual enterprise. For this reason, an analyst readily runs 
into problems when trying to propose exact hypotheses concerning the behaviour 
of individual firms. Paradoxically, for example, apparent horizontal 
differentiation by firms observed at the level of an industry may actually result 
from the upgrading of product quality by firms which have specialized in 
different aspects of quality. This particular possibility seems to be related to 
niche markets. A niche market is "that combination of customers and services 
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with respect to which the firm alone has a competitive advantage over any and all 
competitors... It is the right specialized segment of the market... where the 
maximum degree of product differentiation is limited by preferences rather than 
technology" (Pepall 1992,397). In terms of the characteristics approach adopted 
in this paper, for a firm moving towards a market niche the importance of a 
single parameter of competition will increase. This not only makes the product 
horizontally different from products targeted at other niche markets, but involves 
vertical differentiation as consumers who prefer the specific characteristic are 
probably willing to pay for the increase in the extent of it. In other words, 
products of different market niches may be horizontally differentiated but inside 
the market niche there may be many products that are essentially vertically 
differentiated as they incorporate different amounts of the specific characteristic. 
Secondly, on a more technical issue related to the characteristic approach to 
differentiation, I argue that horizontal differentiation defined in accordance with 
this approach may also involve vertical differentiation. In a two-product case this 
appears when one of the two products contains more of several characteristics 
but less of only few characteristics than the other one. In this situation it is likely 
that there is also a quality difference between the two products, although only 
horizontal differentiation can be confirmed. Thus, one cannot establish definitely 
a distinction between the two major types of differentiation using this approach. 
Thirdly, it seems that especially in markets for industrial goods, differentiation 
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related to the product itself may be constrained by the technical standardization 
of products, i. e., by the requirement that products have to be compatible with 
other products by some of their technical characteristics. This seems to constrain 
the horizontal differentiation of products especially. On the other hand, 
improving quality may be emphasized by firms because of the lower risk of 
losing customers as a consequence of the respecification of a product than 
through horizontal differentiation. This is simply because enterprises are more 
likely to be uncertain about the distribution of tastes of customers, than about 
whether there is demand for a better product if offered at the same price 
(including costs of differentiation). From this perspective issues related to 
technical standardization and incomplete information seem to have got too little 
attention in the theoretical literature (see, however, Harrington 1995, in which 
firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation and acquire 
information on their realized demands in the light of the difference in their 
prices). 
Fourthly, unlike in most theoretical models, in the real world firms usually have 
several possible strategic options at the same time. For example, a firm may 
differentiate horizontally or vertically, aim at minimal differentiation due to some 
informational externalities, for instance, or aim at cost-leadership instead of 
following a differentiation strategy. The long-term profitability of the different 
options depends not only on industry and market characteristics, as the theory 
generally seems to assume, but to a large extent situational and firm-specific 
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factors, such as first-mover advantages and the firm's ability to sustain its 
competitive advantage based on differentiation. Thus, there is certain parallel 
between this "a firm-level view" of differentiation and John Kay's (1993) 
perception of the competitive advantages of firms, which suggests that the work 
by Kay has been underutilized among industrial economists interested in product 
differentiation. More thorough consideration of his argument that firms create 
added value by distinctive capabilities, which are in general based on 








This chapter focuses on exit from export markets by minutely analysing the exit 
and re-entry behaviour of 10 smaller manufacturing firms in Finland. Recent 
studies of entry and exit behaviour of exporting firms suggest that firms have to 
incur sunk costs to enter exporting markets. This tends to cause hysteresis in 
trade flows (see, e. g., Dixit 1989a, Feinberg 1992, Roberts and Tybout 1997). 
Where the investment (or disinvestment) decisions are being made in an uncer- 
tain environment especially an option value for waiting exists (Dixit 1989b). Put 
differently, a firm may benefit from continuing exporting for a while even if the 
export prices fall below the average variable cost (AVC), since if exports became 
profitable again the firm is able to save the cost of an exit and continue utilizing 
the investments in supplying the export markets. From a policy point of view, as 
Roberts and Tybout (1997) note, the sunk-cost hysteresis is especially important 
due to the fact that in the presence of it, temporary policy regimes to support new 
export starts can have persistent effects in the number of exporting firms. 
The research on smaller firms presented in this chapter has been developed 
independently of the work by Roberts and Tybout (1997) but is clearly relevant 
to their results. Roberts and Tybout carefully test the sunk cost hysteresis using 
panel data on a large group of Colombian manufacturing plants. They find their 
data supportive of the hypothesis. However, although the analysis by Roberts and 
Tybout certainly is certainly is more valid statistically than the present one (the 
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sample they use covers all manufacturing plants with 10 or more employees in 
four major exporting industries in Colombia, i. e., 650 firms), it does not allow 
the authors to analyse in detail the sources of sunk costs or uncertainty in export- 
ing, the actual decision-making situations in firms prior to a market exit, or 
managerial attitudes towards exporting after the exits. 45 The purpose of this 
chapter is to cast light on these issues by an in-depth analyses of export exit and 
entry behaviour of firms. The usefulness of the case study method as a potential 
research strategy to explore hysteresis in trade has been suggested by Baldwin 
and Krugman (1989,653). 
Generally speaking, independent smaller firms are characterized by limited 
resources and a utility function which may include also other values than pure 
profit (such as employment). Independent smaller firms are also more prone to 
unique and random factors than large firms, for instance, due to the great influ- 
ence of one person, the business manager, on the operations of the firm. Yet 
export market exits by small firms has been scantly studied. A study worth 
mentioning is Welsh and Wiedersheim-Paul (1980). They made a comparison 
between the experiences of current and failed exporters among 30 Australian 
firms, and concluded that the risk of failure in an export strategy is highest during 
as For example, Roberts and Tybout (pp. 560-561) conclude that their "results are 
consistent with the view that an important source of sunk entry costs for Colombian 
exporters is the need for information on demand sources, information that is likely to 
depreciate upon exit from the market". In a case study it is possible to study the 
sources for sunk costs to enter (or re-enter) export markets directly. 
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the initial exporting stage (p. 342). 
The chapter has been organized as follows. In the next two Sections, I will 
present a theoretical framework of reference for the analysis. To start with, 
Section 2 will distinguish reactive exporters from active exporters. The use of 
this type of categorization of exporting activity is supported by earlier analyses of 
the data exploring decisions to export in smaller firms (see Lautanen 1996). 
Section 3 deals with potential reasons for a small firm's exit from export markets 
and the sunk cost hysteresis. On the basis of this literature survey I suggest that 
exits by reactive and active exporters will be different in many respects. The 
empirical part of the chapter begins in Section 4, with economic developments in 
Finland over the last decade discussed first, and the case study data and the case 
reports presented second. In the deep economic crisis at the beginning of the 
1990s Finland's Markka was devalued by almost 40 per cent, but regained most 
of its value during the consequent 2-3 years. Among other things this develop- 
ment had a great influence on the opportunity cost of exporting in Finnish firms, 
which is evident among the 10 firms highlighted in this chapter. 
My interpretations of the case study data will be presented in Section 5. The 
potential influences of domestic demand and the exchange rate, sunk export 
costs, sources and types of uncertainty in exporting operations, and factors that 
have in practice triggered the decisions to exit will be discussed separately. For a 
theoretical replication, the experiences and behaviour of the firms are compared 
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with the idiosyncrasies of firms that have been exporting uninterruptedly since 
they initially entered export markets (Section 6). In the final Section I outline my 
views of the implications the findings have for theory and further research. 
2. Reactive exporters and active exporters 
Factors that lie outside firms, such as an unsolicited order from abroad or a piece 
of information transmitted through other firms, governmental agencies, banks or 
middleman are important stimuli for entry to export markets in small firms 
(Miesenbock 1988,45). For this reason, the pre-export level of knowledge of 
international operations is often conspicuously low in small firms. Against this 
background it is no surprise that not all smaller firms ever effectively establish 
their exporting (see, e. g., Welsh and Wiedersheim-Paul 1980,335). Not all 
products even have clearly international markets (Kay 1990), which is a fact 
especially relevant in the case of industrial firms producing products to offer (i. e., 
subcontractors). 
On the other hand, randomly chosen firms differ amongst themselves in their 
size, products and resources, which, among other factors, can influence their 
expected profits from exporting. Lautanen (1996) has suggested that firms that 
have become interested in export marketing will have different optimal paces in 
committing themselves to an exporting strategy depending on their expected 
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profits. 46 This argument suggests that different factors can be important at 
different stages of the exporting decision by a small firm. Thus, for the purposes 
of this chapter, it seems reasonable to distinguish two different cases of making 
an exit from export markets. The first one of these concerns making an exit from 
reactive exporting, i. e., when the exports is based on unsolicited export orders 
(type I; Figure 1). Although in general the internationalization of firms undoubt- 
edly has developed towards a more straightforward and strategic process (see, 
e. g., Young 1987), many small firms still start exporting by responding to 
unsolicited orders. The second type of exit from exporting is where a firm makes 
an exit from active export marketing (type II, Figure 1). In the following Section, 
potential factors influencing a small firm's decision to make an exit from export 
markets will be discussed in detail. 
46 A sequence of firms adopting the export strategy is described in Lautanen 
(1996) by applying an existing two-period model of diffusion of new technologies to 
the decision-making problem. The assumptions of the model guarantee that firms 
which have by some point of time committed themselves to exporting will export 
regularly ever after. Accordingly, the model does not allow for the possibility of an 
exit from the export markets. It is notable that a corresponding feature, which is at 
least to some extent in contradiction with the real world, seems to be general among 
theoretic models of diffusion of new technologies (see, e. g., Stoneman 1987). 
Success and failure in industrial innovation itself has received more (empirical) 
attention (see, e. g., Freeman and Soete 1997,197-226). 
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3. Review of causes of a small firm's exit from export markets and hysteresis in 
exporting 
Although making an exit from export markets has not been addressed plicitly 
in the literature on small business internationalization, significant attention has 
been paid to reasons for non-exporting as well as the problems that exporting 
firms have perceived with their export operations. According to Miesenbock's 
literature review (Miesenbock 1988,45-46) the most often-named reasons for 
non-exporting that lie inside firms are limited capacity, lack of information, 
difficulties in export marketing (especially with distribution) and lack of interest. 
Absence of demand abroad, red tape, excessively high costs abroad and trade 
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impediments are the most common external reasons for non-exporting for firms. 
As far as the problems with exporting are concerned, the most important ones are 
lack of knowledge about foreign market opportunities, lack of qualified staff, 
lack of language knowledge, lack of capital, problems with international market- 
ing, problems with collecting money, documentation and red tape, all kinds of 
trade impediments and lack of management time. 
It is worth noticing, firstly, that there are very few problems in the above list 
which are not related to resources (skills and size) of firms. Secondly, rivalry and 
competitiveness in the foreign markets are not directly referred to, although some 
of the issues (such as absence of demand abroad, excessively high costs abroad 
or problems with international marketing) may be deeply related to competitive 
forces. 
3.1. Competitiveness and actions by competitors 
From the point of view of an individual enterprise, a natural reason for withdraw- 
ing from an export marketing experiment is perceiving negative feedback on the 
profitability of the export operations. A firm may not be competitive enough to 
establish its position in the export markets, remaining thus vulnerable to compet- 
itors actions and problems in distribution channels. Export competitiveness is 
influenced among many other things by the choice of the right export strategy 
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(Piercy 1982, see also Eskelinen and Lautanen 1996) and uncertainty. For 
example, an increase in political or economic uncertainty in the destination 
country may increase the costs of hedging enough to make exporting 
unprofitable 47. On the other hand, a cost of exporting is an opportunity cost, 
which (assuming that capacities cannot be adjusted instantly without a cost) 
implies that the true profitability of exporting is dependent on the development 
of the domestic markets. Price competitiveness in exporting naturally relates to 
changes in the exchange rate (e. g., Baldwin and Krugman 1989). 
A firm may also make an exit from export markets due to rivalry. It is well 
known that incumbent competitors in the market segment a firm is trying to enter 
can take strategic actions (such as limit pricing, preemption or signalling com- 
mitment) to deter the newcomer from establishing its position in the markets (for 
such models, see, e. g., Tirole 1988, Chapters 8 and 9). Furthermore, in competi- 
tive markets inefficient firms will be replaced by more efficient ones, which can 
be expected to be true at least to some extent also in the real world. It is also 
possible that firms behave strategically and force their competitors out of the 
market, as the models of predatory dumping or advertising suggest (see, e. g., 
Tirole 1988,372-375). 
47 This is suggested, for example, by the recent experiences from former state 
socialist countries such as Russia (see, e. g., Chapter 4 in Kuznetsov 1994, Eskelinen 
and Lautanen 1993). 
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3.2. The concept of strategic markets 
Another explanation for withdrawing from exporting at the initial stage may be 
that the product is simply not very suitable for exporting: in Kay's (1990) 
terminology, it may not have international (or global) strategic markets. A 
strategic market defines in both geographic and product dimensions the smallest 
area and range of products within which it is possible for a firm to be a viable 
competitor. A central feature of the strategic market is that it reflects not only the 
demand or supply conditions for any particular product, but the interrelationship 
between these two, i. e. between the economic markets and industries (Kay 1990, 
7>. 
Some markets are inherently organized globally or continentally, while some 
nationally or locally. Sometimes firms operate viably with a product range 
narrower than the strategic market or in an area smaller than this. This is ex- 
plained by the non-existence of economies of scale, economies of scope and 
locational comparative advantage, under which the strategic market is defined. 
On the other hand, the geographic dimension of an industry sets rather well 
defined limits on the geographical expansion of markets: It is the area within 
which the location of production can be determined independently of the location 
of consumption (Kay 1990,13). This is a valid explanation of why some subcon- 
tractors of industrial products (especially those firms which apply the just-on- 
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time -principle, are involved in close R&D cooperation or offer bespoke, highly 
customized products), seldom export their products on a regular basis". It is also 
notable that the dimensions of markets are determined by the economic facts of a 
particular case and not necessarily changed by any legal arrangements such as 
those related to economic integration (Kay 1990,22). Overall, the strategic 
markets approach suggest that for some firms with certain product ranges an 
adoption of an export strategy is unlikely even in the absence of any barriers to 
trade. 
3.3. Failure in learning 
Another view on the causes of exit from export markets by a small firm is 
provided by studies that have considered internationalization as a learning 
process. Experimental exporting by an independent small firm targeting an 
adoption of the export strategy can be seen as an endogenous learning or entre- 
preneurial process. The endogenous nature of this process follows from the fact 
that it is unlikely that other firms are the main source of the critical industry- 
specific market information and knowledge. This is because firms tend to keep 
this kind of information back from their (potential) competitors (Lindmark et al. 
4'This is also a reason why a firm's position in the industrial production chain 
may matter in the internationalization of firms in general (cf. Christensen and 
Lindmark 1993). 
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1994. ) An underlying reason for withdrawing from exporting can thus be a 
persistent excessive uncertainty in export markets as a consequence of failure in 
this process. Naturally, a negative feedback on export competitiveness is a 
central part of this leaming process (Welsh and Wiedersheim-Paul 1980,340. ) 
The study by Welsh and Wiedersheim-Paul (1980) suggests that the level of pre- 
export preparation, the level of early commitment to exporting, and export 
marketing behaviour are important behavioural factors influencing the success of 
the learning process. Lack of preparation and commitment increase the possibil- 
ity that negative feedback from the experiment will be interpreted as a serious 
indication of impracticability of exporting, whereas prepared and (mentally) 
committed firms are more likely to regard it as a normal by-product of foreign 
operations (p. 339). Further, active marketing behaviour is seen as necessary to 
find and keep the right contacts and develop expertise in marketing. As the 
entrepreneur is the key person in a small firm's learning process (e. g., Reid 
1981), it seems obvious that a change of business manager can have a direct 
influence on the export orientation of a small firm. These views are supported by 
Aaby and Slater (1989,2 1) who, on the basis of more than 50 empirical studies, 
conclude that in firms with management commitment to exporting, better 
management systems, planning of export activities and earlier export experience 
export performance tends to better than in firms without these features. 
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3.4. Hysteresis in exporting 
3.4.1. The role of sunk costs 
The depth of a firm's financial commitment to export markets is influenced by 
the sunk costs the firm incurs to develop exporting operations. As is well known, 
sunk costs are fixed costs that cannot be realized to their full value (less normal 
costs of usage and capital depreciation) when exiting the markets (e. g., Baumol 
1982,4)49 . This makes sunk costs not only an entry barrier but an exit barrier. 
Sunk costs also work as a signal to other firms of the firm's commitment to its 
markets (see Eaton and Lipsey 1980). 
If there are sunk costs involved in entering a market these costs make a firm treat 
exit differently from entry. Specifically, as to an exit, costs of the exit matter. 
(Bresnahan and Reiss 1993,185. ) These can be thought to be influence 1, by two lp 
factors. Firstly, there may be direct costs from an exit, such as redundancy 
payments if the exporting has involved hiring additional staff that cannot be 
utilized in other operations of the firm. However, it is also possible that the firm 
can merely suspend its foreign operations without abandoning outright the 
exporting project, and continue operations when the state of demand improves. 
4913istinquishing between sunk and other fixed costs may be problematic in 
empirical work, though the concept itself is theoretically well established (see 
Weitzman 1983). 
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Thus, secondly, the extent to which suspending and restarting the exporting 
operations is costly also matters. (Dixit 1992,119. ) 
Sunk costs can cause "hysteresis in trade", an idea which was introduced in the 
mid-1980s by Richard Baldwin (Baldwin and Krugman 1989,636), and extended 
and empirically studied in several papers including those by Baldwin, Krugman, 
Dixit and Roberts mentioned above. Hysteresis in trade means that temporary 
shocks, say exchange rate shocks, can have persistent trade effects: once firrns 
have invested in marketing, distribution networks, etc., to enter a foreign market 
at a certain level of exchange rate, they will find it worthwhile to stay at the 
markets even at a lower exchange rate. This is because in the presence of sunk 
costs it may be optimal for firms not to exit the export markets as soon as they 
start to run operational losses (or, when price falls below the AVC), for reasons 
that will be discussed in more detail below. 
Typical costs related to exporting are outlays from, for example, market research 
and the search for suitable distribution channels, advertising and marketing 
abroad, or country-specific technical testing and certificates needed in order to 
enter the foreign markets. Firms may also need to carry out specific investments 
in production (for example, in technology or additional capacity) or to increase 
the level of international skills of its personnel. It seems reasonable to suspect 
that these costs may be a significant proportion of a firm's revenues if the firm 
itself is small and export oriented, though in general sunk costs related to 
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exporting are probably small compared to the costs of organizing production 
abroad. 
3.4.2. Option value of waiting 
Where the development of exporting has involved sunk costs and there is 
uncertainty about the future profits from exporting, there exists an option value 
for waiting. In a similar way to that theorized in disinvestment decisions (Dixit 
1992,12 1), the sunk costs incurred to enter the export markets (as well as direct 
sunk exit costs) are likely to lower the exit trigger price. With uncertainty caused 
by, for example, a random component in the business manager's skills or 
learning, this trigger price is even lower. Indeed, if there is uncertainty about the 
future profits from exporting it is optimal for a firm not to make the exit as soon 
as the price falls to the AVC, which is the exit trigger price in the standard 
textbook, or 'Marshallian ý50 , theory, but rather to delay the 
decision beyond this 
point. 
The intuition behind a firm's behaviour is obvious: if, while the firm has sus- 
pended operations or is absorbing some operating losses the foreign operations 
turn to the black again the firm will be able to avoid losing the stake sunk by 
50Dixit (1993) uses this term. 
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having waited. If the revenues from exporting do not improve, at some stage the 
loss from the unprofitable export operations reach the point where the firm is 
willing to exit the markets and abandon the export project. In theory, this is the 
point where the current losses exceed the value of the option (Dixit 1992,120). 
A similar logic applies to entering markets if this requires incurring sunk costs. 
By waiting in an uncertain environment (which may be caused say by a recently 
established cooperative partner) a firm can rule out the possibility of losses due 
to a potential worsening in expected profits and still enter if the good state (good 
performance of the cooperative partner) seems not to be only transitory. In 
practice, this leads to an entry trigger price higher than LRAC which is the 
trigger price suggested by the standard theory without sunk costs and uncertainty. 
As Dixit points out (op. cit., 119): the "passage of time reveals more informa- 
tion", which is valuable for firms in these uncertain situations. 
Dixit (1992 and 1993) distinguish two types of uncertainty that eventually lead to 
similar trigger prices for investment (higher than LRAQ and disinvestment 
(lower than AVC) decisions, and thus to waiting. The first one of these is 
uncertainty which is specific to a firm. This is the case explained above. The 
second type of uncertainty is at least industry-wide, such as an exogenous 
demand shock or a change in technology. Now, given rational expectations, no 
single firm has informational advantage over its rivals in relation to this uncer- 
tainty. Thus, if a firm does not take the option to exit (when the price goes 
below 
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AVC in the markets and firms start to suffer operating losses) it can presume 
some other firms will. However, since exits would increase the price on the 
markets, there is again an option value for waiting. (See, e. g., Dixit 1993,7-8) 
3.5. PreliminwZý conclusions 
Overall, the argument above suggests that there are three crucial factors influenc- 
ing a small firm's decision to exit from export markets. These are investments in 
exporting, the expected profitability of exporting, and uncertainty related to 
exporting. The two latter mentioned factors can deteriorate via the influence of 
factors that lie both inside and outside a firm. Some preliminary suggestions for 
characteristics of the two types of withdrawing presented in Section 2 are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table HI. 1. Suggested characteristics of the two types of exits from export 
markets 
Typel Typell 
Exporting activity unplanned, reactive planned, actiVe 
Basic nature of the exit redirection of interests loss of export markets 
Investments to exportiýnj small in proportion to firm size 
i 
large in proportion to firm size 
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Potential causes negative feedback on profitabil- exogenous factors reducing 
ity and feasibility of exporting, profitability of exporting, ri- 
barriers to entry, failure in learn- valry 
ing (endogenous factors), non- 
international strategic markets 
Source of uncertainty inside a firrn outside a firm 
Timing early (AR > AVQ late, involves a period on a loss 
(AR < AVC) 
Consequences loss equivalent to opportunity loss or underutilisation of assets 
cost invested in exporting 
The factors behind an exit from reactive exporting (type 1) are likely to lie inside 
a firm, whereas the factors relating to withdrawing from active exporting are 
likely to lie outside a firm (type H). This preliminary suggestion follows from the 
fact that, firstly, the establishment of exporting can be seen as the end of the 
critical intra-firm process of learning to operate abroad (Christensen and 
Lindmark 1993,142). Secondly, it can be assumed that the influence of domestic 
market conditions, or the entrepreneur personally, on export routine has de- 
creased by this stage. This is because the export activities tend to functionally 
specialize in the firm organization (Miesenbock 1988,47; Reid 1982). Given this 
argument it can be assumed that exogenous factors, such as changes in the 
exchange rate, transportation costs, technology, or uncertainty due to factors that 
lie outside a firm, are more likely causes of exits from planned and active 
exporting than factors lie inside a firm. Hysteresis in exporting 
is also more 
probable in this type of exporting than in unplanned or reactive exporting 
due to 
the fact that exporting has become an important part of the 
firm's operations and 
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it is likely to have incurred sunk costs to develop the exporting operations. 
4. A case study of industrial small firms in Finland 
4.1. Economic developments influencing foreign trade in Finland from the mid- 
18s 
Since the mid-1980s two important developments in the economy of Finland 
have had an influence on the country's foreign trade. The first one of these is the 
collapse of the bilateral trade between the Soviet Union and Finland, and the 
development of closer relations to the European Community. The second one is 
the major macroeconomic fluctuations that included a boom and overheating of 
the economy at the end of the 1980s and a consequent dramatic downturn and 
economic crisis in the early years of the 1990s. Before going into the case study 
data I briefly describe these in turn. 
v 
During the period from the Second World War to the beginning of 1990s the 
Soviet Union was one of the most important trading partners for Finland. The 
share of this "East trade" in the total exports of the country was at its height 
(approximately 25 %) at the beginning of the 1980s, after which it gradually 
decreased to about 15 per cent in 1989, and eventually collapsed to just a few per 
cent by the beginning of the 1990s. The trade practically ceased in 1991 when the 
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Soviet Union collapsed and the bilateral trade agreement ended. At the same 
time, however, Finland had been developing closer relations to the European 
Community. Finland formalized its long-term free-trade relations with the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1986, and was thus able to join the 
European Economic Area (EEA) when this was formed in 1994. Finally, the 
country became a member in the European Union (EU) at the beginning of 1995. 
The share of the EEC/EU countries in the total exports of Finland has risen from 
about 35 per cent in the beginning of the 1980s to 55 per cent in 1996 (Central 
Statistical Office of Finland 1984, Statistics Finland 1998). The country also 
joined the ERM in October 1996 and it aims at entering the EMU among the first 
countries in the EU. 5' 
The economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s was caused by several simulta- 
neous adverse demand and supply shocks. In addition to the overheating of the 
economy in a vast boom in 1987-89 and the collapse in the East trade the 
seriousness of the recession was increased by a too rapid deregulation of the 
financial markets in the mid- 1980's, a cyclical downturn in the Western European 
markets at the turn of the decade and the unrealistically high external value of 
5 'Trade in industrial goods has been free of tariffs between the EU (or its 
predecessors) and Finland since the late 1970's through the associate membership in 
EFTA. Consequently, in most industrial goods the deepening of economic 
integration in the 1990s has implied a reduction in the non-tariff barriers to trade in 
particular. For a succinct historical survey of the integration between Finland and the 
Western Europe, see ETLA 1992,28-32, and the ending of the East trade, Rautava 
1995. 
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Markka until 1992, and rapidly increased public and foreign debt from 1992 on 
(Bordes et al. 1993). In terms of GDP the economy declined by about 10 per cent 
in 1991-1992, after which it started to recover under the export sectors'lead. Yet 
in 1997 the economy still was to some extent depressed by persistent high 
unemployment and the indebtedness of the public sector. " 
The economic crisis was reflected in great changes in the external value of 
Finland's Markka. Towards the end of the 1980s the unstable economic situation 
started to result in pressures against the high value of Markka - in accordance 
with the so-called "strong Markka" regime the external value of Markka was 
kept administratively at its high level. The country's export industries, which are 
crucial for the small open economy, suffered from a lack of price competitive- 
ness in the international markets. In 1991-92 the speculation against the Markka 
grew strongly. A devaluation by 12.3 per cent in the autumn of 1991 was not 
enough to remove the speculation: in September 1992 the Markka was left to 
float. The external value of Markka further depreciated by a more than 20 per 
cent, but afterwards started gradually to regain its value as the economy recov- 
ered from the slump. By the early 1995 Markka had rebounded back to its pre- 
floating level, and it was joined to the ERM at the rate 5.81 FRA/ECU in October 
52 The annual rate of unemployment rose from 3.4 % in 1990 to 13.2 % in 1992, 
and to 18.4 % in 1994. In 1996 the corresponding figure was 16.3 % (Statistics 
Finland 1998). The central government debt as a percentage of GDP rose from about 
10 % in 1990 to about 70 % in 1996, and has only recently started to level out (Bank 
of Finland 1998). 
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1996. (Hernesnierni et al. 1996,22, Bank of Finland 1996. ) 
4.2. The data 
The case study reports below have been compiled mainly on the basis of data 
collected in two separate interviews of the managing directors of 10 industrial 
small businesses in Finland. These interviews were carried out in the spring of 
1996 and in the summer 1997, the latter one of which specifically for this case 
study (for the interview agenda, see Appendix 3 ). 53 In addition to that, material 
from an earlier Nordic comparative study on the internationalization of smaller 
enterprises (in which the ten firms studied here were included) has been used as 
background information and to plan the later stages in data collection. Initially 
the firms were chosen in 1992 for the Nordic comparative study using the 
following criteria: the firms should be independent and locally owned enter- 
prises, or belong to a local group of firms. They should operate either in wood- 
"In total the data-set includes 80 firms interviewed in 1992. Of these, 76 firms 
were reinterviewed in 1996. The interviews in 1992 were associated with the Nordic 
comparative study "Smaf6retagens internationalisering - en studie av 
anpassningsprocesser till EG'92 och regional utveckling" (see Lindmark et al. 1994, 
Eskelinen et al. 1994 and Lautanen 1994). The interviews in 1997 were half- 
structured, whereas the interviews in 1992 and 1996 were based on a structured 
questionnaire form. All interviews have been confidential and made in face-to-face 
situations. The interviews in 1992 were carried out by a pair of academic persons 
involved in the project (including the author of this article), whereas the interviews 
in 1996 and 1997 were carried out by the author of this article. For more about the 
data-set, see, e. g., Lautanen 1996 and Eskelinen et al. 1994. 
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processing or engineering industries, which are the traditionally most important 
export industries in Finland. The number of employees should be between 10 and 
200, and the firms should be located in four different types of regions consisting 
of a total of 14 labour market districts in different parts of Finland. Because some 
of the firms have been reorganized since 1992 there are a few firms in the data- 
set that no longer strictly fulfil these criteria. This study focuses on all those 
firms among the 76 firms (55 firms with export experience) interviewed in 1996 
which have at least once in their history ceased exporting. 
The accuracy of the information collected in 1997 has been checked against the 
information gathered in the earlier interviews and thus corroborated. The con- 
tents of the stories presented below has also been confirmed by the managing 
directors interviewed. Other sources of information were direct observation 
through visiting the firms the three times, product brochures and other written 
material obtained from the firms. The cases have been presented anonymously at 
the managers' request. Basic information on the exporting operations by the firms 
is presented in Table 2. 
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Table IJI. 2. Basic information on the firms and their exporting history " 
Firm Sector Export Destination(s) Max Destination(s) Max 
(approx product and time of ini- share and time of re- share of imate n. tial entry to the of entry and possi- exports of 
of em- first country and ex- ble exit from the turn- 
ployees exit from export- ports exporting oversince 
in 1996) ing ofthe the re- 
turn- entry 
I over 
A (Lpc) wood- antique- The Soviet Union 35% Russia 199 1- 1996: 
(15) pro- like fur- 1972-1987 a 14% 
cessing niture (incompa- 
rable) 
B (Ltd) wood- log Several European 15% Central European 1996: 
(35) pro- houses countries between countries 1991- 70% 
cessing 1977-1987 a (later also coun- 
tries in the Far 
East)b 
C (Ltd) engi- an alu- Sweden 1983- 25% Sweden 1993- 1994: 
(10) neering minium 1987 
b 1994 b (a try in 2% 
framed 1990_1991b) 
window 
D (Ltd) engi- metal Norway 1985- 10% Estonia, Sweden 1996: 
(20) neering structures 1989na. 1994- (ploughs, 8% 
for fish small diggers and 
breeding other earthmov- 
establish- ing contractor 
ments; equipment)b 
E (Ltd) engi- moulds Sweden 1992- 10-12 Sweden 1994- 1996: 
(35) neering for 1992 
a % (preceded by an 70% 
refrigera- unsuccessful try 
tion in- to Germany in 
dustries 1994; later actual 
exports also to 
Denmark, Nor- 
way, Poland, Ire- 
land)b 
"The present (1997) ownership structure of the firms is as follows: Finns B-E 
and J are privately owned limited companies (Ltd). Firms A, F and I are limited 
partnership companies (Lpc) of which A has a sales subsidiary (Ltd). Finns G and H 
are Ltd: s that belong to larger domestic groups of firni-s (Ltd*). As regards entering 
export markets, a superscript "a" refers to unplanned initial export deliveries and "b" 
to a planned, or strategic entry. 
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F (Lpc) engi- log lathe Russia and Czech 60% - (a try to Canada (<10) neering Republic 1992- 1996)n,. 
1994 a 
G engi- circuit Sweden 1992- 0.25 
(Ltd*) neering boards 1993 a % 
(>200) 
H engi- teaching Sweden and Rus- 3-5% Sweden and the 1996: 
(Ltd*) neering equip- sia 1994-1994 b Netherlands 4% 
(20) ment and 1996- (minor 
fixtures exports to some 
for natu- other European 
ral sci- countries and 
ences Russia)b 
I (Lpc) wood- lami- Germany 1995- 5% Estonia and Rus- 1997: 5% 
(30) pro- nated 1995 
b 
sia 1997 (win- (estimate) 
cessing wood )b dows and doors 
board 
j (Ltd) engi- a ma- France 1995- 1% 
(20) neering chining 1995' 
part 
With the exception of the cases G and H the firms were in 1997 independent and 
privately owned businesses (either limited ownership companies or limited 
companies). With the exception of firm G the firms employ at most 35I, Iploy- 
ees. Seven out of the 10 firms reentered exporting markets, from 1 to 6 years after 
the first exit. The maximum annual share in exports of the total turnover of a firm 
before making an exit varies from I to 60 per cent depending on the case. In 6 
firms the exports had started from an unsolicited order and in 3 cases the initial 
entry to foreign markets had been planned beforehand. As to the 7 re-entries, they 
had all been planned, or strategic. 
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4.3. The case study reports 
4.3.1. Firm Case A 
Firm A had noteworthy direct exports to the Soviet Union between 1972-87. The 
firm produces high-quality antique-like furniture and employs about 15 employ- 
ees today. Most of the sales and marketing activities were separated from the 
limited partnership company A into a sister corporation (Ltd) already in the 1970s 
(The numbers presented here unless otherwise mentioned will concern solely the 
productive Firm A). In relation to the whole market for furniture in Finland the 
firm operates on a narrow and ever diminishing market segment of antique-like 
furniture. In recent years the firm has striven to develop new models of furniture 
for the reason that its handmade antique furniture has been imitated by manufac- 
turers of furniture. Competition in price in the market segment has clearly 
increased in the 1990s. 
The exit from the markets in the Soviet Union in 1987 after several years of 
exporting is related to the gradual collapse of Communism in the country and the 
consequent end for bilateral trade between Finland and the Soviet Union. The 
exporting was initiated through a contact that came into being at a trade fair in 
Turku in the early 1970s. There was no need for a market research since in those 
days the purchases were at the hands of particular quarters in the Soviet Union. 
The most important customers for the firm were organizations purchasing 
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furniture for luxurious hotels and prernises of the Communist party. These 
quarters were easily available which made advertising in the export markets 
unnecessary. In fact the most essential costs for developing the exports were in 
those days outlays from sustaining warm relations with the customers by, for 
example, inviting them from time to time to visit Finland. The exports increased 
rather quickly for which the firm hired more employees. The only marked cause 
of uncertainty in exporting after the mid- 1980s was the fact that it was not known 
for how long would the furniture be required by the Soviet Union. Otherwise the 
risks were perceived by the firm to be low because the customer was basically the 
Soviet government and the exchange rate risk was eliminated by binding the 
business into Western cuffencies. 
The exports ended when the purchases gradually ceased by 1988. Fortunately, the 
home-markets were growing fast at the same time for the boom in the end of the 
1980s. While in 1985 about 35 per cent of the turnover consisted of exporting, 
this proportion dropped to 16 per cent in 1986 and to 3 per cent in 1987. The firrn 
searched out the earlier partners - most of whom just seemed to have disappeared 
- but was also trying to export through its own agents. Some occasional export 
deliveries indeed took place in the end of the 1980s, but a more noteworthy trade 
was hampered by unstable political and economic situation in the Soviet Union, 
and the liquidity crisis of potential private customers there. Unprofitable export- 
ing was not continued, and the firm was left, contrary to many other Finnish firms 
involved in Eastern Trade, without outstanding claims from Russia. Overall, the 
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exporting to the Soviet Union had been very profitable and brought the firin its 
basic capital. There was hardly any competition involved in exporting operations 
at that time and the provision was clearly better than in the domestic markets. 
This was due much to the bilateral trade agreement between the two countries, 
which gave the firm an advantage over its foreign rivals. When the bilateral trade 
gradually ended this advantage no more existed. 
The ending of exporting fell upon the enormous boom in the latter part of the 
1980s in Finland. The bringing of exporting to a standstill could be fully compen- 
sated in 1987-88 by the strongly increased domestic sales. Despite the decrease in 
exports, the turnover of the firm grew for 33 per cent in 1987. In 1988 the growth 
of turnover of the firm reached enormous 250 per cent, though this is explained 
by increase in sales rather than in the volume of production. To meet the demand, 
the firm further invested in additional capacity and hired more employees. 
The high demand continued until, in 1991, the markets virtually collapsed. The 
sales company was hit hardest by the economic crisis: the turnover of the com- 
pany fell in 1992 into Jess than 1/10 of the amount in 1988-89 when the boom 
reached its peak. The operations of Firm A were also dramatically decreased 
because of the depression. To survive the firms tried to offset the decrease in 
domestic demand by exports not only to the present Russia but to the Westem 
countries. Regarding the latter destinations the aims were unsuccessful, but to the 
markets in Russia the firm re-entered already in the end of 199 1. Increasingly the 
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sales company has also been an agent for foreign furniture to Russia. The share of 
exports of the turnover has increased incrementally to reach 14 per cent of the 
summed turnover of the sister companies in 1996. 
Due to the transition in the East trade customers, export channels and the whole 
nature of export operations to Russia changed entirely for the firm. Formerly the 
local purchasers made the orders through the bilateral trade system, whereas now 
the firm had to search for customers and decision-makers in the export destina- 
tion by itself. In contrast to the earlier situation, the customers are mainly private 
persons today, for which reason the firm has started, for example, to advertise in 
the export markets. The adaptation to the change has however appeared to be 
difficult, which has been reflected in the fact that the volume of exports has not 
reached the earlier level. Financing difficulties of ordinary Russian customers is a 
problem, because of the high risks the orders have to be invoiced always in 
beforehand: 50 per cent of the order even before making the furniture. Exporting 
to Russia in the 1990's has increased, especially the turnover of the sales com- 
pany, but the influence of exports on Firm A's production and organization have 
been smallish. In general, taught by experience, the firm has not much increased 
the capacity or the number of employees in the 1990's but rather tried to increase 
flexibility in the use of it. 
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4.3.2. Firm Case B 
Firm B (privately owned Ltd) produces log houses for residential and leisure 
purposes. The firm has about 35 employees. Its principal market areas in addition 
to the domestic markets are certain countries in the Far East and in the central 
Europe. In the home-markets the firm is marketing both residential and leisure 
houses, whereas in the Far East the demand principally concerns leisure houses 
and in the central European markets residential buildings. Traditionally the log 
houses have been highly customized, but the effect of this gradually is decreasing 
especially in the foreign markets. 
As many of its counterparts in Finland did, the firm experienced great fluctuation 
in the demand for construction in 1988-9 1. During that period the turnover of the 
firm rose substantially for about 2 years and then fell dramatically in 1990-9 1. 
One can distinguish two different periods in the finn's exporting operations, one 
before and one after the domestic boom. The first one of these consisted of 
reactive exports. The firm got the initial export order in 1977, and the reactive 
exporting ended in 1987 when the home-markets grew strongly enough to make 
the firm short of capacity. The second export period started in 1991 when the 
domestic markets for log houses in Finland collapsed. As an indication of the 
active development of export operations the foreign markets have since then 
become the main source of business for the firm and cqunt for more than 70 per 
cent of the turnover today. The firm has been run in the 1990s by a new manager 
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as a consequence of a transfer of generation in 1988. 
During the first export period the firm did not aim at marketing its products 
abroad but only replied to unsolicited orders. The operations were unplanned and 
the principle of market segmentation was not utilized. If there were problems 
with deliveries to one country, the firm usually made an exit from that country 
markets and replied to orders that were received from other countries. At maxi- 
mum the share of exporting of the total turnover reached about 15 per cent, being 
directed to 1-2 countries at a time. The firm stopped exporting when the domestic 
markets grew strongly in 1987: in 1988 the firm's capacity was in full use, the 
turnover of the firm grew for 50 per cent and the number of personnel increased 
for 25 per cent. The main reason for the exit was that the firm did not have any 
explicit export strategy, i. e. the management had not made a decision to export. 
To a smaller extent the exporting had also been hindered by the high external 
value of Finland's Markka. In addition to the above mentioned factors, the lack of 
10 
language knowledge in the firm and problems which appeared in counti-y -specific 
adaptation of the products contributed to the end of exporting. 
This reactive exporting had no marked impact on the firm in the 1980s. The firm 
did not invest much in exporting and exporting expanded the firm's operations 
only noticeably. This situation changed completely when the domestic markets 
collapsed at the turn of the 1990s. Now to survive from the economic crisis it was 
absolutely necessary for the firm to find markets abroad. In 1991 when the first 
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export deliveries were supplied, the turnover of the firm was no more than 2/3 of 
the turnover in 1989. The firm started to develop exporting actively and by that 
means committed into this strategy by reasonably large investments. From the 
year 1991 the turnover has more than doubled and the share of exporting in- 
creased from 10 per cent to more than 70 per cent of the turnover. The re-entry 
into the export markets has now resulted in obvious changes in the firm: in 
particular, organizational efficiency has increased through more accurate division 
of labour and the quality certification of products in exporting has developed. 
Export prices in different destination countries are set according to results of 
market research that has suggested inter-country differences in customers' 
willingness to pay for log buildings. 
Already by 1997 the firm had invested in exporting in the 1990's more than 10 
times the amount invested during the earlier exporting period. The costs have 
mostly been sunk costs: outlays from country-specific market researches, travel- 
ling expenses and outlays from establishing show rooms abroad. Advertising and 
marketing has been left however for the local distribution channels. Because of 
the fact that the investments into exporting were small in the 1980s, the exit from 
the foreign markets did not involve any direct loss in 1987. The real significance 
of the end of exporting was, however, realized later when the domestic markets 
started to decline: the earlier export channels, though weak, had now been lost - 
and the re-entry had to be started from the very beginning. 
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As a reactive exporter the firm experienced uncertainty that clearly originated 
mainly in the firm itself: the risks related to investing in exporting were perceived 
as too high for, among other things, lack of language knowledge and other 
resources. On the other hand, in the 1990s the uncertainty has been related to 
unstable economic state of the national economy of Finland which has caused 
unexpected changes in the firm's foreign competitiveness. The essential macro- 
economic factors include fluctuation in the exchange rate, increasing costs of 
labour, and high taxation. Thus, during the active export development, the 
uncertainty has originated outside rather than inside the firm. 
4.3.3. Firm Case C 
Firm C (privately owned Ltd) produces glazing frames of light-alloy metal. These 
are of two types. Firstly, so-called 'front windows' that consist of a single pane of 
glass held in an aluminium frame, which is placed within (in-between) the frame 
of the original double glazing (approximately 85 per cent of the turnover). 
Secondly, 'additional windows', which consist of complete double glazing units 
inclusive of aluminium frames. The firm has slightly more than 10 employees. 
Geographically the main market area is the Southern Finland, especially Helsinki 
and Turku regions. In contrast to the situation in the mid- 1980s when the most 
important customers were smaller private houses, today's marketing is targeted at 
housing corporations and real estate companies. 
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The windows produced are customized products which makes it possible for the 
firm to participate refurbishment of houses starting from their planning stage. 
With regard to the whole window markets the firm is specialized and operates in 
a narrow market segment. The competitive edge of the firrn is mainly based on 
differentiation from competitors by bundling supplementary services into the 
product: the firm offers not only an assembling service but also other kinds of 
repairing related to replacing windows and aluminium structures needed in this 
process. The supplementary services have been norninally separated into different 
companies. 
The firm had exports of additional windows to a more marked extent in 1983-87, 
and to a smaller extent also in 1993-94. Investments made to re-enter the markets 
in 1990-91 did not yield result. All three times the destination market has been 
the Stockholm area. The first one of the export periods can be considered as a 
serjous attempt to develop exporting as an important part of the operations of the 
firm. The second attempt to enter the markets in 1990-91 was a slightly lighter 
one and the third one in 1993-94 initiated by an business acquaintance. At its 
best 
the exporting counted for about 25 per cent of the turnover in the mid-1980s. 
At 
that time it had an important role for replacing declining demand for additional 
windows at the home-markets. The front window is not as easily tradeable as 
it 
always includes an assembly as well. Instead, additional windows could 
be sold 
also excluding an assembly. 
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Exporting involved quite a marked fixed costs in the beginning of the first 
exporting period, whereas in the case of the latter two aims to enter the markets 
the costs were smaller. The firm had a complete market research done in Sweden 
to assess its price competitiveness and local competitive situation in 1982, and to 
find a local cooperative partner. According to this market research and the firm's 
own experiences the product was perceived in Sweden as high quality, but for this 
reason could not compete in price. Unfortunately the first cooperative firm soon 
went bankrupt. The firm could however have the old agreement transferred as 
such to another firm. Marketing has all three times been left to the local partners. 
The first exit from the export markets in 1987 was again due to bankruptcy of the 
cooperative firm in Sweden. The firm did not strive to continue exporting at any 
cost as it seemed difficult to find a new trustworthy cooperative firm, and because 
the demand for front windows was vastly growing in the domestic markets in end 
of the 1980s. Despite the fact that the share exports of the tumover fell from 
about 10 per cent to zero, the total nominal turnover grew for 35 per cent in 1988. 
The withdrawal was also influenced by the fact that the whole operational model 
of the firm changed as the demand for front windows (which are always assem- 
bled for the customer) increased. Exporting was also hindered by language 
problems, high domestic level of costs and prices and higher risks related to 
exporting operations in comparison to operations in the domestic markets. 
The 
withdrawal in 1987 did not cause any losses since the firm was thorough 
in 
collecting claims, and the products were never sold under the average unit 
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production costs. 
In 1990-91 when the demand in the domestic markets started to decrease on-ii- 
nously, the firm tried to re-enter the markets in Sweden. Using an export consul- 
tancy the firm acquired a new partner from a larger firm producing facades of 
buildings and found out about the situation in the markets. The demand for 
refurbishment construction was however clearly smaller due to a change in the 
VAT that had put a tax on assembly work (A similar change took place in the 
firms home-markets in Finland in 1994). Consequently, the firm ceased the 
attempts to enter the markets. 
The second proper exporting period in 1993-94 was initiated by an earlier contact 
person in Stockholm. This time the firm developed a special model of the 
additional window for the export markets, but otherwise the firm was not inter- 
ested in investing into exporting as much as before. Unexpectedly, however, the 
key person accidentally died and the firm was obliged to find another one. 
Against the earlier experiences, this caused great uncertainty in the entry process. 
The export deliveries started through the new agent but the firm was not able to 
establish its Position in the markets this time either. This was due to the increase 
in the external value of Finland's Markka that gradually eroded the price competi- 
tiveness of the firm in the foreign markets. Also the payments for supplied 
deliveries became delayed. When the complaints by the agent about the price of 
the product increased in 1994, the firm withdrew from the markets and focused its 
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concentration on the home-markets (the firm did not lower the price of the 
product for which reason the number of complaints was almost in direct relation 
to sales). At the maximum the exports counted for about 2 per cent of the turn- 
over. 
Neither of the exporting periods resulted in any marked changes in the firm's 
organization. The growth of the firm has been based on the expansion of home- 
markets rather than on exporting. With the exception of the export attempt in 
1990, the exits from the export markets have been possible to replace via an 
increase in domestic sales. The export markets however arrested the decline of 
the firm's operations, when the demand for additional windows decreased in 
Finland from the mid- 1980s. In addition, the export operations have contributed 
to product development and have also given other kinds of stimuli that have 
advantaged the firm in its home-markets. 
it 
4.3.4. Firm Case D 
The main products of the firm D are articulated ploughs, small digging machines 
and buckets, in addition to other kinds of equipment for earthmoving contractors. 
The most important product at the moment is the articulated plough, which 
brings 
about 35 per cent of the turnover. The privately owned limited company 
has about 
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20 employees. Geographically the most important market area is the Southern 
Finland, and the metropolitan area in particular: From 40 to 50 per cent of the 
turnover arises from that region. The main aim of the firm in the domestic 
markets is to be able to keep the old and established customers and distribution 
channels such as Kesko Oy and Sisu Oy, which requires, among other things, 
continuous product development. The firm has entered export markets twice with 
different products and to different destination countries. 
The first one of the exporting periods started in 1985 and ended in 1989. This 
included exporting of metal structures for fish breeding establishments in Nor- 
way. Exporting restarted when the firm entered markets in Estonia (contactor 
equipments) and Sweden (a small digger) in 1994. In 1995 the share of exports of 
the turnover was only about 5 per cent and in 1996 about 8 per cent but interna- 
tionalization is one of the firm's main targets. In addition to exporting to Estonia, 
the firm has a plough factory there. 
Exporting to Norway in the 1980s did not involve any significant investments. 
The most important costs incurred from a few visits. at trade fairs and yearly visits 
to Norway. Visits at fairs and translation services the firm used were supported by 
a state export promotion organization. There was no need for market research or 
advertising to enter the markets because initially the business was kindled through 
a client acquaintance in Finland. Neither did the exports require acquiring of any 
new machinery or equipment. The most important source of uncertainty 
in 
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exporting to Norway was the lack of knowledge in Norway. Exporting did not 
have any significant influences on the organization of the fin-n, but made the 
returns slightly better because of the greater mark-up in exporting in comparison 
to sales in the domestic markets. Before the exit exporting represented about 10 
per cent of the turnover. 
The exporting ended when the Norwegian client went on to purchase the fish 
breeding establishments from domestic engineering works in 1989. This was 
preceded by a clear increase in competition in the markets in Norway: the most 
important new rivals were engineering shops supplying structures for off-shore oil 
drilling platforms. As the demand for oil rigs was low many of the works became 
economically troubled. Some of them were afforded industrial support by the 
state for keeping their jobs which increased their competitiveness against foreign 
rivals. Firm D was willing to lower the price of its metal structures but this was 
not enough. Once realizing this situation the firm D tried to find markets for 
ploughs in Norway but failed in this endeavour. In contrast, in the domestic 
markets the firm succeeded in finding a new important customer (Lannen Oy). As 
the domestic markets were growing fast in the end of the 1980s in general as well, 
the firm turned its focus on the domestic markets. In 1989, despite the end of 
exporting, the turnover of the firm grew for 10 per cent. Thus, the consequences 
of the exit from the markets in Norway were in practice minimal for the firrn, 
though exporting had been expected to develop as an important source of busi- 
ness. 
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In 1993 when the slump had substantially increased competition in the domestic 
markets, the firm started to search for foreign markets again. It succeeded to enter 
the markets in Estonia with ploughs and other contractor equipment, and in 
Sweden with a small digging machine. The meaning of exporting has since then 
increased incrementally: from 1994 to 1995 the turnover of the firm increased 36 
per cent while the share of exports rose from 3 to 5 percent. In 1996 the share of 
exports continued its growth to about 8 per cent of the turnover, while the total 
growth of the business decreased to 6 per cent. The meaning of exporting will be 
emphasized in the future because of the fact that the firm's market share of the 
domestic markets for ploughs (20-25 %) is falling. This is especially due to new 
domestic competitors: it is typical for the industry that during depressions a 
number of miscellaneous works enter the markets with low quality - and low 
price - ploughs. 
The firm has had market research done in the markets in Latvia, Lithuania and the 
UK too, though the benefit from these has been according to the manager smaller 
than from personal visits to these potential destination countries. Uncertainty 
related to exporting to Estonia is clearly smaller than in the case of Norway. This 
is because the firm also has a work shop in Estonia and by that means knows the 
markets reasonably well. Markets in Sweden bear greater uncertainty, and 
businesses there are not established. The finn has also set out to invest in an 
export project in Scotland by developing quality certification and by improving 
the knowledge of English in the firm. 
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4.3.5. Firin Case E 
Firm E produces tools (large moulds for compression of plastic and rubber) for 
automobile and refrigeration equipment industries. The exporting of these highly 
customized tools brings the small firm (Ltd, 35 employees) about 70 per cent of 
its turnover. As this business has grown strongly over the last few years, the share 
of other products (thin sheet metal plate products) has decreased into 20 per cent 
of the turnover. Geographically the firm's principal market area consists of the 
Nordic countries. Also the exports to other European countries have been initi- 
ated through large refrigeration equipment manufacturers in the Nordic countries. 
The active export operations have started only in 1994: in addition to this reentry 
in the exporting markets the present case study focuses on the firm's exit from the 
markets in Sweden in 1992. 
The central motivation for the export orientation of the firm are the large fluctua- 
tions in the domestic demand. The firm has established and long-lived customer 
relations in the home-markets. These result mainly from the fact that the firm not 
only produces but also designs the tools to offer, and is able to supply entire 
production lines. In the beginning of the 1990s it was typical for the operations of 
the firm that the domestic demand for moulds strongly varied in term of about 
two years. This was due to smallness and high level of concentration of the 
customer industries, and the fact that the designs of cars and refrigeration equip- 
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ment are not renewed on a yearly basis but more infrequently. For the fluctuation 
in demand the recently renewed machinery and production capacity of the firm 
were from time to time in full use, and clearly under utilized at other times. The 
management of the firm considered two possible solution to the problem: either 
to search for new products for the production of which the technology could be 
applied, or to extend marketing of tools geographically to abroad. In 1992 the 
firm had without its own initiative export deliveries to Sweden, and although 
these had ended before the end of the same year, the firm went on for the intema- 
tionalization strategy. The exporting markets, where the firm re-entered in 1994, 
shortly turned out to be a bonanza for the firin: the share of exports of the turn- 
over rose in two years to 70 per cent of the production. Exporting has spread in 
addition to Sweden to Norway, Poland, Ireland and Denmark. 
The first export deliveries in 1992 were arranged by a Danish corporation the 
sister corporation of which in Finland is run by the manager of Firm E. The entry 
did not involve any fixed costs. Exporting ended because the customer in Sweden 
considered the moulds of the firm clearly too expensive and consequently shifted 
its purchases to Italy. Price was not lowered under the average unit costs so that 
the exporting remained profitable till the end. To some extent, however, the 
exporting was at that time also hindered by the red tape, as the firm perceived 
especially the records related to exporting quite troublesome. Because the firm 
had no other channels or customers abroad, the exit frc; m exports was inevitable 
when loosing the customer. The share of exports of the total turnover of the 
firm 
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became about 10-12 per cent in 1992. 
Since the firm had not invested or prepared for exporting the exit from the export 
markets did not have any marked influences on the firm. The good demand in 
1993 was enough to make the turnover of the firm grow for 36 per cent and the 
number of employees for 38 per cent from 1992. On the other hand the firm did 
not endeavour to compensate the exporting by increased efforts in the domestic 
markets, but started to plan a new entry. The negative feedback from exporting 
had been directed to the price of the product - according to the client the price had 
been 30 per cent too high. Although the mark-up in exporting had been extremely 
good, it was clear to the management of the firm that without a larger volume of 
production the price could not be lowered to meet this customer's demands. 
On the other hand, the firm had got positive feedback on other product character- 
istics than price, such as quality and reliability of delivery. This lead to a strategic 
1P 
decision by the management to solve the capacity under utilization problem by 
extending geographical markets rather than by diversification of production. To 
develop exporting the firm invested in the training of personnel and adopted a 
new more active attitude towards export marketing. The managing director of the 
firm took a course on export management and the language skills of the personnel 
were improved by language courses. In potential destination countries the firm 
had market research done. Although the firm got some support for these activities 
from a public export support organization the developing of exporting involved 
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quite marked fixed costs in the firms scale. Because of the investments to develop 
exporting, risk related to exporting operations were now considered higher than in 
1992. 
The investments payed off. At first in 1993-94 the firm was exploring the markets 
in Germany, but failed to enter the markets. However, in 1994 the firm developed 
at a fair a contact with a large refrigeration equipment manufacturer customer in 
Sweden, which led to an agreement on supplying moulds for this large firm. The 
business ensued surprisingly easily which lead to further measures to expand 
international operations. In two years the firm entered markets in 4 new export 
destinations, and the share of exporting of the operations of the firm rose rapidly: 
in 1995 the share of exports of the turnover was 55 per cent and in 1996 already 
almost 70 per cent. Mainly due to the increase in exports the turnover increased 
by 80 per cent and number of personnel by 25 per cent in 1995. In the following 
year, the turnover grew only by 5 per cent due to the fact that the production 
capacity was now to a large extent in full use. The increase in volume has been 
reflected in lower unit costs and contributed to the profitability of the firm above 
all by making it more stable than before. 
4.3.6. Firm Case F 
Finn F is a privately owned engineering works (limited partnership company in 
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the countryside. It employs less than 10 employees. Today the firm's main 
product is a feed cutting machine. This analysis however focuses on a turning 
machine for building timber, which has been developed and patented by the firm. 
The product was exported mainly to Russian Karelia in 1992-94. Since this round 
wood based technology is not common in the Western countries, the machine has 
been only produced and sold to offer in the domestic markets, and in Russia and 
Czech Republic. The competing technology is to plain the log smooth, requiring 
the log to have already been worked roughly once. The domestic markets for the 
special log lathes are only about 20-30 machines a year. 
The export history of the small firm is peculiar. In 1992, when the firm started, 
the share of exports of the total turnover of the firm was about 5 per cent. In 1993 
it reached 60 per cent, and in 1994 when the exporting operations ended, the 
share was 25 per cent. The peak of exporting in 1993 was due to the delivery of 4 
log lathes and a few smaller products to Russia. In 1995 the reactive exporter did 
not get any more orders from abroad and so the exporting ended. Markets for the 
lathes are geographically limited by the supplementary services, such as a guaran- 
tee service, supply of spare parts and preliminary training how to use the ma- 
chine. These services are difficult for a small firm to carry out where the markets 
are at a great distance. 
The main reason for the exit from the export markets was the fact that the 
firm 
had no export strategy but was only responding to unsolicited orders. 
The two 
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central problems were, firstly, failure to find the right export channel and custom- 
ers, and secondly, the unstable economic situation in Russia (liquidity crisis of 
potential customers). The creditworthiness of customers caused great uncertainty, 
which was tried to minimize by requiring prepayments and using middlemen in 
the export businesses. Some of the businesses were also bound to the US dollar to 
decrease the risk related to the exchange rate. The exporting was also hindered by 
inter-country differences in regulations on safety at work and safety of electrical 
apparatus, as well as the lack of language knowledge in the firm. In addition, 
according to the manager, myopic speculators spoiled some of the reputation of 
Finnish firms in Russian Karelia in the early 1990s, which may have influenced 
the ending of orders. 
The exit from exporting did not cause any marked losses for the firm, since the 
investments to export markets were minimal including only a few product 
brochures and a video in English, smaller costs from acquiring information on 
potential customers and minor travel costs. Lathes were not sold under the unit 
production cost at any point. The firm had, however, problems with the credit- 
worthiness of customers not only in Russia but also in Czech Republic. One of 
the exported lathes is still there in the possession of the customs because the 
customer was not able to pay for it. The firm has tried to resell the machine at the 
site since bringing it back to Finland would be costly. Sending assemblers to 
assemble the machine and to train the customer to use the machine in 1994 
already cost the firm about 25 per cent of the value of it. 
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With the help of its smallness and flexibility, the firm has been able to adjust its 
production according to demand in an extraordinary way. In 1993 a marked share 
of the turnover (almost 60 %) came from exporting of lathes. Yet the end of 
exporting of lathes in 1994 could be replaced fully by sales of lathes and other 
products at the domestic markets in 1994-95. Despite the end of exporting the 
turnover of the firm grew nominally for 64 per cent in 1995, most of which came 
from other products than the lathes. Financially the exporting had been very 
profitable, and also contributed to the skills of the employees and quality of the 
product. In addition it helped the firm to get rid of its image of a village black- 
smith, which has had a positive influence on the firm. The end of exporting 
however caused a designer to leave the firm. 
Afterwards the firm also explored markets for the lathe in Canada, where the 
round wood technology is being used yet to a smaller extent. The aim to enter the 
markets was however abandoned because it would have required sending a 
sample machine to the destination without a guarantee of getting a single order. 
The value of the machine would have been about 10 per cent of the turnover in 
1996. The firm considered the risk to be too high and has since then focused on 
the domestic markets. 
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4.3.7. Firm Case G 
Firm G (Ltd) is a part of a domestic group of companies (Ltd) in the contract 
manufacture of electronics. It has more than 200 employees today. The firm 
produces no physical products of its own but the product is basically the assembly 
work in the production of circuit boards. The most important customer for the 
firm is Nokia Telecommunications Plc, the success of which has resulted in a 
very fast growth of the firm since 1993. In terms of the nominal turnover the 
growth has exceeded 50 per cent a year for the last four years, and the personnel 
has also more than doubled since 1993. As to direct exports, it is restricted to 
supplying a circuit board to a customer Sweden in 1992-93. Today the firm has 
not direct exports of its own, although it has adapted itself quite far into the 
international operational environment. About 95 per cent of the circuit boards 
produced end up in export products and the firm itself purchases components 
directly from intemational markets. 
The export deliveries in 1992 started when a customer of that time, Oy Abloy Ab, 
"sold" one of its products (a fireproof door closing mechanism) to its Swedish 
subsidiary. The transfer of production to the Sweden-based firm did not change 
the supplier of circuit boards but acquiring these from Finland continued. Before 
long the needless intermediary was removed and the Swedish affIliate started to 
order the circuit boards directly from the manufacturer' The meaning of exporting 
was very small for the firm G, since the deliveries abroad formed only a fraction 
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of the turnover (0.25 per cent). 
Exporting ended when the Swedish firm ceased making the closing mechanisms 
in 1993. Firm G had been conscious of the life-cycle of the product already when 
the deliveries changed to exporting, for which reason the exit from the markets 
did not come as a surprise for the firm. The firm had not made any investments to 
develop export operations either. As the volume of exporting had also been very 
small, the exit hardly had a noticeable influence on the operations of the firm. 
Besides, the strongly increasing demand by Nokia totally drew the firm's atten- 
tion. Notwithstanding the ending of exporting the turnover grew by about 10 per 
cent in 1993 and the net profit improved by a factor of 3.5 from the previous year. 
The exporting was however found to be feasible and possibly competitive. 
In the mid-1990s, the firm cautiously started to search for new exporting possibil- 
ities. The aim is to create growing and continuing customer relations tl-,. -, I-', gh 
foreign subsidiaries of Finnish large firms. The idea is based not only on the 
export experience gained in 1992-93, but on the fact that there are economies of 
scale in the production of circuit boards that can be utilized through international 
trade. Lower unit costs due to an increase in volume through exporting benefits 
the customer especially if the foreign affiliate company produces the same 
products as the parent firm. From the firms point of view, there 
is also less 
uncertainty related to starting exporting through this channel than 
by marketing 
the assembly work directly to foreign customers. Overall, however, 
the firm is 
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rather conservative in these aims since the since the growth in the domestic 
markets, i. e. Nokia Group, still takes the central attention of the firm. 
4.3.8. Firm Case H 
Firm H produces teaching equipment and fixtures for natural sciences laborato- 
ries. This limited company has about 15 employees and it is a part of a local 
group of firms that includes, among other things, a printing plant. The products 
and their main markets form two primary groups: fixtures, the markets of which 
are limited into the nearby countries (Nordic countries and Russia), and teaching 
equipment for which the potential market area is the whole Europe. The firm had 
exports in 1994, and after a year break again since 1996. Both periods are results 
of the same internationalization strategy. 
It is essential in the industry to be able to supply almost everything from the 
equipment to other teaching materials needed in a natural science teaching 
laboratories. Consequently, the firm H has more than 20.000 selling lines. The 
largest European manufacturers have up to 40-60.000 selling lines, only part of 
which, naturally, are made by the firms themselves. Typically firms are also able 
to supply tuitional entities for different levels of education from elementary 
school to university. These reasons make entry into markets difficult. Further, 
because the teaching programmes are renewed at intervals product development 
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is a prerequisite for staying as a strong competitor in the industry (Some of the 
equipment, though, dates from the nineteenth century). The product development 
is determined by the tuition processes, i. e., the pedagogical usefulness of the 
products: normally the products are extremely simple for their appearance. 
The firm has increasingly invested in development of exporting from 1992. 
Exporting is hindered especially by technical barriers and differences in tuition 
programmes. It may take a couple of years to take in a particular country's 
tuitional organization. This implies that positive returns may be expected only 
after irreversible investing has continued for a while. Once the particular tuitional 
organization has been embraced and products adjusted accordingly the costs 
become markedly lower. The firm H has incurred costs especially from market 
researches, advertising and marketing materials and visiting a number of trade 
fairs abroad. Some of the market research has been carried out by the firm itself: 
there are normally only a few firms operating in the markets in each country and 
the branch is typically well organized. In addition the demand is reasonably easy 
to forecast since this is primarily determined by state budgets: teaching laboratory 
materials are almost to the full public procurements. For these reasons the direct 
costs of developing exporting have not been, on average, more than a per cent of 
the yearly turnover since 1992. 
The firm started to develop exporting actively to Sweden in 1992. it took how- 
ever almost two years before the firm got the first export order in 1994. During 
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the same year the firm also had a one-shot delivery in a building project to Russia. 
Unfortunately the import company in Sweden went bankrupt before the end of the 
year and so the exporting was interrupted. In addition to the above mentioned 
factors the exporting was to a smaller extent hindered by higher risks related to 
exporting operations compared to domestic operations. Together the value of 
these export operations was between 3 and 5 per cent of the turnover of the firm. 
The firm started to look for a new export channel in Sweden immediately after 
the bankruptcy. The deliveries in 1994 took the firm a bit higher on the learning 
curve but economically the returns were clearly negative at that point. Products 
were priced profitably, though, but the investment did not have time to pay for 
itself. 
The temporary withdrawal from the export markets did not have any significant 
impact on the firm. This was mainly due to the fact that the demand in the 
domestic markets was higher in 1995 than in 1994. Despite the absence of 
exporting the turnover rose from 1994 to 1995 for 23 per cent, while profitability 
remained stable. The firm did not however transfer its attention away from export 
marketing but continued the development of exporting operations. The markets in 
the Netherlands were taken as the next target after Sweden. The firm also started 
to hire and train personnel taking into account the internationalization aim. 
However, it took no less than till 1996 before the exporting to Sweden continued. 
Due to the bad experiences in Sweden prudence and carefulness in operational 
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planning of exporting increased. The most important source of uncertainty was 
however related to the skills of the personnel: getting familiar with the tuition 
programmes in different countries is a demanding task for a small enterprise. 
Instead, the uncertainty outside the firm was quite far limited to a choice of 
cooperative partners abroad. No risk is related to the exchange rate as it is typical 
for the industry that the export business is done in domestic currencies. Also the 
industry demand is easy to forecast since it is basically tied to two factors only: 
term timetables and public investments in education. 
The firm re-entered the markets in Sweden in 1996, almost two years from 
leaving the markets. In the same year it got the first export orders from the 
Netherlands. Exporting accounted for about 4 per cent of the turnover in 1996 the 
total nominal growth of which was 38 per cent from the previous year. Today 
(1997) the firm has minor exports also to some other European countries and 
Russia. Expertise in exporting has clearly risen, and the market spreading strategy 
has helped to lower the risk related to export markets. Consequently, the share of 
exporting of the turnover is expected to grow fast during the next few years. 
4.3.9. Firin Case I 
Firm I produces wooden windows (approximately 65 per cent of the turnover) and 
doors (35 per cent of the turnover). The number of employees in this 
limited 
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partnership company is about 30. The most important group of customers for the 
firm are private detached houses, but marketing is directed also towards terraced 
houses and building companies. Geographically the markets of the firm include 
the whole Finland, but very recently the firm has also had exports to Russia and 
the Baltic countries. In this case study the focus is on exporting of a by-product, 
laminated wood board, to the markets in Germany in 1995. 
The idea of exporting came into being in the firm in 1994. The demand for 
windows and doors had been low for years because of the extended depression of 
the construction business. Competition had also increased because an important 
rival for the firm had got an advantage over the firm in a state supported reorga- 
nizing arrangement to avoid a bankruptcy. Consequently, the firm was threatened 
by a need to give employees a notice to leave. To avoid this situation the firm 
considered a possibility of producing and exporting laminated wood board, that 
could be produced as a by-product. The stimulus for the export trade was a 
newspaper advertisement in which a German client was searching for a supplier 
on a year contract basis. The agreement, which was to stay the last, was bom in 
less than 6 months from the very beginning of the whole exporting idea. For the 
export product the firm acquired a particular clamp the value of which was about 
3 per cent of the turnover in 1995. The entry to exporting did not involve other 
marked costs. 
However, only 5 monthly lots were shipped before the end of the exporting. 
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Strong uncertainty that was related on one hand to the German client's behaviour, 
and on the other to the exchange rate begun soon after the start of exporting. Only 
the first 2 of the deliveries went smoothly, but after that the client started to 
demand, at the same price, larger boards that were more difficult to produce. This 
increased labour costs in making the laminated wood for which reason exporting 
took a turn for the unprofitable. Because of the fact that the external value of 
Markka was at the same time rising, continuing exporting under the contract 
would have clearly been at a loss. According to the manager of that moment, a5 
per cent improvement in the exchange rate experienced already could have made 
the exporting profitable again. The firm did not however believe this would 
happen, but brought the problem of interpretation of the contract to a head and 
stopped deliveries to Germany. The total value of the 5 deliveries was about 5 per 
cent of the turnover, which itself showed a3 per cent increase in 1995. 
Before the ending of exporting it had been continued at a loss for 2-3 months, i. e., 
2-3 deliveries. The reason for continuing the exporting at a loss was that the firm 
expected it to be continued under a better contract, and that the clamp had been 
procured for the exporting in particular. According to the managing director of 
that moment there were export markets for laminated wood, but for a small 
producer as Firm I exporting would not have been unprofitable at the exchange 
rate of that moment. For this reason the firm did not try to enter markets else- 
where in Europe. On the other hand, the exporting of doors or windows to the 
West European countries was thought to require development of a particular 
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range of patterns, for which the idea was abandoned. 
The firm endeavoured to compensate for the exit from export markets with 
domestic sales of windows. Despite every effort the turnover decreased for 10 per 
cent in 1996 from the previous year. In total, the returns from the export trial 
were negative though the loss was minimal. The amount of sunk costs that will 
materialize from the special clamp depends on whether the clamp will be sold 
secondhand or not. So far the trials have been unsuccessful. 
The firm re-entered export markets, this time in Russia and the Baltic countries, 
with its main products in 1997. The new managing director of the firm played a 
crucial role in restarting of exporting, and the first export businesses have come 
into existence through his personal contacts. The manager had earlier been 
conducting window factory projects in Estonia and had by that means both market 
knowledge and important contacts in the destination countries. Confide ý, -. ,e in the 10 
positive development of exporting is now much greater than in the case of 
exporting the wood board. Large risks related to exporting into the former state 
socialist countries are minimized radically by requiring 100 per cent payment 
before the products are supplied and by doing business only in Finland's Markka. 
In the first half of the 1997 the exporting was mainly directed to Estonia, and it 
brought about 5 per cent of the 6 month's turnover. The overall emphasis is 
however still in the domestic markets: the total turnover is expected to grow for 
about 50 per cent in 1997. As such the exporting does not improve profitability of 
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the firm, since the mark-up in exporting is kept at the same as in the domestic 
markets. The firm has increased the number of employees by 20 per cent from 
1996. This is mostly due to the expansion of sales on the domestic markets: the 
direct organizational changes for the exporting are limited to hiring one person 
who is fluent in Russian. 
4.3.10. Firm Case J 
Firm J is a privately owned (Ltd) engineering works that employs about 20 
employees. The firm manufactures demanding precision machining parts which 
are either bespoke or produced in small series. The customers include 5 large 
firms in Finland, the most important of which are WIrtsild Diesel International 
Ltd and Valmet Oy (Plc). The competitiveness of the firm is mainly based on the 
high quality of the production and established customer relations. This competi- 
tive edge has been strengthened over the last years by a strategic decision to focus 
on the main business (demanding machining parts) and by lopping off the number 
of customers. 
About 80 per cent of the firm's production ends up in export products through the 
domestic customers. The export history of the firm is short and comprises only a 
delivery of a series of machined parts to France in 1995. The firm has never 
aimed at exporting itself but the deliveries were based on an unsolicited order by 
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a French subsidiary of the Wdrtsild Diesel International Ltd. The machined part 
exported was similar to that supplied for Wartsila in the domestic markets. For 
this reason the exporting did not require special attention regarding production. It 
did not influence the volume of businesses much either, since the value of it was 
only about I per cent of the year's turnover. Exporting was however expected to 
continue and grow because there were demand for several other machining parts 
as well. Exporting to a larger extent would have been advantageous for the finn 
because it would made possible greater series and by that means lower unit 
production costs. 
There were two main reasons for the end of exporting. Firstly, the customer's 
payments were delayed which put the firm's liquidity situation to test and looked 
from the point of view of the firm as if one of the risks related to exporting 
operations was going to materialize. The firm's claims for the machined parts 
supplied were eventually met 8-9 months late, with help from lawyers. Secondly, 
fast growing domestic demand kept the firms capacity in full use in 1995. As a 
clear indication of that, the firm's turnover grew nominally from 1994 to 1995 by 
about 40 per cent and with regard to the main business even more than this. Also 
profitability developed very positive in years 1995 and 1996. In addition to the 
above mentioned reasons, the attractiveness of exporting was lowered by a 
language problem since the customer was not willing to use English as a business 
language. 
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The firm continued exporting despite the delays in payments for 3-4 months. 
Eventually the losses were however limited to smaller collecting costs and to the 
loss from unpaid interest on arrears. As such the mark-up in exporting was very 
profitable. The firm had not invested in exporting in beforehand, i. e., the entry in 
the markets was costless. Neither did the firm perceive any particular risk related 
to the exporting in comparison to deliveries for domestic customers. This was 
because the quality of the product and reliability of delivery had been acknowl- 
edged by Wartsila, and because the orderer was an affiliated company of 
Wartsila. 
Because of the exit the risk related to new exporting is perceived as higher by the 
business manager of the firm even if the liquidity situation is nowadays much 
better than in 1995. Public services such as state export guarantees, which were 
not used in 1995, could however be used to minimize the direct risks. Thus, 
although the firm does not aim at exporting, it is according to the manager likely 
that it would reply to unsolicited orders from abroad. 
5. Analysis of the case study dat 
5.1. Method of-analysis 
The analysis uses so-called pattern matching logic (Yin 1994,106-119) which is 
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one of the most preferable research strategies for case study analysis. In this 
technique the case study data is analysed by comparing an empirically based 
pattern with a predicted one (Yin 1994,106). The present study is not only 
descriptive and exploratory, but also explanatory in its aim to pose competing 
explanations for the same set of events and to indicate how such explanations 
may apply to other situations (see Yin 1994,4-5). The data has been analysed, 
firstly, by within-case analyses the purpose of which is to gain familiarity with 
data and produce preliminary theoretical considerations, and secondly by cross- 
case pattern search to look beyond initial impressions and view evidence from 
multiple points of views (see Eisenhardt 1989,533). The preliminary suggestions 
presented in Table 1 were shaped by replication, not sampling, logic across the 
cases until they could not be improved by exploration of the data. In Section 6 the 
findings will be compared with experiences of committed exporters that have 
been exporting uninterruptedly since the start of their exporting to increase the 
validity of the findings. Like experimental studies, case studies are generalizable 
to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes (Yin 1994,10). 
5.2. Domestic demand and the exchange rate 
Figure 2 represents the development of the exchange rate for the Markka (trade 
weighted; dark curve) and the domestic demand (the constant prices index 
for 
private final consumption; lighter curve), together with the export periods of the 
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10 firms. Although the trade weighted exchange rate does not perfectly reflect 
changes in the export competitiveness for individual firms, it can be assumed to 
be a good estimate of those changes: most of the firms have been operating on the 
West European markets that are by far the most important export destination for 
Finland". The developments in the exchange rate and the domestic demand do 
indeed coincide strikingly with the export behaviour of the firms. In particular, 
none of the firms under study had exports at the turn of the decade, when both the 
external value of Markka and the domestic demand were at their high, whereas 
Firms A-H entered export markets between the end of 1991 and 1994 when the 
external value of Markka and the domestic demand were both low. 
A scrutiny of the case study data reveals that for two (B and Q of the four firms 
(A-D) that exited export markets before the turn of the decade both the exchange 
rate (or high level of domestic costs) and the rise in domestic demand contributed 
to their exits from export markets. In the case of Firms A and D, price competi- 
tiveness did not directly influence the exits, but of the two factors, the domestic 
demand only contributed to the exit. An increase in the domestic demand contrib- 
uted also strongly to the exits in the cases of Firms B and C. 
"On the other hand, in trade with Russia (The Soviet Union) the meaning of price 
competitiveness has become important only in the 1990s when trade with freely 
exchangeable currencies started. Until then the most important single factor 
influencing the volume of trade between Finland and the Soviet Union was the 
dollar 
price of cruel oil imported to Finland under the clearing system (Rautava 1995). 
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Notwithstanding Firm B, in the cases A, C87and D the exits were involuntary. In 
these cases the firms were dependent on one customer abroad or lost their 
distribution channel due to local developments in the export destination. How- 
ever, when considering re-entry after the cessation of exporting it seems as if the 
firms found it more worthwhile to focus on the domestic markets. What makes 
this behaviour worth noticing is that it coincides with the view that there are 
different trigger prices for entry and exit in the presence of sunk costs. In particu- 
lar, the level of exchange rate towards the end of 1980s did not lead to action to 
leave the export markets, whereas, on the other hand, the same level was not good 
enough to induce reentry by these firms to export markets. Intuitively, the entry 
trigger to exports must also have been raised by the buoyant state of demand in 
the domestic markets. 
As to exit and entry by the firms in the 1990s, the improvement in external 
competitiveness due to the devaluation of Markka coincides with the entries by 
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Finns A-H between the end of 1991 and 1994 (Figure 2). Yet, on the baýds of the 
case reports, the simultaneous depression in the domestic markets had a signifi- 
cant positive influence on Firms A, C, D and I decisions to enter export markets". 
In these cases the firms were more or less obliged to search for markets abroad 
in 
order to compensate for the decline of the home markets. The exits by 
Firms C, F- 
J took place at the time when Markka was gradually revaluing and the 
domestic 
56 In addition, the unsuccessful attempt to enter the markets 
in Sweden by the firm 
C in 1990-91 was motivated by the depression in home-markets. 
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demand, on average, slowly recovering from the slump. In fact, however, only 
Firms C and I made the exit because of the poor profitability of it, whereas in the 
cases of Firms G and J it was the increase in the domestic demand that essentially 
contributed to the exits. Further, in the cases of Firms F and H neither of the 
factors explicitly influenced the decision-making of the firm. Of course, one 
cannot exclude a competing explanation that the exchange rate would indirectly 
have had impact on the exits in these cases as well. 
Hence, overall, the case study data and Figure 2 suggest that there is large 
variation between the cases in how the exchange rate and the domestic demand 
have influenced making an exit from exporting. What the findings however 
clearly suggest is that a cost of exporting should be taken as an opportunity cost: 
as the exits by some of the firms show firms may choose to concentrate on the 
domestic markets even if exporting is likely to be profitable. Conversely, this fact 
suggests that factors other than exchange rate (or price competitiveness) as such 
are important determinants of export performance. 
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Figure IH. 2. Export periods of the firms, domestic demand and the exchange rate 
















1980 1990 2000 
"The time series on the trade-weighted exchange rate and the private final 
consumption only available from 1975. 
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5.3. Costs of exporting and ti Lng- f 
. a-e 2 
Lit 
Table 3 considers the costs of export development and the meaning of sunk costs 
in timing the making of an exit from export markets. In general the firms have 
been involved in exporting in reasonably low-cost ways. Only in the cases of 
Firms C, H and 1, which had deliberately entered exporting markets do the costs 
seem to have had some importance. On the other hand, in those cases where the 
entry has been based on unsolicited orders the fixed costs from exporting have 
been unsurpnsingly small. 
Table 1111.3. Costs of exporting and timing of the export exit 
Case: The main Length Total profit- Possible reentry Signifi- 
1. year sources/ sig- of time ability of ex- cance 
of en- nificance of the firm porting (INV) and 
try costs in an contin- sunkness 
2. year initial entry ued ex- (SUNK) of 
of exit porting investments 
on a to export- 
loss ing 1996" 
A: outlays from very profitable re-entry in 1991 (na. ) 
1.1972 sustaining (different group 
2.1987 good relations of customers) 
with the cus- 
tomers (low) 
18 The numbers (INV, SUNK) are assessments by the managers on the total costs 
of exporting incurred up to the time of the second interview in 1996. The first one of 
these (INV) concerns the total significance of investments (fixed costs) to exporting 
in the firm's operations, and the second one (SUNK) the ability to utilize these 
investments in the domestic operations if the firm were to make an exit from export 
markets. Both of the assessments are given on an integer scale from I (low) to 5 
(high). 
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B: product adap- profitable re-entered in (3,4) 1.1977 tation (low) 1991 to the same 2.1987 and later differ- 
ent destinations 
with higher in- 
puts 
C: market re- profitable an attempt in (2,2) 1.1983 search by a 1990-91 to the 
2.1987 consultant, same destination 




(a try re-entered in 
in market re- 1993 to the same 
1990- search by a destination 
91) consultant, 
search for a 
cooperative 
partner, travel- 




for a coopera- 




D: travelling profitable re-entry in 1994 (3,4) 
1.1985 (low) to another desti- 
2.1989 nation with dif- 
ferent products 
and higher in- 
puts 
E: (na. ) (low) profitable re-entry in 1994 (2,4) 
1.1992 to the same and 
2.1992 later different 
destinations 
F: marketing ma- profitable; a an attempt in (2,5) 
1.1992 terial, acquir- small loss will 1996 to another 
2.1994 ing informa- materialize destination 
tion on poten- later from an 
tial customers unpaid export 
and travelling delivery 
L (low) 
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G: (entry costless) profitable re-entry possible: (1,5) 
1.1993 the firm aims at 
2.1994 exporting in a 
longer term 
H: market re- unprofitable at re-entry 1996 to (2,3) 
1.1994 search, market- that point the same and 
2.1994 ing and adver- since the irre- different destina- 
tising material, versible in- tions by increas- 
product adap- vestments ing inputs 
tation, travel- made for ex- 
ling (moderate) porting did 
not have time 
to pay for it- 
self 
1: acquiring spe- 2-3 close to zero, re-entry in 1997 (na. ) 
1.1995 cial machine months additional loss to another desti- 
2.1995 for the export (2-3 de- will material- nation with dif- 
product (mod- liveries) ize later the ferent products 




sale price of 
the clamp 
J: (entry costless) contin- collecting re-entry possible (na. ) 
1.1995 ued ex- costs and un- but the firm does 
2.1995 porting paid interest not develop ex- 
despite on arrears de- porting actively 
the de- creased total 





The firms have incurred costs to develop exporting from market research, search 
for distribution channels, export specific investments to production and product 
adaptation, marketing material and advertising abroad, travel and the keeping up 
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of relations with customers. These outlays are likely to be to a large extent sunk. 
This is because they are irreversible, there are in general no second hand markets 
for the investment projects, and the firms' can make little use on these invest- 
ments in their domestic operations. Thus, the nature of costs is in line with the 
view that entering foreign markets involves a sunk cost. However, as mentioned 
above, the significance of the costs have in the finns studied here generally been 
small, and in some cases indeed non-existent. It is also rather unclear to what 
extent these costs are exit costs. Thus, it is by no means surprising that only Firm 
I continued exporting for a while making a loss. Further, a sunk cost is not a 
necessity for a firm to engage in export business. 
Another interesting feature in the firms' behaviour is that with the exception of 
Firms F, G and J they have made a planned re-entry to export markets. The 
findings do not, however, suggest that a re-entry would necessarily need to 
involve increased investments in exporting. A firm can become a react*' 
exporter or a non-exporter after being involved rather actively in exporting, as the 
case of Firm C shows. On the other hand, some firms may find it convenient to 
continue exporting with a reasonably opportunistic attitude, as the case of Firms J 
shows. This implies that the export market behaviour of at least some smaller 
manufacturing firms might be better explained by economic factors beyond the 
hysteresis hypothesis, such as those of the "strategic markets" approach. 
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5.4. Uncertainty 
Table 4 considers the type and (the managers' perceptions on) the degree of 
uncertainty related to exporting operations. Sources of uncertainty that mainly lie 
outside the firms include export channels and cooperative partners abroad, an 
unstable economic situation in the home-markets or in destination countries, 
exchange rate, and a competitive situation in the export markets. Factors that are 
related to the firms own organizations are difficulties with foreign languages, 
insufficient skills of personnel, and a lack of foreign market knowledge. The 
managers' assessments of the degree of uncertainty vary from small to moderate 
risk. This suggests that the firms have not made their investments to exporting, if 
any, in an especially uncertain environment. 
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Table 1111.4. Uncertainty related to exporting 
Case Export period; Main sources for uncertainty related Source Risk re- to exporting of un- lated to 
cer- invest- 
tainty ments to 
inside export- 
outside ing 
the firm (RISK)" 
A 1972-1987: decrease in the bilateral trade between the outside 
Soviet Union and Finland from the mid- I 980s, increas- 
ing instability of political and economic situation in the (na. ) 
destination country, increase in competition in the export 
markets outside 
1991 -: instability of political and economic situation in 
the destination country, liquidity crisis and creditworthi- 
ness of the new group of customers (private sector) 
B 1977-1987: a language problem, problems in product inside 
adaptation (3) 
1991- : unstable economic situation in the home-coun- outside 
try: exchange rate, labour costs, taxation 
C 1983-1987: a language problem, foreign cooperative inside/ (2) 
partners outside 
1993-1994: foreign cooperative partners, exchange rate 
outside 
D 1985-1989: lack of language knowledge, lack of market inside 
knowledge for other products (1) 
1994-: na. 
E 1992: the customer's claims about the price of the prod- outside 
uct 
1994-: insufficient market knowledge, aims of an impor- outside (2) 
tant foreign customer to shift production to another 
country 
F 1992-1994: unstable economic situation in the export inside/ 
destination and creditworthiness of customers, lack of outside (2) 
proper export channel, lack of language skills, technical 
barriers to trade, exchange rate 
G 1993: no obvious uncertainty 
59Riskiness of investments to exporting (I low risk -5 high risk) evaluated by the 
business managers in the 1996 interview. 
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1994: inter-country differences in tuitional organiza- inside 
tions, skills of the personnel (2) 
1996- : inter-country differences in tuitional organiza- inside 
tions, skills of the personnel, choice of a cooperative 
partner 
1995: conflict over the contract with the foreign cus- outside 
tomer, exchange rate (na. ) 
1997-: unstable economic situation in the export destina- outside 
tions and creditworthiness of customers 
1995: delays in the customer's payments, a language outside/ (na. ) 
problem inside 
In the cases of Firms A, E, and I the uncertainty during the first export market 
period had mostly been related to factors that lie outside the firms, and in cases of 
the firms B, D and H factors inside the firms. In the cases of Firms B, C, D, E, H 
and J the uncertainty related to the first entry to exporting has been quite clearly 
specific to the firm, whereas in the cases of Firms A and F it has involved factors 
that are specific to the export destination (Russia). There are however no salient 
common features in the investment, exit or reentry behaviour of firms B, C, D, E, 
H and J (firm-specific uncertainty) that would make them obviously different 
from Firms' A and F (destination specific uncertainty) behaviour (Tables 2 and 
3). Neither does the behaviour of Firms B, D and H (fmn-specific uncertainty due 
to factors inside the firms), differ saliently from the behaviour of Firms A 
(destination related uncertainty due to factors outside the firm) or E (firm-specific 
uncertainty due to factors outside the firm). This simple categorization suggests 
that the type of uncertainty has not influenced the export market behaviour in any 
recognizable way. Naturally, an alternative explanation is that the uncertainty 
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always is to some extent firm-specific as a firm's way of handling and responding 
to the uncertainty is specific to its organization. As to the suggestion in Table I 
about the type of uncertainty in strategic and unplanned entries, I will deal with 
that below in the context of Table 6. 
5.5. Practical trigger mechanisms 
In seven of the cases (A, C, 3-87and D- H) the making of an exit from export 
markets has taken place reasonably unexpectedly from the point of view of the 
firms Put differently, in these cases the end of exporting has not been a deliberate 
decision by the business management. In the four cases where the exit has been a 
voluntary one, one can distinguish three factors that have triggered the decisions 
to exit. These are an increase in uncertainty (I and J), revaluation of Markka(C93- 
90 1), and an increase in the domestic demand (B). On the basis of the data 
it is 
not possible to distinguish critical values in these triggering factors. The analysis 
of triggering factors is presented in Table 5. 
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Table 111.5, Trigger mechanisms in exiting exporting 
Case Year of exit; The main reasons for withdrawing from export- The factor ing triggered 
the exit 
decision 
A 1987: gradual termination of bilateral trade between the Soviet 
Union and Finland, unstable political and economic situation in 
the destination country and liquidity crisis of potential private 
customers, increase in competition in the export markets, growth 
of domestic markets 
B 1987: growth of domestic markets, lack of export strategy, high increase in 
domestic level of costs and prices, a language problem and prob- domestic 
lems in product adaptation demand 
C 1987: bankruptcy of the foreign cooperative partner, growth of 
domestic markets, a language problem, high domestic level of 
costs and prices, higher risks than in domestic operations 
1994: unfavourable gradual change in the exchange rate exchange 
rate 
D 1989: increase in competition in the export markets, failure to 
find customers for other products in the destination, growth of the 
domestic markets 
E 1992: the only foreign client transferred its purchases to a cheaper 
supplier in another country, difficulties in finding export channels 
and customers abroad, high domestic level of costs and prices 
F 1994: lack of export strategy and failure to find the right export 
channel, unstable economic situation in the export destination and 
liquidity crisis of local customers, lack of language skills, techni- 
c barriers to trade 
G 1993: end of the life-cycle of a product supplied to order, lack of 
other customers abroad, growth of domestic markets 
H 1994: bankruptcy of the import company, difficulties to find other 
customers and export channels, higher risk related to foreign 
operations than to domestic operations 
1 1995: increase in labour costs during the first annual contract, uncer- 
conflict over the contract, unfavourable change in the exchange tainty, ex- 
rate change rate 
1995: delays in the customer's payments which caused problems uncertainty 
in financing the exports and steeply increased ridperceived by 
I the firm, growth of domestic markets, a language problem I 
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The factors can be thought to have been reflected in the export market price of the 
product and the firms to have left the market at some point when the exports 
became unprofitable. Yet it is striking that only Firms' I decision to exit was 
explicitly due to the unprofitability of exporting. On the other hand, the finding 
that in majority of the cases the exit have not been voluntary or involved any 
trigger that would have stimulated the managements' decision to exit, is worth 
emphasizing. This is because it suggests that a large share of export market exits 
by smaller manufacturing firms may lie beyond the explanatory power of the 
hysteresis hypothesis, which in general assumes that the exit follows from the 
exporters decision to exit. Specifically, the timing of the exit has not been 
determined by the exiting firms in many of the above cases. Rather, it has been 
determined on the demand side. 
5.6. Pattems of exit and reent[y behaviour of the finns 
IV 
Table 6 summarizes the patterns of exit and entry behaviour of the firms. To 
make it easier to make cross-case comparisons over the patterns these have been 
marked using letters as abbreviations. As to the sunk cost hysteresis, the pattern 
suggested by the sunk cost hysteresis hypothesis is either HW or MW (high or 
moderate sunk costs to enter the markets, waiting on a loss before exit) or 
LE 
(low entry costs, exit without operational losses). The two latter 
letters in the first 
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column refer to whether the export period as a whole has been profitable, and 
whether the firm has reentered the markets later. As to the second column in 
Table 6, the pattern suggested in Table I for uncertainty is either UI (uncertainty 
related to an unplanned entry will be due factors inside the firm) or SO (uncer- 
tainty related to a strategic export entry will be due to factors outside the firms). 
The abbreviations are explained in detail at the bottom of the table. 
Table HIA Summary of patterns of exit and reentry behaviour of the firms 
Case; export 
period 
Sunk cost hysteresis Uncertainty Factors triggered the decisions 
to exit 
A 72-87 LE PR na. 0 
A 91- so 
B 77-89 LE PR Ul domestic demand 
B 91- so 
C 83-87 ME PR Sna. 
C 93-94 LE PN so exchange rate 
D 85-89 LE PR Ul 
D 94- Sna. 
E 92 LE PR UO 
E 94- so 
F LE PN Una. 
G LE PN na. na. 
* 93-94 ME UR SI 
* 96- Sl 
195 MW PR so uncertainty, exchange rate 
197- so 
i I LW PN UO uncertainty 
Abbreviations: The two first letters in the column "sunk cost hysteresis" refer to the 
meaning of sunk costs to develop exporting (L low, M moderate, H high) and timing of 
the exit (E early which approximates the situation where the average revenue AR in 
exports have been greater than the average variable cost AVC at the time of exit, W 
waiting which approximates the situation AR < AVC at the time of exit). The latter two 
letters in the column refer to the total net profitability of exports, i. e., total revenues - total 
costs (U unprofitable, P profitable) and to possible reentry (R reentry, N no reentry), in 
the respective order. In the column "uncertainty", the first letter refers to the type of 
initial 
entry (S strategic entry, U unplanned entry), and the second to the type of uncertainty 
related to developing exporting (I main source inside a firm, 0 main source outside a 
firm). 
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In the casesC83-87, H93-94and 195 the firms have incurred moderate sunk costs in 
entering export markets. Of these only the case195 involved a period of loss 
before the exit. Hence, there is in general very little support for export hysteresis 
in this data. On the other hand, in the cases of exits A72-87,1377-89ý C93-94, D85-899 E92ý 
F and G the firms have incurred only small costs to enter the export markets and 
their exits have not involved prolonged losses. Thus only the casesC83-87, H93-94 
and J, where, the firms have either entered the exports with moderate sunk costs 
and left the markets without waiting, or entered without sunk costs and run 
operational losses before the exit, are (at first sight) in contradiction with the sunk 
cost hysteresis hypothesis. However, as is clear from above, in case J the export- 
ing was not unprofitable (the price of the product as itself was set above AVC) 
but the reason for exit was delays in the customer's payments. In the caseC83-87 
exporting was ceased because of a sudden loss of the export channel due to the 
bankruptcy of the cooperative partner, and not to unprofitability of exporting. 
Neither was the exit by the firm H based on the decision of the firm, because it as 
well was due to a bankruptcy of an import company. Hence, overall, due to the 
opportunistic nature of the export market behaviour of the firms, is seems to me 
that there is little in the present data that the hysteresis hypothesis could explain. 
As to the pattern predicted for the sources of uncertainty in different stages of 
export development, the empirical evidence largely supports this hypothesis but is 
not totally consistent with it. Cases Aq,, 
B77-89, B91, C93-94, D, E94,19, and'97 
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provide support for the prediction that an unplanned rather than a strategic entry 
to export markets involves uncertainty that is due to factors inside the firms. On 
the other hand, the cases E92, H93-94, H96and J suggest the contrary. As to case J, 
the uncertainty due to internal factors was reduced by the fact that the product 
was known to be good of quality and because the customer was a subsidiary of a 
Finnish firm. In case H (H93-94and H96) the firm operates in a sector in which 
certain factors reinforce the significance of internal factors for uncertainty in 
export development (for example, thorough adoption of country-specific tuitional 
progranunes in foreign languages) and lower the significance of external factors 
for uncertainty (easily predictable total demand and easily available market 
information). Yet in the case E92 there are no obvious potential explanations 
available for the contradiction between the evidence and the hypothesis. A partial 
explanation for the modest impact of internal factors for uncertainty in the 
beginning of exporting might be the characteristics of the manager: through a 
position as a manager of a foreign firm's sister company in Finland, he or she had 
earlier experience on international operations and good language skills before the 
entry to export markets in 1992. 
6. Comparison with firms exporting uninterruptedly 
In a multiple-case research design the individual cases should be treated 
in a 
manner similar to multiple experiments: some of the cases predicting explicitly 
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similar results (a literal replication) and some contrasting results but for predict- 
able reasons (a theoretical replication) (see Yin 1994,44-52). The purpose of 
theoretical replication is to bring out the conditions under which the phenomenon 
under study is not likely to happen. Following this research strategy, the idiosyn- 
crasies of firms that have made an exit from export markets (presented above) are 
here compared with those of firms exporting uninterruptedly since the start of 
their export operations. These reference firms have been selected from the 
database of the study such that they export similar products as the firms that have 
made an exit from export markets. In total there are 55 firms with export experi- 
ence in the 76 firm dataset, which implies that the six firms were chosen from the 
group of 45 firms that have been exporting uninterruptedly since they stated 
exporting operations. A crude half of these 45 firms have started to export before 
the mid- 1980s, two fifths during the latter part of the 1980s, and the rest (three 
fifths) in the 1990s. 
In the previous Section it was concluded that generally the exits from export 
markets studied here have not been preceded by large sunk costs incurred by the 
firms to enter these markets. This is because exporting in these firms had either 
been based on unsolicited orders, or the exporting operations had not been 
developed to increase the firm's market share in the destination markets or to 
enter to new destination countries. Obviously, these facts can increase the risk of 
an involuntary exit from the export markets. Also, changes in the domestic 
demand and exchange rate were identified as potential factors to have contributed 
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to the exits. Given these suggestions, I will focus on three main questions in this 
comparison. Firstly, whether the investment behaviour (sunk entry costs) in the 
context of export operations differ between the firms that have ceased exporting 
and those which have not. Secondly, whether the reference firms have entered 
other destination markets soon after the entry to the initial country. Thirdly, 
whether the firms shifted emphasis in marketing to the domestic markets during 
the boom in the late 1980s, and how they have coped with the loss of price 
competitiveness due to the revaluation of Markka in 1993-95.1 will consider each 
of these questions in turn, but before that I briefly describe the data from the 
reference firms. 
6.1. Six reference firms 
Running through the 45 firms produced six firms that export the same or similar 
products as Firms A (antique-like furniture), B (log houses), F (log lathe), H 
(teaching equipment and fixtures for natural sciences), I (laminated wood board) 
and J (machining parts). These six reference firms produce wooden furniture 
(Firm K), log houses (L), forestry harvesters (M), measuring equipment and 
reagents (N), laminated wood board (0) and machine tools and machining parts 
(P) (Table 7). Although the firms do not necessarily form perfectly matched pairs 
according to the products they manufacture, they do represent reasonably similar 
environments for international operations. In the following the development of 
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exporting in the firms will be briefly described. Unfortunately, due to the fact that 
the managers of the reference firms have not been interviewed specifically on the 
present topic, the data available on these firms are not as detailed as in the case of 
Firms*A-J. 
Table HI. 7. Six reference firms 
Firm Sector Export Destination Num- Share of I S R 
(approxi- product and time of her of exports N U I 
mate n. of initial entry desti- ofthe V N S 
employees to export nations turnover K K 
in 1996)60 markets 1995 1995 
K (Lpc) wood-pro- furniture Norway 1980' 5 89% 5 5 5 
(40) cessing 
L (Ltd) wood-pro- log houses Japan 1972 a 10 50% 4 5 2 
(30) cessing 
M (Ltd) engineering forestry har- Sweden 1989a 11 33% 4 5 3 
(160) vesters 
N (Ltd) engineering measuring Japan 1988 b 40 89% 4 5 5 
(10) equipment, 
reagents 
0 (Ltd) wood-pro- laminated Germany 2 75% 2 2 2 
(20) cessing wood board 1987 b 
P (Ltd) engineering machine Sweden 1988' 3 67% 1 3 1 
(30) tools, com- 
6'Ltd (Limited company) and Lpc (Limited partnership company) refer to the 
ownership structure of the firms in 1996. As in Table 2, a superscript "a" refers to 
unplanned initial export deliveries and "b" to a planned entr, and as in Table 3 INV 
refers to the total significance of investments (fixed costs) to exporting in the firm's 
operations (1 = insignificant -5= very significant); SUNK refers to ability to utilize 
the investments in the domestic operations in case the firm would make an exit from 
export markets (I = low sunk costs -5= high sunk costs); and RISK refers to 
riskiness of investments to exporting (I low risk -5 high risk) evaluated by the 
business managers in the 1996 interview. 
230 
Firm K (Limited partnership company) produces wooden furniture that it started 
to export, initially to Norway, in the year of establishment of the firm in 1980. 
Exporting was the firm's business idea even at the time it was founded. The 
manager had earlier worked in a large Finnish exporting firm in the same industry 
which experience was helpful when setting up the export operations in practice. 
Within a year after the entry to Norwegian markets the firm entered two other 
destination markets in Switzerland and France. Today the enterprise is especially 
dependent on international markets: more than 90 per cent of the turnover comes 
ftom exporting. Destination countries as well as design of furniture have changed 
over the years, mainly because of reproduction by competitors. At present, the 
firm has exports to 5 countries, where the exports have been organized through 
local import companies. The most important destinations today are Switzerland 
and Germany. 
Investments by the firm in the development of exporting have been very signifi- 
cant compared to its domestic operations and to a large extent sunk. The invest- 
ments are also considered by the manager to have been relatively risky. The most 
important outlays have been investments into new technology, product develop- 
ment costs and travelling expenses. 
The share of exports in the total turnover of the firm rose during the depression 
(1992-93) close to 100 per cent but has since then decreased to some extent 
(to 
about 90 per cent in 1995). The gradual revaluation of Markka in 1993-95 and 
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high indirect cost of labour have significantly weakened the firm's price competi- 
tiveness in its main markets in the Western Europe. In response to this increase in 
competition the firm has invested more in product development and adopted a 
new wax colour technology, by the help of which some of the lost competitive- 
ness has been restored. 
Firm L (Ltd) produces wooden houses. Its first export delivery (based on an 
unsolicited order from Japan) took place in 1972, but the exports became regular 
only in the course of a few years when the firm entered markets in Sweden in 
1975. An increase in the volume of exporting and a deliberate development of the 
exporting operations in the firm (for example, establishment of own sales subsid- 
iaries in the most important export destinations) since those days indicate that the 
finn has adopted the exporting strategy to the full. The exporting, which is the 
source of about one half of the firm's business, mostly concentrates on five 
destinations among ten export countries altogether. 
The share of exports of the total turnover of the firm has steadily risen from 30 
per cent in 1988 to 50 per cent in 1995. To some extent, however, this rise 
follows from a decrease in the domestic sales due to the depression and increased 
competition. Actually, not only did domestic demand for the firm drop further in 
1995 but also exports were hindered by a decrease in demand due to the revalua- 
tion of the Markka. Systematic investments in exporting operations, however, 




The most important sources of costs of developing exporting operations in the 
firm have been marketing, employing new personnel for exporting and the 
establishment of sales organizations abroad. The costs have been according to the 
manager relatively significant in the firm's operations, and the potential to take an 
advantage on these investments in the domestic markets small. 
Firm M's (Ltd) main products are forestry harvesters and transport tractors. 
Export operations by the firm started from an unsolicited order to Sweden in 
1989. This soon led to active development of exporting, because the firm's 
product was technologically advanced and the firm's principal aim now was to 
expand the volume of production. Markets in Norway were entered in 1990. The 
volume of exporting, however, started to grow strongly only in 1993 when the 
external value of Markka was at low. By 1995 the number of destination coun- 
tries rose to 11 and the share of exports of the turnover gradually close to 50 per 
cent in 1996. Exports to the key markets in Sweden, United States and France 
have been organized by establishing sales subsidiaries in these countries, whereas 
in other destinations different export strategies are being employed. 
The investments made to enter new destinations and to penetrate the old markets 
have been significant in the firm's operations during the last few years. These 
have been targeted especially at the building of the export channel (i. e., establish- 
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ment of the subsidiaries). Also travelling, marketing abroad, product development 
and hiring new personnel for exporting have brought considerable costs. Accord- 
ing to the manager the investments have borne relatively large risks and the 
possibility of utilizing the investments in the domestic operations is non-existent. 
The expansion of markets geographically has to some extent taken resources from 
product development, to which the emphasis is being shifted back today. 
Firm N (Ltd) produces high technology measuring equipment and reagents. The 
firm has focused on research and development activities and the marketing of the 
products, whereas the physical production of the products has been left to subcon- 
tractors. The small enterprise has been a thoroughbred exporting firm from the 
time it was established through an MBO-type arrangement in 1988. Already in 
the first year of operation the firm had exports to more than 5 countries. The firm 
inherited some of the export channels to these countries (import companies 
abroad) from the previous parent company. On the whole, however, most of the 
considerable development of exporting activities in terms of entries to new 
destinations and the development of new export products took place after the firm 
became independent. 
Today the firm has exports to some 40 countries with the share of exports in 
turnover approximately 90 per cent. During the years 1993-95 the share of 
exports decreased by a few percentage points, but it is expected to grow to close 
to 100 per cent again in the near future. From the outset, most important destina- 
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tions have been Japan, Austria and the UK, whereas the firm's current presence in 
some of the 40 destinations (such as China) is only strategic and based on their 
future growth potential. 
The development of exporting has involved costs from travelling, marketing 
abroad, market research and product development. These outlays have been 
significant in relation to the firm's turnover and, according to the manager of the 
firm, fully export specific. Also they have borne reasonably high risks. 
Firm O's (Ltd) key product is laminated wood board. The finn was established 
for the particular purpose of exporting in 1987. Even in the first year of operation, 
a considerable proportion of the firm's turnover came from export markets in 
Germany and England, and in the early years of the 1990s this share rose rapidly 
to three quarters of the turnover. Since then the share of exports of the turnover 
has varied between 70 and 85 per cent, with the low reached in 1992 and the high 
in 1994. 
The initial exports were sold as a result of the manager's experience and contacts 
with potential customers abroad that he/she had gained in a large Finnish export- 
ing firm. In the course of the years the firm has had exports also to Japan, Bel- 
gium, Sweden and Switzerland, but today exporting is concentrated to the main 
markets in Germany and England. In these countries the firm has solid and 
established relations with a small number of customers, the most important of 
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which are furniture manufacturers. 
Important sources of costs of developing exporting have been investments in 
production technology and capacity, and travel. Lately the firm has especially 
aimed at improving the promptness of deliveries, since this has not been the best 
possible due to the full use of the production capacity in the recent years. The 
magnitude of the investments specifically for exporting, however, is not consid- 
ered by the manager as very large in proportion to the firm's turnover. Neither has 
the export specificity of the investments been high, which is explained by the fact 
that the investments were directed to production and technology rather than to 
export marketing. 
Firm P (Ltd) produces machine tools and machining parts (components). The 
enterprise was established to continue the operations of a production plant of a 
Swedish machine tool manufacturer in Finland in 1988. By this means the firm 
10 
had an important export channel ready when operations as an independent firm 
began. 
At the initial phase more than 90 per cent of the production ended up in Sweden. 
Since then exporting has spread to new destinations but its overall meaning in the 
firm's operations has decreased. Despite the fact that the firm has in the 1990s 
entered markets in Belgium (in 1991) and the United States (in 1992), the share 
of exports in turnover is only of the order of 70 per cent today. This decrease has 
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however followed at least partly from the firm's deliberate attempt to decrease its 
dependency on the international markets and to broaden its domestic base of 
customers. On the other hand, the firm's attempt to enter markets in Germany has 
been unsuccessful and at least partly hindered by language problems. 
The most significant sources of costs for developing exporting have been travel- 
ling, hiring new staff for exporting and marketing and advertising abroad. 
Because the establishment of key export channels has not required much re- 
sources, and on the other hand because of the recent emphasis on the domestic 
markets, the investments to develop exporting have not been large relative to the 
firm's scale. The risk related to these investments is also considered low by the 
manager of the firm. 
6.2. Interpretations 
Even without any numerical data on the reference Firms' K-P investment costs it 
seems obvious that these firms have invested substantially more in the develop- 
ment of exporting than the firms they are here being compared with. 
This conclu- 
sion is based on the managers' evaluations of the extent of export-specific 
investments in relation to the total operations of the firms, and to the general 
picture of the development of exporting in these firms. The matter 
is clear also in 
the case of Firms 0 (laminated wood board) and P (machining parts), 
that have 
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according to the managers' assessments invested in development of exporting 
only modestly. This is because in Firm I (reference point to Firm 0) the invest- 
ments in exporting were limited to acquiring one machine for exports of a 
byproduct, and Firm J's (reference point to Firm P) entry to the export markets 
was costless because it was based on an unsolicited order. In those firms from 
which the information is available, the extent to which the investments can be 
utilized in the domestic operations is smaller or equal to that in those firms which 
stopped exporting. None of the firms which exited from export markets had 
invested in building their own sales organizations abroad, whereas Firms L and M 
have used this strategy in organizing their exports. 
Given that the investment behaviour described above is related to the firms' 
export performance, the question then is, firstly, what has been achieved by these 
investments and by the active development of exporting on the whole that may 
have contributed to the continuation of exporting uninterruptedly. Secondly, as 
far as the hysteresis hypothesis is concerned, it is relevant to ask whether these 
investments make such hysteresis plausible in these firms. Regarding the first 
question, I believe that the fact that the firms have spread exports to several 
countries, as well as the firms' overall commitment to their exporting through an 
established strategy, are important features. I will discuss these in turn. 
The reference firms differ from the firms which stopped their exporting fairly 
distinctively in that they have entered one or more new export destinations soon 
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after or, indeed, simultaneously with the entry to the first country. Firms K, N and 
0 entered their second export market in the same year as they started export 
operations. Firms M and P entered a second country in their second year of 
exporting and Firm L within three years from the first export deliveries. Instead, 
with the exception of Firm B (which was responding to unsolicited orders only) 
none of the firms that made an exit from export markets sold exports to more than 
one country at a time. From the point of view of export performance, the interpre- 
tation of these observations is straightforward: exporting to more than one 
country markets at the same time decreases the risk of an involuntary exit from 
exporting. Of course, this is nothing new since market spreading as an option in 
strategic planning is well known in the export marketing literature (see, e. g., 
Piercy 1982). 
It is notable that Firms M, N, 0 and P initially entered export markets in the late 
1980s, when the external value of Markka was high and the domestic markets 
booming (see Figure 2). This suggests strong competitiveness and resolution by 
the firms to adopt the exporting strategy. Also, Firms K and L seem not to have 
shifted the emphasis in their marketing to the domestic markets in the late 1980s 
in the same magnitude as did Firms A and B. Finally, the firms that have exported 
uninterruptedly have all become reasonably dependent on export markets, i. e., a 
large share in their turnover comes from exports. In my opinion this lends support 
to my earlier proposition that factors other than the exchange rate (i. e., price 
competitiveness alone) have been crucial determinants of success in export 
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markets. The comparison of firins that have and have not made an exit from 
export markets overall suggests that the exits have been contributed by a lack of 
an active export marketing strategy and a minor commitment to export marketing 
at the buoyant state of domestic markets. While this may not do justice to all 
firms that have made an exit from export markets, it seems to be rather comfort- 
ably in line with the cases presented here. 
As to the second question, the hysteresis hypothesis implies in practice that for 
firms which incurred considerable sunk costs in exporting it may be optimal to 
continue exporting uninterruptedly in conditions where making an exit from the 
markets is the best option for firms which have not incurred such costs. In 
comparison to the firms which stopped exporting the uninterruptedly exporting 
firms have indeed incurred larger sunk costs, and have not exited the export 
markets. However, firstly, there is no exact information on the extent to which 
these costs are exit costs, and secondly, I have no data on the profitability of 
exporting from the reference firms. The reference firms may also have improved 
their efficiency in exporting (export competitiveness) more than that of the 
opportunistic exporters due to their deeper involvement in exporting. Thus, I still 
have no strong case for, or against, export hysteresis in the present data. 
Finally, as to customers abroad, export channels and critical export market 
information in the firms' possession, it should be noted that Firms N and P have 
partly inherited these from their previous parent companies. Another 64shortcut" to 
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export markets seem to have been the past work experience of a manager, as the 
past histories of Firms K and 0 show. With the exception of the re-entry to export 
markets by Firm 1, Firms which stopped exporting do not exhibit these "inher- 
ited" characteristics. This suggests that they might be positively related to success 
in exports. This finding is parallel to the findings from Finnish small firms by 
Hurmerinta-Peltomaki (1998). She argues that the past history and experience of 
an entrepreneur (pre-export knowledge) influences both how and how fast the 
decision to export is made after the establishment of the firm. From the point of 
view of the export hysteresis hypothesis, the finding is relevant because in a case 
like this a sunk cost related to the entry to export markets is likely to be smaller 
than without such inherited resources. In other words, past history of a firm 
matters for sunk cost hysteresis. 
7. Conclusions 
This study has used the case-study method of research to study export market 
exits by small manufacturing firms based in Finland. The 10 firms studied 
represent all export market exits in the history of the 76 small manufacturing 
firms constructing the total database of the study. Due to the research methodol- 
ogy, however, the findings are generalizable only to theoretical propositions, not 
to the population of firms. 
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Overall, as would be expected, the vast changes in the exchange rate and domes- 
tic demand during the last decade have both induced export market entry and exit 
in the firms studied in this chapter. The firms studied have in general initially 
involved themselves in exporting in reasonably low-cost, or opportunistic, ways. 
Thus, they largely resemble type I exits (exit from reactive exporting) predicted in 
Table 1, rather than type H exits (exit from active exporting). One would expect 
these firms to have exited from export markets without absorbing operational 
losses, which is indeed largely true in this data. Put differently, the behaviour of 
the firms can be largely explained by the standard "Marshallian" theory, and so 
does not require a theory of investment that is more general than this, such as the 
sunk cost hysteresis theory. When the behaviour of these firms was compared to 
that of firms that have been exporting similar products uninterruptedly, it became 
clear that the reference firms had incurred larger sunk costs than firms in which 
the exporting was interrupted. However, unfortunately the data does not include 
exact information on the profitability of exports in the reference firms over the 
1P 
years, and no evidence on operational losses in the export markets. 
The study has however generated many, to my mind, relevant insights into the 
export market behaviour of manufacturing small firms. As to export performance 
in general, price competitiveness is naturally important. However, having said 
this, it seems to me that factors other than the price competitiveness (i. e. the 
exchange rate) are likely to be crucial determinants of export success. Successful 
exporters, including some of the firms that have made an re-entry to exports after 
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a pause, seem to share some common features. Most importantly, the firms seem 
to have committed themselves to an explicit export strategy soon after or, even 
before, the (re-)initiation of exports. Secondly, they have expanded their exports 
to more than one country shortly after the start of their export sales. Some of the 
firin cases also suggest that a past experience of a firm or a manager may provide 
a firin a valuable shortcut to develop exporting. 
From the point of view of the sunk cost hysteresis hypothesis three observations 
in this case study are especially worth mentioning. The first of these is that the 
firms that have made an exit from export markets have been generally risk averse 
or opportunistic in their exporting behaviour. This has meant that the exits have 
been in most of the cases involuntary. In these cases the timing of the export 
market exits has been determined on the demand, not supply, side. This finding 
lends support to the note by Richard Baldwin (Baldwin 1988) that demand side 
factors may be important in export hysteresis, and suggests that the role of the 
demand side in export hysteresis should be studied further. Secondly, develop- 
ments in the domestic markets have in general had a fairly significant influence 
on the export market entry and exit behaviour of the reactive exporters. The 
message of this finding is clear: the cost of exporting should be taken as an 
opportunity cost. This supports the view that relative prices and costs rather than 
absolute prices or costs should be used in the analysis of hysteresis in exporting. 
Thirdly, the past history of firms, or inherited resources, may influence the sunk 
costs firms have to make to enter export markets. Empirical studies might benefit 
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from taking note of this as well. 
Finally, in retrospect, it would make sense to gather more information on the 
learning behaviour of firms and data to define their "strategic markets" 'a la John 
Kay (1990). This is because some of the firms studied here seem to find it 
convenient to continue exporting with an opportunistic kind of attitude and not to 
sink costs in exporting. The export market behaviour of at least some smaller 
manufacturing firms, and especially those not producing final products, might be 
better explained by economic factors beyond the reach of the hysteresis hypothe- 
sis, such as Kay's "strategic markets" approach. 
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Concluding Chapter: Implications for further research 
In this study the exporting and differentiation behaviour of industrial small firms 
has been analysed on the basis of survey data collected by interviewing business 
managers. The research has utilized both econometric and case study methods to 
analyse this data. Due to the nature of the data the perspective of the study has 
been that of an individual firm, rather than that of industries or markets. With 
certain qualifications, which will be discussed below, this perspective has proved 
to be reasonably profitable as it has implications for both empirical and theoreti- 
cal research in the export operations of small firms, product differentiation, and 
the hysteresis in exports. 
The key findings and conclusions of the study have been sununarized above in 
the introductory chapter and presented in detail in Chapters 1-1111. The purpose of 
this concluding chapter is to throw light on the study's lessons for further re- 
search. Small business policy is not explicitly considered because the number of 
observations in the analyses of the study is strictly insufficient for making 
generalizations to populations of firms. 
In general, one can argue that survey data based on interviews and the case-study 
method have plenty of potential in research in industrial economics, which has 
been realized rather scarcely so far in the literature. It should be noted that case 
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studies are not intended to displace statistical analyses - actually they can do this 
only rarely in hypothesis testing - but they can be used to create and extend 
theories and specify new hypotheses. In the present study, for instance, the data 
has made it possible to complement statistical analyses on several occasions by 
in-depth analyses of the firm's behaviour. This has brought out new and impor- 
tant points unattainable through statistical methods. Weaknesses of the method 
were striven to be minimized be prevented by paying particular attention to the 
data collection stage of a study. For example, the business managers involved in 
the study were interviewed several times over a lengthy period, and the data was 
corroborated after each interview through checking it against the infonnation on 
the firms obtained earlier and the written material obtained from the firms. This 
has helped to reduce response bias, inaccuracies due to poor recall and reflexivity 
by the respondents. The interview agendas in the in-depth interviews were largely 
customized, which increased the willingness of the managers to cooperate and 
made the interviews intensive and focused. Further, the interviews were strictly 
confidential which contributed to handling unfortunate episodes in the histories of 
the firms, such as export market exits and bankruptcies. These facts have also 
assumably reduced response bias caused by ex post justification. My considered 
view is that data collected by this method is a far more reliable and complete 
source of evidence than a survey database collected by posted questionnaires. 
Thus, although the method is not cheap, is seems to me that survey data based on 
interviews has been underutilised thus far in the literature. 
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A large part of this study has dealt with small business internationalization, the 
literature on which is fragmented and lacks economics-based causal theories. In 
Chapter 1,1 applied an existing theory of the diffusion of new technologies to 
model the export decision-making by firms. Chapter M, for its part, considered 
the decision to exit from exporting on the basis of a theory of (dis)investment 
under uncertainty. As to the application in Chapter I, the rank effects model 
describes, to my mind, reasonably well the presumed different phases of small 
firms' decisions to export. The empirical analysis based on the model's predic- 
tions also produced quite sensible results, such as the strong contribution of the 
language skills of the managers to the rapidity of the internationalization process. 
On the other hand, as regards exit from exporting, the theory based on sunk costs 
did not prove to be a very useful device in explaining the exit behaviour of the 10 
small firms studied in the case study. In other words, the behaviour of the firms 
can be argued to have been largely in accordance with the standard (Marshallian) 
microeconomic theory. 
Overall, however, what these applications of industrial economics models 
suggest, at the very least, is that applications of the theories in industrial econom- 
ics to the internationalization process can complement the traditional learning 
based conceptualizations by providing new informative viewpoints on export 
development. The modem industrial economics that can model, for instance, 
situations where the decision-making takes place in several stages, or involves 
learning or uncertainty, is a very promising tool for developing theories of small 
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business internationalization. Another example of a possible application is John 
Kay's (1990) -Strategic Markets" approach, the 
main features of which were presented in Chapter IH (Section 3.2. ) above. This 
approach, which is based on economies of scale, scope and locational compara- 
tive advantage, defines the minimum area, product or geographical, within which 
it is possible for a firm to compete, and beyond which firms seldom expand their 
operations. Thus the framework offers potentially a rationale for why some firms 
just do not find exporting a viable strategy whereas some other firms do. 
As to empirical analyses on the internationalization of firms it is clear that the 
research methodology based on advanced econometric techniques should be 
encouraged. The strength of the use of multivariate models instead of univariate 
analyses is naturally that it is possible to control for the influences of several 
factors on the dependent variable simultaneously, as was done, for example, in 
10 
the probit estimating model in Chapter 1. Considering the variety of the icsults in 
the empirical literature this is a critically important, yet by no means new, point. 
The literature is also bifurcated with one group of studies that have sought to 
explain the propensity to export and another group of studies considering the 
intensity, or development, of exporting. Against this background, the tobit model, 
which is a censored regression model, seems to me a powerful and natural tool to 
analyse the determinants of exporting. This idea is naturally based on the fact that 
with a tobit model the researcher can utilize simultaneously information held 
by 
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exporting firms (data both on the regressors as well as the regressand, e. g., the 
share of exports in turnover) and home-market firms (data only on the regressors), 
to explain the intensity of exporting. Given the availability of suitable data-sets, 
which should not be a major problem, this method is not only more efficient than 
either one of the traditional approaches by themselves, but could also help to 
bring the two branches of research closer together. However, in the present study, 
the tobit model was not utilized since it is not appropriate for the empirical 
analysis of the specific application of the innovation diffusion theory to exporting 
presented in Chapter I or the export market exit studied in Chapter Ill. 
In the area of research in product differentiation and the basis for competitiveness 
of firms more generally (the subject matter of Chapter II), research rooted in the 
perspective of the individual enterprise seems relatively underdeveloped. In 
particular, approaches that endeavour to link price competitiveness and differenti- 
ation, and those considering ability to sustain competitive advantages, seem to 
have received unduly scant attention in the industrial economics literature in the 
light of the vast significance of these issues in the real world. In this research I 
have taken advantage of the new horizons in analysis opened by a perspective 
taking an individual firm's viewpoint, that are difficult to accomplish on the basis 
of theoretical models considering the behaviour of a group of firms. In particular, 
from the individual firm's viewpoint it was possible to observe and analyse 
situations where a firm had several strategic options available at the same time. 
Case studies do provide a rich source of information on the foundations and 
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creation of competitiveness, whether they be led by costs or differentiation, since 
with the help of them one can clarify causal relations between different variables 
at the crucial level - in the decision-making processes of firms. 
2SO 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire 1996 61 
Timo Lautanen 
Department of economics 
University of Warwick 
U. K. 
INTERNATIONALIZATION AND COMPETITION IN SMALLER FIRMS 
Structured/sem i-structu red interviews 1996 
Implementation of the interviews 
All the 80 entrepreneurs interviewed in 1992 will be contacted and 
interviewed, even if the firm is known to have gone bankrupt or quitted. 
The entrepreneurs will be contacted first by telephone to see if and when 
it would be convenient for us to interview them. After this a letter including 
information on the study and some of the questions (those which require 
numerical information, such as number of employees, share of exports in 
turnover and the proportion of subcontracts in turnover) will be sent to 
make sure that all the required pieces of information will be available 
without inconvenience at the actual interview. In all occasions, the utmost 
confidentiality and the academic nature of the study will be emphasized. 
In the following agenda introductions to questions and other notes are 
separated by square brackets. In the interviews, the respondents will get 
in front of them a folder containing the questions only to make answering 
easier. 
"The questionnaire is based to a large degree on the Finnish questionnaire used 
in 
the Nordic comparative research project "Smaforetagens internationalisering - en 
studie av anpassningsprocesser till EG'92 och regional utveckling" in 1992 (see 
Lindmark et al. 1994). In addition, some questions have been adopted 
from the 
questionnaires and interview agendas in Reid (1993) and Piercy (1982). 
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CONFIDENTIAL 
Interview agenda 1996 
Name of the interviewer: Date of the interview: 
Firm code: Time interview started: 
[Firm: 1 no changes 
2 Re-established (independent) 
3 Re-established (not independent)] 
[Interviewee: 
1 Interviewee is the owner-manager (same person as in 1992) 2 Interviewee is the owner-manager (different person than in 1992) 
3 Interviewee not the owner-manager (same person as in 1992) 
4 Interviewee not the owner-manager (different than in 1992)] 
[Pre-ample: Thank you for agreeing to this interview. As I told you over 
the phone this is a follow-up study of the research project of the Academy 
of Finland implemented in 1992-94 (A Nordic comparative study on the 
internationalization of small businesses). Before going to the questions 
themselves, I would like to emphasize some of the principles of this study: 
1) Confidentiality and academic nature (firms or persons will be presented 
anonymously in any reports published, and nobody else than the re- 
search group members will have access to the original information 
material; the questions are also rather general and do not involve any real 
business secrets), 2) We hope that through the information we compile in 
this study we can influence the decision-makers of the small business 
policy in Finland and other Nordic countries (refer to our first report 
published by the Ministry of the Interior in 1994, and the final report by the 
NordREFO in 1994). Also, the interviews have often given the in*rview- 
ees themselves new ideas to develop their firm more competitive. All the 
interviewed persons will also obtain the final report of the study in which 
the key findings will be summarized. If you have any questions about the 
study, please feel free to ask me any time. You can also contact me later 
- you have my contact information in the letter you received earlier. 
In practice, what I would like to do today is to update some of that infor- 
mation we already have on the basis of the first interview in 1992, and go 
through a number new questions related to possible exporting and 
competitive conditions of your firm. Some of the questions are not rele- 
vant for all the firms, so part of the questions can always be skipped. 
Some of the questions are also more and some less structured. Even if 
you are not the person interviewed in this firm in 1992, you still can 
answer the questions and by so doing help a lot. I have here an agenda 
(folder) for you which should help you to answer the questions] 
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uestions: CONFIDENTIAL 
[Questions marked with an asterisk are included in material sent in 
beforehand] 
1. Background: 
1.1.1. Name and address of the enterprise: 
1.1.2. Interviewee and position in the firm: 
1.2. Branch (ISIC-3): 
[To start with, I need to know what changes, in terms of organization, personnel, 
products and size, has taken place in the your company since 1992 when we 
interviewed you last time. ] 
1.3. Could you tell us whether the firm's organization has changed in the 




Mergers or acquisitions: 
1.4. Any other changes in the organization of the firm since 1992? 
*1.5. Number of employees in 1994 and in the end of 1995 (two part-time 









*1.6. Basic education of the white collar staff today. How many of the 
present white collar staff has the following educational background: 
- university degree 
- technical (or other) college 
- without further education 





- Other language, what 
1.8. Has the competence level of the total staff changed since 1992? 
clearly deteriorated at the same improved clearly 
deteriorated level improved 
12345 






*1.10. Regional division of sales, 1995 
1995, per cent 
of the turnover 
local (labour mar- 
ket district) 
the rest of Finland 
foreign c untries 
100% 
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1.11. What was the net result of the firm in 1995? Use the following scale (net result per the turnover, excl. VAT): 
clearly in the red null in the clearly in the red result black in the black (> -5 %) (-5--1 %) 0 -5%) (>5 %) 
12345 
1.12. How has the profitability of the firm developed over the last three 




no change varying 
34 
*1.13. What was the (approximate) share of own capital in the total capital 
of the firm in 1985,1990 and 1995? 
year share of own capital in the total 




[Good. Next we have questions which concern the management and especially 
you yourself] 
Manager 
2.1. Is this firm run by a new managing director compared to the situation 
in 1992? 
1 yes [questions 2.2. - 2.5.1 2 no [go to 2.6.1 
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If yes, what is your [or the new manager's if the interviewee not the manager]: 
2.2. Basic education? 
1 max high school (secondary school; 12 years of education) 2 2-3 years technical degree 
3 2-3 years commercial degree 
4 4- years technical degree 
5 4- years commercial degree 
2.3. Do you have a fairly good knowledge of the following languages (can 
you do business in these lanquages? ): 
spoken both spoken neither 
and written 
-English 1 2 3 
-German 1 2 3 
-Swedish 1 2 3 
-French 1 2 3 
-other what 
2 3 
2.4. Do you have following work experience (for six months at least): 
yes 




2.5. Have you born in this region and do you have any other family 
relations in here? 
yes no 
12 






2.6. Were you internally recruited? (i. e., were you working for this firm 
before you became the manager)? 
yes 2 no (recruited 3 lam the establisher 
outside this firm of the firm 
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2.7. For how many years have you been working in this enterprise? 
years 
2.8. How old are you? 
years 
2.9. In which work tasks have your work-related skills and knowledge 
developed most since 1992? 
2.10. To what extent do you have work-related personal contacts with 
other entrepreneurs in this region? What is the purpose of these con- 
tacts? How important these contacts are from the point of view of devel- 
oping the enterprise? 
2.11. Describe in short those personal contacts of yours which give you 
access to important information to develop the enterprise. Who are the 
partners (customers, subcontractors, shareholders etc. ) and where are 
they located? What kind of information do you obtain from them? How 
important is this information for the enterprise? 
2.12. Which of the following are the three most important elements in 
managing the firm: 
1 cost efficient production 
2 "Just on time" in production and delivery 
3 high quality of the products 
4 product development 
5 customizing of products 
6 profit maximization 
7 defending market share 
8 growth 
9 internationalization 
10 other (what? ) 
1., 2. 
_, 
[Very good, next we will deal with products and production] 
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3. Products and production technology 
*3.1. What are the main products of the firm and what was the share of 
each of these in the total turnover of the firm in 1995? 
product group approximate share 
of the total turnover 




L) oduct 2 
product 3 
3.2. To what extent has your firm introduced new products in the markets 
since 1992? 
- completely new products 
- new models better by quality 
- new models developed by other 








*3.3. How large is the share of your own products in the total turnover of 
your firm? 
3.4. What is the meaning of the following issues for the competitiveness 
of your main product? 
not very 
important important 
a) price 1 2 3 4 5 
b) reliability of delivery 1 2 3 4 5 
c) technical level 1 2 3 4 5 
d) quality 1 2 3 4 5 
e) design 1 2 3 4 5 
f) customization 1 2 3 4 5 
not at all 
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3.5. How has the production process of your firm changed since 1992: 
much more more no change more much more labour labour capital capital intensive intensive intensive intensive 
1 2 34 5 
3.6. To what extent has your firm adopted new production technology 
since 1992? 
to a 
not at marked 
completely new technology 
all extent 
in the industry 12345 
new technology for this firm 12345 
improved existing technology 12345 
3.7. In general, to what extent has this firm adopted the following technol- 
ogies: 
to a 
not at marked 
Construction: all extent 
- data assisted construction 
(DAC) 12345 
Production: 
- numerically controlled 
machine tools (CNC, NC) 
- robots or manipulators 
Production control (steering): 
- DAC/DAP systems 
- material production control 
(MPC) 
- logistic control 
Quality control: 
- random tests 
- quality system 
- certification of staff 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Management IT systems 
- accounting and budget 
control systems 
- data network to customers 
or subcontractors 
- financial information and money 
transactions connections 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
3.8. In general, to what extent has your firm automated production with 
the use of data assisted production systems (equipment or technology)? 
not at all or 
very little significantly 
112345 
3.9. How important are the following issues currently in development of 
your firm (R&D)? 
not very 
important important 
a) development of own 
process technology 12345 
b) adoption of new process 
technologies 12345 
c) development of new 
products 12345 
d) improvement of 
existing products 12345 
4. Subcontracting relations 
[In this Section our aim is clarify both upstream and downstream subcontracting 
relations of yourfirm by dividing these into local (inside this labour market 
district) and non-local ones. ] 





How large was roughly the proportion of subcontracts a) from this region b) from elsewhere of the total turnover of your firm in 1995? 
a) local region, about 









Approximately what was the proportion of these contractions a) for firms 
in this region b) for firms elsewhere, of the total turnover of your firm in 
1995? 
a) local region, about 




[Good, next we deal with the cooperative relations of yourfirm to otherfirms, 
people or institutions in more general] 
5. Cooperative relations 
5.1. How many active cooperative networks is your firm currently involved 
in? 
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5.2.1 would like to ask you to think of the most important of these cooper- 
ative networks. How many partners are there in this network and where is 
the most important partner located? 
Number Location of the most important partner: 
of local capital elsewhere abroad 




5.3. Which ones of the following business services has your firm used 







elsewhere f rom 
both 
a) information technology 
services, consultancy 0 








f) export consultancy 0 
g) technical expertise 0 
h) juridical consultancy 0 
i) personnel training 0 
j) private financial services 0 
k) public enterprise 
services 0 











1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
[Very good, the next set of questions deals with the possible exporting activities 
of yourfirm. The first thing to find out is whether yourfirm ever 




*6-1. Did your firm have export deliveries in 1995, or earlier? 
1 yes (1995), without a pause from the start of the exporting in 
2 yes (1995), started initially in but there was a pause 
in exporting from 
- 
till 
3 not in 1995, but we have started this year (1996) 
4 not in 1995, but we had earlier, from till 
[questions 6.3., 6.6. and 6.7. and then go to Section 7] 
5 no, never [go to question 8.13. and then to Section 11] 
6.2. Is this exporting established (regular) in the sense that you have 
established your position in markets of least one foreign country? 
1 yes 
2 no 
*6.3. What was the share of exports of the total turnover of your firm in 
1992-1995? What do you reckon it will be in 1997? 
year exports, per cent 







*6.4. In total, how many countries did you export to in 1995? 
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*6.5. What were the five most important export countries and their ap- 
proximate shares of the total exports in 1995? 
exports to this country/total 






*6.6. What is the main product exported? 
(SIC-4: 
6.7. How would you summarize your firm's expectations from exporting? 
Where do you think your firm will be located on the following scale in the 
future. say. in 5 years: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Exports will Exports Exports will Export will 
? 
xports 
be just a will be be equal be slightly will 
supplement substantial in importance more be the 
to home- but not as to home- important main 
markets, important market than source of 





7. The first export delivery 
[As we know, finns start and develop their exporting activities in very different 
ways and paces. In this sectiony I will ask questions about the veryfirst export deliveries of yourfirm and about the stimulifor exporting. In the section after 
this the possible later export activity will be clarified. ] 
7.1. How did you come to Lhink of the possibility of exporting? What was the most important stimulus? 
1 got an unsolicited order from abroad 
2 observed other firms exporting the similar products 
3 own import operations 
4 the idea came from another domestic enterprise 
5 the idea came through a personal contact 
6 the idea came from a bank or a middleman 
7 the idea came from public export stimulation 
programme 
8 excess capacity 
9 domestic recession 
10 intensified local or domestic competition 
11 growth objective of the firm 
12 taking advantage on potential economies of scale 
13 other stimulus, what? 
If there were several stimuli, what were the second and third important 
ones? 
1. 
7.2. When did you get this stimulus for exporting? How long before the 
very first export delivery? 
year: (years, 
months) before the first 
delivery 






8. Exporting after the first delivery 
*8.1. If you have had export deliveries to more than one country, could 
you please name these countries (up to 5 first) in th ý order of Starting 
export ? (You may not export to these countries any more). 
_country 
exporting started (year) 





8.2. How well do the following characterizations describe the change in 
your exporting activities from the beginning? 
- We still export our not at very 
products directly to end- all well 
users abroad 12345 
- We still use wholesalers, agents or 
partners abroad to organize exporting 12345 
- We have invested in sales or 
production subsidiaries abroad 12345 
- We nowadays use different export strategies 
in different export markets 12345 
*8-3. Next we need to define the moment when the proportion of 
exports of the total turnover reached for the first time 10 per cent to 
stay at this level for at least two consecutive years? Lets call this 
moment (year) "establishment" of exporting. 
*8.3.1. Has the share of exports of the total turnover in your firm 
ever been 10 % or more? 
1 yes, when for the first time? 2 no 
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*8.3.2. If yes, was it at that level in the following year also? 
1 yes, the year of establishment of exporting according to this definition is thus [the latter year] 2 no 
*8.3.3. If no, has the proportion of exports of the total turnover ever 
reached 10 per cent to stay at this level for at least two consecutive 
years? 1 yes 2 no 
If yes, when? 
- the year of establishment of exporting thus [the 
second year] 
*8.4. How many workers did you approximately have at the time of the 
export "establishment"? 
*8.5. How many countries did you export at that time to? 
*8.6. Do you think that your firm was at that time (when exporting was 
"established", ie. in among other domestic producers of your 




4 fairly large 
5 large 
*8.7. What do you reckon, were you one of the first or last to "establish" 
exporting among the other domestic producers of your main export 
product? 
1 we were the very first to "establish" exporting (to export more 
than 10 % of the turnover) 
2 we were among the first, not the very first one 
3 about half of the firms may have "established" exporters al- 
ready 
4 clearly, more than half of the firms were "established" exporters 
already 
5 almost all the other firms in the industry were "established" 
exporters 
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[8.8. - 8.17. more generally on the development of exporting] 
8.8. How well do the following characterizations describe the develop- 
ment of your exporting activities? 
a) We learned from your own 
experiments and mistakes in exporting 
especially in the beginning 
b) We were surprised to find certain 
things about the exported product(s) or 
the production process after we started 
exporting 
c) We acquired new workers or 
white collar staff for exporting 
activities 





d) We used external market research to acquire 
foreign market information 12345 
e) We found public export assistance or 
information services very helpful in 
developing our export activity 12345 
f) People or firms we have been in contact 
to through export business have helped us with 
product design, process development and otherwise 
to improve our export performance 1234 
g) We strived to develop exporting because 
we expected it to be clearly profitable 2345 
i) We needed "experimental" knowledge 
(knowledge gainable only through own operations 
and experiences in exporting) to 
develop exporting 12345 
8.9. Does your firm have other foreign market activities apart from direct 
exporting of goods, such as: 
yes no 
indirect exporting (through a local agent) 2 
exporting of services or know-how 2 
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- licensing, franchising, contract manufacturing, 
international subcontracting 
- importing 
- production, assembly, sales (promotion) subsidiaries, 
warehousing units or service units overseas? 





8.10. What type of resources or information you mainly acquired from 
other firms, public institutions and by buying from markets to develop 
exporting? 
8.11. Do the following issues form thresholds for your firm's exporting 
today? 
Production: yes no 
a) insufficient production capacity 2 
b) shortages in production process 2 
c) lack of competent personnel 2 
d) differing standards (DIN, ISO etc. ) 2 
e) differing safety or quality regulations 2 
f) difficulties with speed of deliveries 2 
g) uneven product quality 2 
h) difficulties in meeting the "just on time" 
principle of customers 2 
i) other, please specify: 
Marketing: 
a) difficulties in technical testing of products 1 2 
b) credit rating of customers 1 2 
c) lack of experience in foreign currencies 1 2 
d) difficulties in finding 
the right distribution channels 2 
e) difficulties in finding customers 2 
f) difficulties in finding decision-makers 
and relations to them 2 
g) difficulties in finding situations for 
displaying and marketing of products 2 
h) juridical and other problems with contracts 2 
i) language problems 2 
j) other, please specify: 
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8.12. Which of the following form the most important obstacles to exports to the (other) European Union countries? 
1 languages 
2 cultural differences 
3 lack of competence in exporting in general 
4 limited resources 
5 high domestic cost and price level 
6 home country image 
7 currency risks 
8 physical barriers to trade (e. g., duty 
regulations and passage through 
9 technical barriers to trade 
(e. g., legislation and standards) 
10 fiscal barriers, VAT 
11 other, please specify 
1., 
[Skip 8.13. if the firm is an exporting firm] 
8.13.1. If your firm has no exporting, please indicate the most important 
reasons for this: 
not very 
important imp ortant 
a) difficulties in financing the exporting 1 2 3 4 5 
b) scarce staff resources 1 2 3 4 5 
c) high domestic level of costs and prices 1 2 3 4 5 
d) high transportation costs 1 2 3 IP 5 
e) sufficient demand in the domestic markets 1 2 3 4 5 
f) lack of suitable products 1 2 3 4 5 
g) language difficulties 1 2 3 4 5 
h) cultural differences 1 2 3 4 5 
i) distance from the markets 1 2 3 4 5 
j) other, please specify 1 2 3 4 5 
8.13.2. Are you planning to try or start exporting in the near future? 
1 yes 2 no 
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*8.14. Have you discussed with government officials (in export 
programmes) on the problems you have faced in your export operations, 
or got financial support for developing exporting? How have you benefited 
from these? 
*8.15. How these programmes could be improved? 
[Good. Then we have a few questions that are related to the costs of exporting] 
9. Costs of exporting 
[Forfir-ms with export experience. By initial costs of exporting here is meant here 
outlays which a firm is involving in to develop exporting. Such costs rise, for 
example, from acquiring resources and knowledge for the export business]. 
9.1. What type of initial costs did your firm involve in to establish its 
exporting? 
a) employment of new staff devoted to exports 
b) investments to technology or 
capacity of production 
c) product development 
d) market research 
e) export market promotion based at home 
country (promotion and advertising abroad) 
f) direct investments abroad in production, 
sales or promotion offices or subsidiaries 
g) travelling 
h) other, please specify 
not very 
important important 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
9.2. How would you assess the overall importance and riskiness of these 
investments? 
they were they were 
not large substantial 
1 
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they have beared they have involved 
no risk quite risky 
12345 
9.3. Could your firm have benefited from these investments in the domes- 
tic markets if you had not continued exporting? 
no, the investment could 
not have been utilized 
in the domestic business 
1 
the investments could have 
been fully utilized in the 
domestic business 
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[Excellent. Now we have only afew sections left. If thefirm is not one of those 
withdrawn temporarily orfor goodfrom exporting, go to section 11: "Competi- 
tive situation "I 
10. Withdrawing from exporting 
[There are a variety of reasons whyfirms may quit exporting, temporarily or 
permanently. Next we would like to ask more about the specific conditions where 
yourfirm stopped exporting; I learned [from 6.1.1 that you quitted or paused 
exporting in 7 
10.1. Which one of the following is closest to your firm's exporting activity 
before the withdrawal from exporting: 
1 we were responding to unsolicited orders from abroad, but 
were not really interested in committing itself in exporting, 
2 we were actively exploring possibilities for regular exporting, 
but found that it was not profitable or feasible for other reason 
we were already exporting regularly to a country, or to several 
countries 
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10.2. To what extent did the following issues influence your firm's with- drawal from exporting? 
not 
important 
a) difficulties in finding right export channels 12 
b) increased demand in the domestic markets 12 
c) difficulties in financing the export 12 
d) difficulties in adapting the product 
for the export markets (design, packaging, 
legal/technical specifications etc. ) 
e) concentration of exports 
to an old declining product 
f) high domestic level of costs or prices 
g) language or cultural barriers 
h) loss of a key person 
i) legal/technical regulations (tariffs, quotas, 
non-tariff barriers, red tape etc. ) 
j) less intense competition 
in the domestic markets 
k) increase in competition in the export market s1 
or otherwise competitors' actions 
1) high risks related to export marketing 
m) difficulties in finding customers abroad 1 
n) high transportation costs 
o) political instability in the export market 
p) economical instability in the export market 1 







2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
10.3. Could you tell me more about the withdrawing and the reasons for 
it? [For example, if the competitors did matter, what were the competitors' 
actions] 
10.4. How large was the proportion of exports of the total turnover of the 
firm at its largest before the withdrawal? 
approximately % 
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10.5-1. In case the exchange rate had been 20 per cent higher (i. e., Finland's Markka would have been devaluated by 20 %) in the time of the withdrawal, would you have stayed in the exporting markets or withdrawn from exporting? 
1 we would have stopped anyway 
2 we would have continued exporting 
10.5.2. How about the situation with a 10 per cent devaluation? 
1 we would have stopped anyway 
2 we would have continued exporting 




10.7. What was the cause for these losses? 
10.8. If the withdrawing was preceded by a period at a loss, how long was 
this period? [If export orders occasional in nature, ask the number of deliveries 
over the experimenting period, and how long was this period? ] 
1 not at all (exporting was profitable till the end) 
2 from 1 to 3 months 
3 from 4 to 6 months 
4 from 7 to 12 months 
5 more than a year 
[Very good. Now we have only a couple of sections left (only about 20 question); 
important and interesting set of questions: they concern competition. If needed, 
emphasize thefull confidentiality of this research, and thefact that the inter- 
viewee could be of an irreplaceable help by answering these questions] 
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11. Competitive situation 




how many main competitors do you have? 
how many minor competitors do you have? 
If no, 
- how many competitors do you have in total? 
11.1.2. Is your main competitor: 
1a domestic firm 2a foreign firm 
11.1.3. Do you meet your hardest competitor: 
1 in the export markets 
2 in the domestic markets 
3 both in the exporting and domestic markets 
11.1.4. Is your main competitor smaller or larger than your firm? 
1 smaller 
2 about the same size 
3 larger 
11.2. How many producers of the main product are there in the local and 
in the country in total in addition to you? 
in the local area (labour market district) 
in Finland 
11.3. Approximately what is your share of the markets for the main 
product in Finland, and what is this piece of information based on? 
1 personal estimate or analysis by this firm 
2 market research for this firm 
3 industry organization, magazine etc. 
4 other, what? 
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11.4. How would you describe the change in competition during the last 
three years (since 1992) in the markets for the main product? 
1 competition has increased substantially 
2 competition has increased 
3 no change 
4 competition has rather decreased 
5 competition has clearly decreased 
11.5. What has caused the possible change in competition? Name the 
three most important reasons? 
1 introduction of new products 
2 decrease in demand 
3 competition from the low-cost countries 
4 exchange rate changes 
5 introduction of new production technology 
6 exclusion of barriers to trade 
7 new domestic competitors 
8 new foreign competitors 
9 fewer domestic competitors (production in Finland) 
10 fewer foreign competitors (production abroad) 
11 restructuring of the industry through mergers or acquisitions 
12 other, please specify 
1 
-, lp 
11.6. How would you describe the current business conditions in the 











11.7. If all your main competitors CUT their akes, say, by 5 %, and you did not change your price, how do you reckon it would affect your sales of the main product? The sales would most likely: 
1 fall more than 5% 
2 fall by approximately 5% 
3 fall, but less than 5% 
4 not fall at all 
11.8. If your main competitors INCREASED their prices by 5 %, and you 
did not change your price, how do you reckon it would affect your sales of 
the main product? The sales would most likely: 
1 increase more than 5% 
2 increase by approximately 5% 
3 increase, but less than 5% 
4 not increase at all 
11.9. Do you reckon you would reduce your price if your main competitors 
really CUT their price by 5%? 
1 no 
2 yes, but less than 5% 
3 yes, by 5% 
4 yes, more than 5% 
11.10. Would you raise your price if your main competitors RAISED their 
prices by 5%? 
1 no 
2 yes, but less than 5% 
3 yes, by 5% 
4 yes, more than 5% 
11.11. Did the EEA and/or EU membership change the operating environ- 
ment of this firm? 
yes 
no significantly 
a) through increasing competition in export 12345 
b) by providing new exporting possibilities 12345 
c) through increasing foreign competition 
in the domestic markets 12345 
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d) through emphasizing product adaptation 12345 
e) through changes in subcontracting systems 12345 
f) other, please specify 
1 
11.12. Have the EEA/EU memberships implied increasing import competi- tion in the domestic markets for your main product? 
1 no 
2 in a smaller degree 
3 significantly 
11.13. Have the EEA/EU memberships lead to foreign direct investments 
into Finland into production of the main product of this firm? 
1 no - 
2 yes: increase in new subsidiaries or establishments in Finland 
3 yes: increase in number of takeovers or mergers of Finnish firms 
4 yes: increase in smaller investments in Finnish firms 
12. Competitive forces and firms' planning attitudes 
[This is the last set of questions]. 
INDUSTRY (the markets for your main product): 
12.1. Is it important or general that competitors differentiate their products 









12.3. Sometimes there are advantages called "economies of scope" 
possible to achieve from producing or delivering different objects (prod- 
ucts, services etc. ) together rather than separately (by different firms). 
Do 
you consider that there are "economies of scope" related to your main 
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product, i. e., is it/would it be advantageous to produce or deliver some products or services together with Your main product? 
a) economies of scope no 
yes 
marked in production 2 345 
b) economies of scope 
in delivery or marketing 2 345 
12.4. What is the meaning of the following factors as barriers to market entry in the markets for your main product? 
not 
a) economies of scale (larger firms have important important 
cost advantages and can thus sell cheaper 
deterring by so means entry) 12345 
b) differentiation of products (customer loyalty 
or diversification to fill the product space) 12345 
c) substantial capital requirements 
(to start operations) 12345 
d) (sunk) shifting costs (market exit costly 
which makes this a market entry barrier) 12345 
e) limited access to distribution channels 12345 
f) threat of a punishment/retaliation 
by competitors (explicit or tacit) 12345 
g) dumping (price kept low as necessary to 
make potential entrants unable 
to cover their costs) 12345 
h) legal/technical impediments to market entry 12345 
i) other obstacle, what? 
12345 
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Planning attitude of this firm 
12.5. Do you aim at differentiating Your main product from the competing products? yes 
no strongly 
12345 
12.6. By what means you do this? [Physical features of the product, post- selling services, advertising, ... ?I 
12.7. How important are the following aims in the operations of your firm in the markets for the main product: 
not 
a) we challenge potential new important important 
competitors when they enter the 
markets by our good competitiveness 12345 
b) we defend our position in the markets by 
influencing the possibilities 
for new market entry 123 
12.8. Do you reckon you have so-called absolute cost advantages (e. g., 
special know-how related to the product or production which is difficult to 
imitate; limited access to inputs; out advantageous location; public 
support) 
1 yes, what 2 no 
12.9. Have the recent integration developments (the EEA/membership in 
the EU) or changes followed these in the operating environment had an 




*12.10. Which government measures would best benefit this firm? 
THANK YOU EVER SO MUCH. 
[Take thefolder. Remind about the possibility to contact any time. ] 
Time interview completed: 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire 1997: 1 
(An example of a customized interview agenda on product differentiation): 
Timo Lautanen 
Ph. D. Programme 
Department of Economics 
University of Warwick 
Coventry, U. K. 
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN SMALL MANUFACTURING FIRMS: SEMI- 
STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 1997 
- Brief the meaning of this particular part of the study & exchange the 
latest news 
- This interview: mostly free-form questions in addition to that numerical 
information asked by fax in beforehand. 
1. The firm and the manager; time, date & place of the interview 
FAX number of the firm: 
2. Turnover, number of employees, main products & shares of subcon- 
tracting and the transmission components of the turnover in 1996 (and for 
as many years during the last ten years as possible; financial perfor- 
mance over the last ten years (net prof it/tu mover); cf. the fax sent in 
beforehand) 
3. Product strategy and differentiation etc. 
- How do you define the markets where the firm operates in? 
- The product strategy of the firm? Changes in this and when? 
- One can argue that only rarely diversification as a response to increased 
competition is beneficial. Why did you choose diversification? What level 
of expertise did you have on specialized subcontracting when you de- 
cided to change the product strategy? 
- How in practice the product (components) has been changed over the 
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years? Why? What do you mean by supplementary services discussed last year? Do these relate both to components and subcontracting? 
- How do you define quality of components? 
- Do you advertise to promote your product over those of rivals or to increase demand for components/special subcontracting in general? When did this start? 
- What type of information do you as a background information in differen- 
tiation? (Customer feedback, own R&D, market research ... ) 
- What are the main challenges for the product strategy over the next few 
years? [to conclude where the firm may have failed in the past in this 
respect] 
- In the markets for a) components b) specialized subcontracting is the 
dominant form of competition by price, quality, sales, market share, 
advertising of some other (what) form? 
- Pricing policy? Describe changes in this over the years? 
- How many competitors do you have in the markets for components? 
Has this number changed over the last few years? Are there any other 
differences in the products (transmission components) between the most 
important competitors (cheap imports) than quality and price? 
- Do customers care about quality of components? Is it impossible to 
produce low quality with lower costs? [Why do you stick to high quality 
and high price? An example is provided by M. Porter: high qualitprnan- 
agement can be efficient and an excellent competitive advantage in 
relation to normal low-quality producers; how do you see the Chinese 
producers of transmission components in this respect? ] 
- Why not trying to lower labour costs by shifting production to Russia or 
Estonia only at a stone's throw away? What kind of difference would this 
make? 
- What was the reason for the bankruptcy? (Competitors reactions? 
Decrease in demand due to the slump? Did you have foreign debt? ) 
- What factors have influence the profitability over the last ten years? 
- Agglomeration economies: a) Locational advantages form clustering, 
infrastructure (no? ), b) standardization (yes? ), c) Informational extemali- 
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ties, following competitors design (? ), d) reduction in customer search 
costs (no? ) 
- Would relocation in the product space, i. e., changing the product's 
characteristics be costly? Give examples of costs of developing or chang- 
ing the product? 
- Have your competitors changed their products of production processes 
as you have changed yours? 
- Why did the meaning of export clearly decrease in the late 1980s? 
- Any changes in technical regulations concerning components due to the 
integration agreements between Finland and the EU/EEC? New competi- 
tors? 
Ask for an annual report, brochures, and permission to publish an anony- 
mous case study report based on the interviews and other material. 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire 1997: 2 
Timo Lautanen 
Ph. D. Programme 
Department of Economics 
University of Warwick 
Coventry, U. K. 
EXPORT MARKET EXIT: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 1997 
- Brief the meaning of this particular part of the study & exchange the 
latest news, 
- This interview: 7 sections; questions asked as applicable, emphasis on 
sections 4-6 (exiting and reentering export markets) 
0. The firm and the manager; time, date & place of the interview 
FAX number of the firm: 
1. Basic information on the firms in 1996 (as in the previous interviews; 
asked in beforehand by fax; check these in the interview situation): 
- The main products: 
- Number of employees: 
- Turnover, billion FIM: 
- Net result % of turnover: 
- Share of exports of turnover: 
- Total number & names of 5 most 
important exporting countries (if exporting): 
2. Marketing & competition (current situation; in case the firm has not 
exports currently, ask about the situation at the time the firm had exports) 




- Have you used market research of any kind, and if you have, for what 
reason? (potential motives: a) how price changes influence customers, b) how interested are customers on your products, c) to find out the reaction 
of competitors, d) to get an idea of future developments in the market e) 
other? ) 
- Market research home markets/export markets? 
- Do you advertise; if yes, how? Home markets/export markets? 
- Which of the following is closest to the main aim of your advertis- 
ing/marketing? (a) making your product known in general to potential 
customers, b) to make clear the difference between yours and competing 
products, c) to make clear similarities between yours and competitors' 
products) Any difference between home markets/ export markets? 
- Do you ever sell at "different prices goods which cost the same" (at 
different mark-ups)? if yes: in different marketing areas, in home and 
foreign markets, for different customers, for large and small traders, 
other? ) 
3. REVIEW BRIEFLY the earlier info on the export history of the firm with 
the manager: 
- Initial stimuli and reasons for exporting? 
- Level of pre-export preparation and activity in export marketing? 
- Export history of the firm (start, countries, share of exports of the turn- 
over ... ) 
- What kind of uncertainty do you see was related to the 
decision to 
export? (E. g., learning, other firm-specific factors, exchange rate, demand 
etc .... ?) How do you see 
this influenced on your decision to start to 
export? 
- Did the firm expand as a consequence of 
the exporting? (Cf. The 
numbers asked by fax in beforehand concerning the size of the 
firm 
before and after the exit year) 
4. Withdrawing from export markets: 
- When? (unless already known) 
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- Basic info on the firm at that time (as above, unless already known; 
asked by a fax in beforehand) 
- Why? (compare with the reasons given in 1996; ask more if necessary) 
- What was the factor that "triggered" the cessation of exporting? A threshold value? (explain if required) 
- How and what type of negative feedback did you get from exporting? 
- What kind of uncertainty do you see was related to the decision to 
withdraw from export markets? (learning, the exchange rate, demand 
abroad, etc .... ?) 
- Did the firm replace export markets as a source of business somehow, 
and if did, how? 
- Changes in the firm (organization, size, products, marketing ... ) for exiting the export markets? (Cf. For the number given in the fax) 
- Did you take any of the following actions when the problems in export 
markets started? ( a) tried another product, b) reduced overtime working 
or introduced short-time working, c) increased sales efforts in export 
markets, d) increased sales efforts in home markets, e) cut prices, f) 
increased quality, g) other? ) 
- Do you think some form of export promotion or support could have 
made you to stay at the exporting markets? What do you reckon would 
have been best form of support? 
5. Costs: 
- What type of costs did the exporting involve? 
- How large were these costs? (incremental costs above the costs of 
selling in Finland) 
- Were the incremental costs smaller or larger than the 
incremental 
income from exporting above the income from the domestic sales? (Le., 
in the end of the day, was the exporting project profitable, or did it cause 
losses? ) 
- In some, arguably common, circumstances 
it is optimal for firms to wait 
and absorb operational losses before ceasing the exports in total. 
Did 
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your firm run a loss in the export markets before the exports ended? For how long time (or how many deliveries)? How large was the loss of the 
value of the deliveries on average? 
6. Potential re-entry 
If not, 




- How would you characterize the uncertainty related to this new entry to 
exporting? Do you think you waited for more sure signals on the expected 
profitability of exporting than in the first time you tried exporting? (longer 
time before the entry? ) 
- Why was entry successful at this time (if it was)? [to check against 
information on why was it not at the earlier time] 
- Other similarities/differences between the two entries? 
- Basic info on the firm at the time of possible re-entry (as above; asked 
by fax in beforehand) 
- Any changes in the firm because of the exporting this time 
(as above) 
7. A possible second withdrawal from exporting 
- When? 
- Why? 
- Any similarities/differences between the two exits? 
Other new material on the firm? (product brochures, newspaper articles 
etc.? ) 
* Permission to publish an anonymous case study report based on the 
interviews. 
